the 117th reported to Division that its right wing (3d Batt3lion) w<strong>as</strong> being attacked by enemy forces employing self-propelled guns; at the same moment the 120th got a message from the 743d Tank Battalion <strong>as</strong>king if the 2d Battalion of the 120th had pulled out and reporting a loss of three-fifths of the 743d tanks. At 15IO the 30th Division heard that German tanks were pressing the 2d Battalion, 120th, followed by enemy infantry. The general gist of these scraps of information pointed to trouble in the area between the 3d Battalion, II7th and the 2d Battalion, 120th. And this seems, in effect, to have been the zone of the German's main effort in a localized counterattack that employed tanks. The 743d Tank Battalion, on the right of the I2oth, w<strong>as</strong> badly cut up in the first brush with enemy armor. Company B of the 743d w<strong>as</strong> inveigled by two Mark lV's, which were used <strong>as</strong> decoys, into advancing down a minor farm road toward a fork. When the B tanks were within 200 yards, German armor struck, flanking the American force and racing down the roads from the fork with sirens screaming. The American tanks found themselves immeuiately involved with German tanks and supporting infantry. The enemy troops attacked boldly and with <strong>as</strong>surance; in a matter of 15 minutes (by 1509) Company B w<strong>as</strong> shot up and forced to abandon its vehicles. In the next half hour the attack swept p<strong>as</strong>t both flanks of the 2d ' Battalion, [20th, which found itself apparently cut off to the rear. The battalion commander w<strong>as</strong> wounded. Some elements broke under the pressure, and the 2d battalion w<strong>as</strong> pushed back some 400 yards. German troops also began to appear in the [st Battalion's area, and enemy artillery put in the heaviest fire experienced by the I20th since the stJrt of the offensive. An estimated four battalions were shelling the 120th's sectof, and service company trains were experiencing great difficulty in reaching the forward elements. Some officers who went through this battle regarded the next two hours <strong>as</strong> the most trying period experienced by the 120th Infantry in any part of the campaign in France (including Mortain); their impression w<strong>as</strong> that the Germans <strong>here</strong> came nearest to a breakthrough of the 30th's lines. But this w<strong>as</strong> a local impression, and t<strong>here</strong> w<strong>as</strong> no real chance of a breakthrough. Most of the 2d Battalion w<strong>as</strong> well in hand; they tightened up their position, established a perimeter defense, and held on. The 1st Battalion moved up to a supporting position, and the 743d Tank Battalion stayed in the field with its remaining armor. American artillery, working under peculiar difficulties, w<strong>as</strong> called on for strong support and gave it. The 30th Division Artillery w<strong>as</strong> in the midst of displacing its headquarters when the attack started; consequently, it had to operate between 1400 and 1500 from the old CP, with only three telephones and one map. Altogether 18 battalions, including all of Division and Corps Artillery, were employed in firing against the enemy thrust, but no coordinated fire w<strong>as</strong> possible until the forward CP opened at about 1500. <strong>Of</strong>ficers at the old CP told the battalions to concentrate one round per minute for 30 minutes on various positions on or near the main highway to the south. The period for firing w<strong>as</strong> later extended to 60 minutes by General McLain, Division Artillery chief, in order to prevent any German reserves from joining the tanks which had already broken through. As a result of reports of German armor coming directly up the highway, a considerable part of these fires, between 1500 and 1630, were placed along that route and even ea.st of it. But shortly t<strong>here</strong>after Artillery got news that our own tanks were on the highway and more fires were shifted to the west. The general uncertainty <strong>as</strong> to position of our own and enemy forces ,,:<strong>as</strong> troublesome for the artillery; yet though some of their target are<strong>as</strong> were close to friendly units (particularly the armor of Combat Command B), t<strong>here</strong> were very few reports of trouble from short rounds. In fact, the artillery gets, and deserves, major credit for stopping the enemy effort. By 1830, the dangerous area west of the highway w<strong>as</strong> under control, with indications of enemy withdrawal. Unable to exploit the
3 0
- Page 2 and 3: ST-LO (7 July -19 July 1944) Americ
- Page 5: WAR DEPARTMENT Historical Division
- Page 10 and 11: THE JULY OFFENSIVE ST-LO, capital o
- Page 12: eluded the Viro River and aimed at
- Page 15: Near! y 15 miles wide at the start,
- Page 18 and 19: XIX CORPS ATTACKS WEST OF THE VIRE
- Page 20 and 21: units and to close quickly with the
- Page 22 and 23: ASSAULT CROSSING SITE on the Vire R
- Page 26: ing into Normandy in mid-June, the
- Page 34: 12th Paracl!t/te Regime1lt. Germall
- Page 37: off, the 1St Battalion following at
- Page 45: while the 3d Battalion was hit by a
- Page 51 and 52: of the 3d Battalion were ambushed a
- Page 53: 1(1 Oeser! MAPNO.8 @JORCn •
- Page 57: yond the Mont-Castre hills, one of
- Page 66: FIXING DHIOLITIONS to blow a gap th
- Page 70 and 71: corners, and spray the lateral hedg
- Page 72: attack with two battalions in colum
- Page 76: The 2d Platoon of Company A attempt
- Page 80 and 81: Army to give it the 14/h Parachute
- Page 85: Atter hard fighting, the 2d Battali
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On 13 July the claim was made that
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35TH DIVISION, 12-14 JULY "'" MAP N
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pressed, they could retire easily t
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from the high ground across both st
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geant. In the 120th, the strength o
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supply problem. But the main ports
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mingled, and artillery fire was har
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to enemy movement or maneuver, Gene
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the battalion that night and return
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penetration. General Gerhardt did n
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manding the 3d Battalion, was given
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the regiment was finally ordered to
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further was launched. The attack wa
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have the honor to announce to the C
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The I13th Cavalry Group, in corps r
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clinging to the idea of mailltamtll
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CONCLUSION A GENERAL OFFICER WRITES
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of them could be withdrawn from the
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., Hay.-du.PuifS L8$$01 I X FIRST X
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-1 ....... --- Gr(lll/".$ (11'1' 38