SUDAN: Durable solutions elusive as southern IDPs return and ...

According to the Humanitarian Policy Group (26 March 2009, p.5):
"Many of the expelled agencies were also involved in food security and livelihood support
programmes, for both camp-based and rural populations. These programmes ranged from
vocational training, income generation and fuel-efficient stoves to agricultural and livestock
support, including agricultural inputs, training in improved practices and veterinary care. Whilst
small in scale compared to more mainstream humanitarian responses, such interventions are
important in protracted crises, both to support the diversification of livelihood strategies and to
utilise all possible means to meet basic needs."
Livelihoods and urbanisation in Darfur
Livelihood options are mostly found in Darfur’s towns and cities, which has resulted in a rapid
process of urbanisation in Darfur. For example, the Darfur Food Security and Livelihoods
Assessment 2008 found a significant improvement in food security in South Darfur (improvement
by 37 percent compared to 2007), which was explained in part by "A construction boom around
urban centres in South Darfur [which] has created employment opportunities for IDPs in
particular, as the larger camps tend to be situated close to urban areas in the State" (Government
of Sudan et al., 23 February 2009, pp.2-3).
In a December 2008 report on the needs of youths in Darfur, the Women’s Commission wrote:
"The conflict has severely disrupted livelihoods and livelihood coping strategies in Darfur. Many
IDPs lost financial assets, such as livestock; physical assets, such as farms and household
possessions; natural resources, such as fruit trees and water resources; human capital due to
deaths and attacks; and social capital, undermined by attacks on and displacement of groups,
villages and families. Trade networks and markets have also changed dramatically as a result of
the conflict. The supply chain is fractured: the displacement of producers and traders has
disrupted the supply and distribution of goods, insecurity has stopped or altered trade routes and
the closure and decline of markets—particularly smaller rural markets—have limited demand for
goods and services. Formal and informal taxation policies, for example, government taxation on
top of fees to rebel groups, have increased transportation costs dramatically. An estimated 20-30
percent of urban traders went bankrupt during the earliest days of the conflict and many more
have been squeezed out of business in subsequent years. The shrinkage of previous markets
and livelihood opportunities severely restricts the opportunities youth have to earn income—
irrespective of the training programs they participate in. Some traders, however, have stayed in
business by switching commodities, relying on protection from tribal networks and shifting
markets out to IDP camps where new markets have emerged. The market in Kalma camp in
South Darfur, for example, is a classic shadow economy. With no taxation, IDPs and locals alike
buy goods and services in the marketplace. As one worker noted, “Everything is available in this
camp,” including flip flops, bolts of fabric, soccer balls, kettles, dried fish, limes, cosmetics and
used washcloths. A thorough understanding of shifting market realities in Darfur is an essential
first step in identifying livelihoods opportunities for youth and the types of educational and
vocational training programs needed to prepare them for these opportunities" (Women’s
Commission, December 2008, p.10).
Alex de Waal writes (31 March 2009):
"During the war the cities have doubled in size. There has been a huge inflow from the rural
areas. That is in addition to the 30% of the Darfur population that lives in IDP camps. Social
scientists who have worked in the camps estimate that at least one third of the camp residents
are economically integrated into the towns, others are partially integrated, and many more (those
who live in small camps dispersed throughout the countryside) are using the camps as
“dormitories” and have some rural-based livelihoods, returning to the camps to sleep at night.
This would imply that the correct figure for urban residents in Darfur is 45%. One way of
interpreting the last six years is accelerated (and traumatic) urbanization—Darfur catching up with
the rest of the country.
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