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Army to give it the 14/h Parachute Regime1Jt (5th Parachute Division), from army reserve. But on 1 [ Jtlly, Sevwth Army had too mmly problems elsewhere to commit its only resaves, which in any evellt had not yet arrived. The 352d Divisioll, illc!tldillg IIlIder ils command the battle groups of the 266th and 353d Divisions, had respo11Sibility for the sector north of St-Lo. Here, defensive successes cOllld be ,'eported for II July. Bllt Seve1lth Army was aware, from a capttlred order, that the Americall main effort was being made along the St-U; Bayetlx highway, and had no illusions about the seriouslless of the threat from that quarter. GERMAN ANTITANK GUNS 0/ light caliber (47-mm) captured ill the battles of early July and lined up here lor ordnance inspection. 7'
XIX CORPS HAS SLOW GOING (12-14 JULY) WITH HILL '92 firmly in its grasp, the 2d Division had completed its limited mission in the drive for St-La. But for XIX Corps the attack of II July was just the start of a new phase, and all three of its divisions continued in heavy battle. The results for the next three days were meager in ground gained and high in losses. Rallying after the loss of a part of its fortified MLR, 3d Parachute Division offered a type of resistance that ended hopes for quick capture of St-L{'. West of the Vire, the remnants of Battle Group "Heintz" and the 30th Mobile Brigade were now stiffened by elements of Panzer Lehr, and were ready to continue the tenacious type of defense that had frustrated chances for breakthrough to St-Gilles. What our units were experiencing in this fight, and what they were learning, is effectively summarized by an officer who went through it all and wrote from the standpoint of the front-line combat man: There were just three ways that OUf infantry could get through the hedgerow country. They could walk down the road, which always makes the leading men feel practically naked (and they are) . They could at· tempt to get through gaps in the corners of the hedgerows and crawl up along the row leading forward or rush through in a group and spread out in the field beyond. This was not a popular method. In the first place often there were no gaps just when yon wanted one most, and in the second place the Germans knew about them before we did and were usually prepared with machine-gun and machine-pistol reception committees. The third method was to rush a skirmish line over a hedgerow and then across the field. This could have been a fair method if there had been no hedgerows. 72 Usually we could not get through the hedge withoot hacking a way through. This of course took time, and a German machine gun can fire a lot of rounds in a very short time. Sometimes the hedges themselves were not thick. But it still took time for the infantryman to climb up the bank and scramble over, during which time he was a luscious target, and when he got over the Germans knew exactly where he was. All in all it was very discouraging to the men who had to go first. The farther to the rear one got the easier it all seemed. Of course the Germans did not defend every hedgerow, but no one knew without stepping out into the spotlight which ones he did defend. It was difficult to gain fire superiority when it was most needed. In rhe first place machine guns were almost useless in the attack because about the only way they could be used was to fire from the hip. If you set them up before the advance started, they had no field of fire and could not shoot the enemy . If you carried them along until you met the enemy, still the only way to get them in position was to set them up on lap of a hedgerow bank. That was not good because the German was in the next bank and got you before you set the gun down. Anyway, it had to be laid on the bank, no tripod, just a gun barrel lying unevenly on its stomach. On the other hand the Germans could dig their guns into the banks in advance, camouflage them, and be all set to cover the roads, trails, and other bottlenecks our men had to use. The artillery was the major fire support weapon. But it suffered certain handicaps. In the first place it had to be adjusted from the front line by forward observers. These sometimes had difficulty knowing just where they were, and the trees frequently delayed adjustment because of the short vision. If you found the enemy in the next hedgerow he was frequently less than 100 yards from you, and that was too close for artillery fire, particularly since short rounds would probably burst in the trees over your men in your own hedgerow. If the enemy was two or
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ST-LO (7 July -19 July 1944) Americ
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WAR DEPARTMENT Historical Division
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THE JULY OFFENSIVE ST-LO, capital o
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eluded the Viro River and aimed at
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Near! y 15 miles wide at the start,
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XIX CORPS ATTACKS WEST OF THE VIRE
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units and to close quickly with the
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ASSAULT CROSSING SITE on the Vire R
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ing into Normandy in mid-June, the
Page 34: 12th Paracl!t/te Regime1lt. Germall
Page 37 and 38: off, the 1St Battalion following at
Page 39: 3 0
Page 45: while the 3d Battalion was hit by a
Page 51 and 52: of the 3d Battalion were ambushed a
Page 53: 1(1 Oeser! MAPNO.8 @JORCn •
Page 57: yond the Mont-Castre hills, one of
Page 66: FIXING DHIOLITIONS to blow a gap th
Page 70 and 71: corners, and spray the lateral hedg
Page 72: attack with two battalions in colum
Page 76: The 2d Platoon of Company A attempt
Page 85: Atter hard fighting, the 2d Battali
Page 89 and 90: On 13 July the claim was made that
Page 91 and 92: 35TH DIVISION, 12-14 JULY "'" MAP N
Page 93: pressed, they could retire easily t
Page 97: from the high ground across both st
Page 100 and 101: geant. In the 120th, the strength o
Page 102: supply problem. But the main ports
Page 107: mingled, and artillery fire was har
Page 110: to enemy movement or maneuver, Gene
Page 115: the battalion that night and return
Page 118 and 119: penetration. General Gerhardt did n
Page 120: manding the 3d Battalion, was given
Page 123 and 124: the regiment was finally ordered to
Page 126 and 127: further was launched. The attack wa
Page 128 and 129: have the honor to announce to the C
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The I13th Cavalry Group, in corps r
Page 133 and 134:
clinging to the idea of mailltamtll
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CONCLUSION A GENERAL OFFICER WRITES
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of them could be withdrawn from the
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., Hay.-du.PuifS L8$$01 I X FIRST X
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-1 ....... --- Gr(lll/".$ (11'1' 38
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