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discovered that its maneuver had not gone far
enough to envelop the enemy positions, particularly
the reserve line, dug in along another eastwest
lane. Several times Compan y G almost
reached this lane, only to be forced back by heavy
fire from the front and left flank. The battalion
commander tried a wider envelopment by sending
Company F west of E and then south, but this
effort netted only one field. On the other side of
the nose, the 320 Infantry was making even less
headway on 14 July.
The problem of cracking this German strongpoint
was never really solved; success on other
parts of the front settled the issue during the next
few days. On 14 July, in accordance with XIX
Corps' order to make tbe main effort near the
river, the I37th Infantry had put all three battalions
into line. The 1st Battalion took over the
center, with the 3d on its right, each supported
by a platoon of medium tanks, a platoon of tank
destroyers, and Division Artillery. Attacking at
0800, they encountered thick mine fields and
88-mm fire, as well as zones covered by enemy
machine guns. The right wing of the I37th Infantry
nevertheless kept its advance rolling. The
TD's, operating as assault guns, placed heavy fire
on the hedgerows just in front of the infantry,
knocking out 19 machine-gun emplacements and
4 mortar positions, and shaking enemy resistance.
Late in the day, the 3d and 1st Battalions broke
loose in a rapid advance that reached the Pont­
Hebert-St-L{\ highway. The regiment had suffered
125 casualties during the day's fighting, and
lost II medium tanks. Fifty-three prisoners were
taken.
This progress, and gains made the next day
southeast of Ie Carillon (p. 102), were to undermine
the enemy resistance on the center of the
35th Division's front. Though well organized
and ably defended, the security of the German
strongpoint near Ie Carillon depended on flank
protection. This was compromised by breakthroughs
both to left and right, leaving the Germans
in a pronounced salient which would
eventually be untenable.
86
In still another way, the day's gain along the
right bank of the Vire had more than local importance.
The 35th Division had now come far
enough along the edge of the river to threaten the
flank of enemy resistance at the Pont-Hebert
crossing, and to assist effectively the 30th Division
in its battle across the river.
Seventh Army noted, with satisfaction, defmsive
successes on the front of the 352d Division
and its attached combat groups during 12-13Iuly.
Army's only concern here was due to an embarrassing
repeat order, comi1lg down from Hitler,
that the 352d Division be withdrawn from
the battle zone and sent to rest and refit. Hitler
had made the same demand before, starting in
lune, bitt Seventh Army had never found it practicable
to withdraw the battered unit, eVe/l though
concurrillg ill the lleed for its relief. Now, such
a move was more tl1an ever impossible, since
II Parachute Corps had 110 reserve i'l hand.
On 141uly the 352d lines finally gave, near the
Vire, and the American penetration was only
sealed of} by employi1lg the "last available forces."
That evening Field Marshal Rommel visited the
CP of the II Parachute Corps. The comma1lding
ge1lerai of that unit i1lformed Rommel that, combat
strength havi1lg bee1l so seriously dimi1lished
through the total lack of replaceme1lts, the demand
of the higher command to hold tile present
MLR at all costs could "hardly be guaranteed."
The Salient 'West of the Vire
OOth Division)
The 30th Division, in its hard day of fighting
on II July, had not only beaten off one wing of
Panzer Lehr's desperate counterattack, but had
also won a footllOld on the highest ground of
the north-south ridge between the Taute and
Terrette Rivers. But it was still nearly four miles
from its ultimate objective area, and attack would
henceforth be canalized in a corridor of limited
width giving little room for maneuver. Further
advance along the ridgeline would be exposed at
all times to observed artillery and mortar fires