SUDAN: Durable solutions elusive as southern IDPs return and ...

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IDPs from Darfur Following the attack by rebels of the Justice and Equality Movement on Omdurman in May 2008, IDPs from Darfur have been at risk of arbitrary arrest and detention, unlawful beatings, torture and ill-treatment in detention, dubious judicial proceedings, and extra-judicial executions (HRW, June 2008; IRIN, 26 May 2008 and 23 September 2008; Human Rights Council, 2 September 2008; Sudan Tribune, 12 May 2008, 14 May 2008, 22 May 2008, 24 May 2008, 12 September 2008). For more information see the section on Physical Security and Integrity in Khartoum and other Northern States. 124
DURABLE SOLUTIONS (RETURN, LOCAL INTEGRATION, SETTLEMENT ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY) Durable Solutions (by region) Southern Sudan The conflict between the government in Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) which started in 1983 displaced an estimated 4.5 million people: four million IDPs and half a million refugees. Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, relative stability returned to Southern Sudan for the first time in decades, and by the end of 2008 an estimated 2.24 million displaced Southern Sudanese had returned (UNMIS/RRR, 14 January 2009). It must be noted that not all people who are included in this category of returnees have in fact returned to their places of origin in Southern Sudan. In particular, refugees and IDPs whose places of displacement were outside Southern Sudan are counted as "returnees" upon their return to Southern Sudan, regardless of whether they return to their places of origin or settle elsewhere in Southern Sudan. The majority of these returnees in Southern Sudan are still struggling to find a truly durable solution to their plight. One measure of the difficulties faced by returnees is the fact that about 10 per cent of all IDP return movements so far (185,000 people) are estimated to be "failed returns", i.e. return movements which lead to secondary displacement because returnees do not manage to successfully establish themselves in the places of return (IOM, 24 October 2008, section 5, table 3). Another indication of the difficulties experienced by returnees in rebuilding their lives in Southern Sudan is the fact that in the majority (60 per cent) of return movements tracked by IOM and the South Sudan Relief and Rahabilitation Commission, women and children stay in their places of return alone, while the male head of household either returns to the place of displacement, or to a different location, for reasons of employment (IOM and SSRRC, January 2009, p.12). The return of displaced people in Southern Sudan poses a challenge to concepts and planning models that apply in other post-conflict situations. In other contexts, support for the return of displaced people is commonly framed in terms of assistance for the reintegration of formerly displaced people into their communities, which themselves are presumed to have remained intact. In Southern Sudan, the scale of displacement was such that “reintegration” does not adequately describe the processes whereby returnees begin to reconstruct their lives in their places of origin. Returnees, the duration of whose displacement is often measured not in years but in decades, in many cases must rebuild the very communities from which they were forced to flee, since so few people stayed behind. Even where throughout the war years some people remained in returnees' places of origin, it would be misleading to refer to them as “receiving communities” insofar as this is meant to signify an ability on the part of these “stayees” to provide support to the returnees. Indeed, even if people were not displaced, they have of course been severely affected by the deprivations caused by the war. These non-displaced people are in fact amongst those who received the least assistance 125
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SUDAN: Durable solutions elusive as
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CONTENTS CONTENTS 3 OVERVIEW 6 DURA
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LACK OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 114
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southern governments lack commitmen
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Dinka Ngok population and 23 per ce
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areas that researchers from the UK
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support the policy. The SSRC’s ro
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CAUSES, BACKGROUND AND PATTERNS OF
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south is given the option of choosi
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esources were among the factors tha
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Southern Sudan. Southern Sudanese w
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Tensions remain high in the area: t
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"In May 2006, the GoS and a faction
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"The expulsions will also have impl
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50,000 non-Arab communities before
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From the mid-1980s, the Congress’
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"In addition to the conflict in the
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Kassala n/a Red Sea n/a Total State
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Sudan plus Southern Kordofan and Ab
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See also the map "LRA Reported Atta
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New displacement in 2010 "Since Jan
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UNHCR December 2009 United Nations
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According to UNMIS, as of December
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It is noteworthy that according to
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following figures, which indicate t
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"A total of 1,161 villages were ass
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- The Lord Resistance Army (LRA) (S
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The following table shows the break
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ANLA 2009 34% 27% 19% Results of th
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households that are IDPs (15%) or a
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under five in the surveyed area wer
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Livelihoods South Sudan Annual Need
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Education The 2010 Work Plan for Su
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to Juba, preferring to be unemploye
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shortcoming is most evident in the
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Family Life, Participation, Access
Page 73 and 74: Recruitment and use of children by
Page 75 and 76: THE THREE AREAS Overview Humanitari
Page 77 and 78: Border demarcation Chatham House re
Page 79 and 80: 3) Even where school buildings are
Page 81 and 82: DARFUR Physical Security and Integr
Page 83 and 84: efforts to implement its mandate. W
Page 85 and 86: OCHA, Situation Report No. 4 (28 Ma
Page 87 and 88: By September 2009, 40 per cent of t
Page 89 and 90: found to be 15.6 percent (compared
Page 91 and 92: the Masalit and the Fur. The area a
Page 93 and 94: other Darfur Peace Agreement signat
Page 95 and 96: Urban migrants constitute an invisi
Page 97 and 98: in making choices about how to resp
Page 99 and 100: violence, alcohol abuse, involvemen
Page 101 and 102: number of constituencies allocated
Page 103 and 104: of sexual violence remain unreporte
Page 105 and 106: This is particularly important beca
Page 107 and 108: 26. Most children were killed or in
Page 109 and 110: There are also high maternal morbid
Page 111 and 112: KHARTOUM Physical Security and Inte
Page 113 and 114: Basic necessities of life Khartoum
Page 115 and 116: while existing services fell short
Page 117 and 118: The lack of livelihood opportunitie
Page 119 and 120: given for free, so there is much de
Page 121 and 122: The electoral law presented particu
Page 123: "There are still no official number
Page 127 and 128: Local integration (settlement in th
Page 129 and 130: Jidad, Western Darfur, where the in
Page 131 and 132: Since the signing of the Comprehens
Page 133 and 134: "The Sudanese government is failing
Page 135 and 136: As at 20 March 2010, 9,855 of the a
Page 137 and 138: The UN Secretary-General in his 29
Page 139 and 140: Amnesty International (AI), October
Page 141 and 142: Darfur Relief and Documentation Cen
Page 143 and 144: Internet : http://www.internaldispl
Page 145 and 146: Internet : http://www.iwpr.net/?p=a
Page 149 and 150: Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), 18
Page 151 and 152: Overseas Development Institute (ODI
Page 155 and 156: Internet : http://www.sudantribune.
Page 159 and 160: UN Office for the Coordination of H
Page 161 and 162: United Nations and partners, 18 Dec
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SUDAN: Durable solutions elusive as southern IDPs return and ...

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