To download as PDF click here - US Army Center Of Military History

More documents

Recommendations

Info

corners, and spray the lateral hedgerow ahead to cover the infantry scouts advancing (in this case) along the axial hedges. These scouts would also be covered by BAR men. Two of the four demolitions men followed behind, and the engineers and the leader of the infantry squad would choose the best place for the tank to go through the next barrier. Special EE-8 phones were installed on the rear of the tanks and connected with the tank's interphone system for tank-infantry communication during action. Two engineers would stay with the vehicle to protect it during advance, scanning and firing at side hedgerows to keep down enemy bazooka teams. In the area close to the line of departure, hedgerow embankments were carefully scooped out on the American side, leaving a shell which the tanks could push through on the day of attack. The terrain difficulties to be expected in the coming battle were essentially those normal to hedgerow fighting; Hill 192, as a "hill," presented no special problems other than the enemy's opportunity for observation from the higher ground. The slopes were gradual, rising about 150 feet in the 1,000 yards from the 38th Infantry's line of departure to the flattish top. A large diamondshaped woods lay on the southeast side, near the crest, and might be expected to figure prominently in the enemy's defensive plans. But the main advantages for the German defense lay in the ordinary dissection of the hill slopes and their approaches by an intricate pattern of hedgerowed fields and orchards. (For an example of this on the eastern slopes, see Map 11.) The enemy had not been neglecting his opportunity for organizing this terrain. As usual, he VlEW NORTH FROM HILL '92, over the ground which had to be covered by the American attack on II July. The picture is taken from a field 200 yards trom the crest. The 1St Battalion of the 38th Infantry came through this ground in the successful attack.
made no attempt to maintain a continuous defensive line, relying rather on a number of strongpoints that could support each other by interlocking fires on all gaps. Alternate positions and support positions were prepared to the rear, making possible an elastic defense and the organization of counterattacks. On Hill 192, as elsewhere, the hedgerow dikes made field fortifications easy. Often these embankments were thick enough to allow the Germans to dig in and then tunnel laterally, providing shelter and living quarters for several men underneath the hedge. Nearby fox holes could be dug along the hedgerow, stepped for firing positions. Sunken farm roads crisscrossed the hill, making movement of armor difficult; the only feasible way for our tanks to cross these obstacles-
Page 2 and 3:
ST-LO (7 July -19 July 1944) Americ
Page 5:
WAR DEPARTMENT Historical Division
Page 10 and 11:
THE JULY OFFENSIVE ST-LO, capital o
Page 12:
eluded the Viro River and aimed at
Page 15:
Near! y 15 miles wide at the start,
Page 18 and 19:
XIX CORPS ATTACKS WEST OF THE VIRE
Page 20 and 21: units and to close quickly with the
Page 22 and 23: ASSAULT CROSSING SITE on the Vire R
Page 26: ing into Normandy in mid-June, the
Page 34: 12th Paracl!t/te Regime1lt. Germall
Page 37 and 38: off, the 1St Battalion following at
Page 39: 3 0
Page 45: while the 3d Battalion was hit by a
Page 51 and 52: of the 3d Battalion were ambushed a
Page 53: 1(1 Oeser! MAPNO.8 @JORCn •
Page 57: yond the Mont-Castre hills, one of
Page 66: FIXING DHIOLITIONS to blow a gap th
Page 72: attack with two battalions in colum
Page 76: The 2d Platoon of Company A attempt
Page 80 and 81: Army to give it the 14/h Parachute
Page 85: Atter hard fighting, the 2d Battali
Page 89 and 90: On 13 July the claim was made that
Page 91 and 92: 35TH DIVISION, 12-14 JULY "'" MAP N
Page 93: pressed, they could retire easily t
Page 97: from the high ground across both st
Page 100 and 101: geant. In the 120th, the strength o
Page 102: supply problem. But the main ports
Page 107: mingled, and artillery fire was har
Page 110: to enemy movement or maneuver, Gene
Page 115: the battalion that night and return
Page 118 and 119: penetration. General Gerhardt did n
Page 120:
manding the 3d Battalion, was given
Page 123 and 124:
the regiment was finally ordered to
Page 126 and 127:
further was launched. The attack wa
Page 128 and 129:
have the honor to announce to the C
Page 130:
The I13th Cavalry Group, in corps r
Page 133 and 134:
clinging to the idea of mailltamtll
Page 135 and 136:
CONCLUSION A GENERAL OFFICER WRITES
Page 137 and 138:
of them could be withdrawn from the
Page 140 and 141:
., Hay.-du.PuifS L8$$01 I X FIRST X
Page 142:
-1 ....... --- Gr(lll/".$ (11'1' 38
show all

To download as PDF click here - US Army Center Of Military History

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?