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Battle of the Hedgerows. From the opening of the offensive on 7 July through the 22d of that month, the 30th Division had 3,934 casualties; the 29th'S ran to 3,706; the 35th'S were 2>437. If the figures of the 2d Division for its two days' battle at Hill 192 are included, and those of the 3d Armored Division, the total comes to nearly Il,OOO killed, wounded, and missing. These losses were taken for gains of three to seven miles on the corps front. Nor do the mere figures tell the whole story. An officer who fought with the 30th Division comments on their losses as follows: The people who do the actual advancing to close with the enemy arc the riAe platoons, 81 of them (in a di· vision), each with a T / 0 strength of about 40 men. These are the men who do the scouting, the patcoling, the Halik protection, the front-line work. The battles progress no faster than they do. Now the aggregate strength of these 81 platoons is about 3,240 men. I hazard a guess that at least 75 percent of the total casualties were in the riAe platoons, or a total of about 2,950 (30th Division). This figure is 90 percent of the rifle platoon strength. Possibly the actual figure was less than this, but I do know that the great bulk of casualties was in the rifle platoons. In two weeks' time there must have been at least a 75 or 80 percent turnover in these platoons. This had two effects. First, during a day's combat the squads and platoons would lose some of their men. They consequently had fewer men for patrols, for fire support, and for guard at night. Second, in order to fill the ranks, the replacements were sent up to their squads without any satisfactory pre-battle orientation. The squads never had a chance to get really organized and worked into a reasonable team. Casualties among these raw recr uits were relatively high. From the viewpoint of these boys, things were really rather dismal, and had a natural tendency to discourage that dash and selfsacrificing spirit which one sees in the movies and the picture books. The cost of the offensive was more apparent to the soldiers of First Army than were the gains. The original objectives set by Army had not been attained except in the St-L8 area, where the distance to the objective was least. Nevertheless, the ground won was sufficient for General Bradley's 126 malll purpose. Whatever the hopes at the start, the Battle of the Hedgerows evolved into an effort to win jump-off positions for a great breakthrough effort: by 18 July, suitable positions had been won. VII and XIX Corps had fought \:laS[ the area of marshes and river where maneuver room was limited, and were firmly set in the higher, more favorable country near the St-U} Periers highway. Here, from the front won by the 9th and 30th Divisions, the opening blow could be launched. And the gains made east of the Vire by XIX Corps, while not used for a breakthrough base, would be of essential value to the main effort. On the one hand, the loss of St-L8 deprived the enemy of a main road center, weakened his chances to meet the forthcommg drive by maneuver from the east, and forced him to guard against a possible further attack up the right bank of the Vire; on the other hand, out capture of St-L8 and the high ground around it gave First Army solid protection on the left Hank of the planned zone of breakthrough. The fruits of the Battle of the Hedgerows were thus to be realized in Operation COBRA. Buildup, regrouping, and other preparations for that decisive offensive were well under way by the middle of the month, and the original target date was 18 July. Weather forced postponements and gave the enemy a breathing spell; the days from 18 to 22 July were marked by rains that were outstanding even in that wet month, turning the battle zone into a quagmire and postponing the jump-off. But on 25 July the armor, infantry, artillery, and air power assembled for COBRA began the attack that broke through to Marigny and St-Gilles, opening the way for the destruction of Seventh Army in tl,e Campaign of France. The Battle of the Hedgerows contributed to this success in other ways than by gain of important tactical ground. First Army's losses were heavy, but, relatively, the German Seventh Army had suffered much more. Many of its units, like the mixed battle groups composing the 352d Division, were exhausted to a point where they could no longer be counted on for sustained effort. None
of them could be withdrawn from the front. By keeping pressure on the whole line from the coast to Berigny, General Bradley had not only prevented the enemy from regrouping, but had worn down his last immediate reserves for use against a breakthrough. Enemy armor, especially, had been committed to the line in driblets and used up in the hedgerow battles. German strength on the whole Seventh Army sector was strained to the breaking point. No better evidence for this could be found than in the pages of Seventh Army's War Diary. Its commander was well aware that the American army could launch a blow in greater strength than the cermam had yet faced. He suspected that before 20 lilly plans for such an offensive were under way, and evell predicted that the likely sector was the area between Periers and St-La. He illdged (on 20 July) that the position of the German MLR was not favorable for defense, except on the Lessay sector. But, with all this, there was little that 55 General Houser could do to meet the expected crisis. His losses in the July battle, unlike the American losses, had nat been compensated by COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH ST·LO /V'T< opened only with difficulty through the wrecked streets. Here, 30 July. a typical convoy, rUTIning bumper to bumper, is going through in build-up of th e breakthrough, already pushed as far as Brittany. 12 7
Page 2 and 3:
ST-LO (7 July -19 July 1944) Americ
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WAR DEPARTMENT Historical Division
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THE JULY OFFENSIVE ST-LO, capital o
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eluded the Viro River and aimed at
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Near! y 15 miles wide at the start,
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XIX CORPS ATTACKS WEST OF THE VIRE
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units and to close quickly with the
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ASSAULT CROSSING SITE on the Vire R
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ing into Normandy in mid-June, the
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12th Paracl!t/te Regime1lt. Germall
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off, the 1St Battalion following at
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3 0
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while the 3d Battalion was hit by a
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of the 3d Battalion were ambushed a
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1(1 Oeser! MAPNO.8 @JORCn •
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yond the Mont-Castre hills, one of
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FIXING DHIOLITIONS to blow a gap th
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corners, and spray the lateral hedg
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attack with two battalions in colum
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The 2d Platoon of Company A attempt
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Army to give it the 14/h Parachute
Page 85: Atter hard fighting, the 2d Battali
Page 89 and 90: On 13 July the claim was made that
Page 91 and 92: 35TH DIVISION, 12-14 JULY "'" MAP N
Page 93: pressed, they could retire easily t
Page 97: from the high ground across both st
Page 100 and 101: geant. In the 120th, the strength o
Page 102: supply problem. But the main ports
Page 107: mingled, and artillery fire was har
Page 110: to enemy movement or maneuver, Gene
Page 115: the battalion that night and return
Page 118 and 119: penetration. General Gerhardt did n
Page 120: manding the 3d Battalion, was given
Page 123 and 124: the regiment was finally ordered to
Page 126 and 127: further was launched. The attack wa
Page 128 and 129: have the honor to announce to the C
Page 130: The I13th Cavalry Group, in corps r
Page 133 and 134: clinging to the idea of mailltamtll
Page 135: CONCLUSION A GENERAL OFFICER WRITES
Page 140 and 141: ., Hay.-du.PuifS L8$$01 I X FIRST X
Page 142: -1 ....... --- Gr(lll/".$ (11'1' 38
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