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12th Paracl!t/te Regime1lt. Germall plalls were
to assign the Pallzer Lehr Divisioll to the St-lea1lde-Daye
sector. Field Marshal Rommel (Army
Group Comma1lder) visited Seve1lth Army advanced
CP alld discussed plans for committil1g
this divisio1l .
More Coordination Troubles (9 July)
The ground won by XIX Corps in its first two
days of attack already gave more room for First
Army to employ its strength. Plans were now
under way to bring in the 9th Division (Maj. Gen.
Manton S. Eddy) on the right of the 30th, west
and southwest of St-Jean-de-Daye. The 9th, operating
under VII Corps, was going to "borrow some
dry ground" from the bridgehead won by XIX
Corps and fight southwest into the main VII
Corps' zone, along the axis of the Ie Desert-les
Champs-de-Losque highway. XIX Corps would
be repaid for its "loan" of ground by the greater
security given its right flank. During 9 July, General
Eddy's veteran unit was moving down from
the Cotentin to assembly areas just north of the
Vire-Taute Canal, which it reached by 1600.
Pending its arrival in the bridgehead, Combat
Command A of the 3d Armored, together with the
Il3th Cavalry Group, had the mission of holding
a defensive line beyond Goucherie as far south as
the highway to Ie Desert. (For the day's action,
see Map 5.)
With this greater assurance of protection for
their flank and rear, the 30th Division and the
attached armor of Combat Command B resumed
their attack to the south. It was the third day of
fighting and the third of intermittent rains; the
tired troops were wet and muddy from their leggings
to the top of their helmets.
The 9th of July was to go down in the 30th Division's
books as one of their worst days in France:
the troubles with respect to coordinating movement
reached a climax just as the division met its
first serious counterattack.
Field Order 4, issued at 0200, revised the pattern
for attack south toward the original objectives.
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The immediate objective was now set as the high
ground around Hauts-Vents, about 4,000 yards
from forward positions of the 30th Division. At
Hauts-Vents (Hill 91) there began a ridge, running
south between the Vire and Terrette Rivers,
which gave the Germans observation over a wide
stretch of country toward St-Jean-de-Daye. The
northern end of this ridge was the objective assigned
to Combat Command B fighting in the
division center, a zone that ran south-southwest.
On its right, the 120th Infantry was ordered to
attack in a zone west of the highway and flanked
by the Terrette River; its 3d Battalion would continue
to hold the nose of higher ground near Ie
Desert, and protect that flank wltil the arrival of
the 9th Division late in the day. East of the Pont­
Hebert highway, two battalions of the II9th were
to attack toward Pont-Hebert, while its 1st Battalion
continued to hold positions east of the Vire
until relieved by the 35th Division. The Il7th
Infantry was given a limited zone astride the
Pont-Hebert highway; after an advance of 1,000-
2,000 yards, its 3d and 1st Battal ions would be
pinched out. The 743d Tank Battalion supported
the 120th Infantry, while the 823d Tank Destroyer
Battalion was ordered to protect the vital crossroads
against any danger of counterattack from
the south along the Pont-Hebert high way.
Every unit commander was "counterattack-conscious,"
and became more so during the morning.
From Corps came further news of the enemy tanks
that had been reported earlier as being on the
move south of St-LB. General Corlett telephoned
General Hobbs during the morning that a lot of
tanks were moving across the corps front toward
the west bank of the Vireo They were going
around the big bend in the Vire near St-LB, and
were thus in an area which threatened the 30th
Division. Corps' information indicated a largescale
movement, with armor and motorized tJ nsport
observed over an area with a five-mile radius.
Aerial reconnaissance reported another 50 tanks
further south. General Corlett suggested that bazookas
and antitank guns be put well forward,
and Division and Corps Artillery were alerted for