SUDAN: Durable solutions elusive as southern IDPs return and ...

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p.21: "In addition to the increased violence and displacement, large-scale outbreaks of diseases such as malaria or visceral leishmaniasis (kala-azar) remain common in Southern Sudan. […] Kala-azar [a neglected tropical disease, contracted by the bite of a sand fly] thrives in poor, remote, and unstable areas, where there is extremely limited access to healthcare, so while outbreaks are seasonal in Sudan and are not directly linked to the violence, the current outbreak highlights the already precarious medical humanitarian situation facing the population of Southern Sudan." The lack of rapid response MSF argues that there is a lack of rapid response that would meet the emergency needs of the population. The reason lies in the donor funding in Southern Sudan:” The primary objectives of donors and the UN have been based on efforts to support the CPA. As a result, Southern Sudan is addressed as a ‘post-conflict’ context and the focus on longer term development is disproportionate to that on immediate humanitarian aid.” Consequently, "[m]ost NGOs in Southern Sudan have a strict development agenda and funding sources that are unable to allow for a rapid response to the emergency needs of the population" (MSF, December 2009, p.12). In view of escalating violence across Southern Sudan, both inter-tribal as well as LRA attacks, more attention has to be given to the immediate humanitarian needs of the population. Development aid as it is in Southern Sudan "has serious flaws and it is not wired to meet the growing emergency nature of the Southern Sudan context" (MSF, December 2009, p.30). NGOs deliver 85 per cent of health-care services It is also noteworthy that NGOs deliver up to 85 per cent of primary health-care services in Southern Sudan and pay the salaries of three quarters of the health staff (NGO coalition, 2010, p.24; MSF, December 2009, p.5). A recent OECD study on delivery of public services in Southern Sudan notes that there had been almost no formal government in the south during the war (Nort- South war). Consequently, “Southern Sudan was starting from a situation of extreme poverty and virtually non-existent normal government institutions” (OECD, 2009, p.81). The entire public service, including personnel and system has to be built virtually from the scratch. Therefore in the health sector service delivery is still primarily undertaken by NGOs. GoSS ability to take on the delivery of services is furthermore hindered by the fact that in five years (since the signing of the CPA in 2005) the South Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), administered by the World Bank and funded by donor countries, spent only a third of its money (Guardian, 18 February 2010). It was anticipated that the fund would play a leading role in contracting third parties to deliver government services for at least two years of the interim period and that its role would be phased out as GoSS’s capacity increased. But the complex rules imposed by the World Bank on the GoSS requiring up to 62 steps to procure anything, led to delays and frustration. GoSS lacked the capacity to manage lengthy procurement and contracting procedures (Guardian, 18 February 2010; OECD, 2009, pp.79-83, 146-147). According to the GoSS "a government which is contracting out services because it lacks internal capacity is unlikely to have the capacity to manage complex process for contracting-out" (presentation by Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in OECD, 2009, p.147). 70
Family Life, Participation, Access to Justice, Documentation and other Civil and Political Rights Civil and political rights Census (April-May 2008) A national census (the Fifth Housing and Population Census), initially planned for November 2007, was held in April-May 2008. (The results were only released in May 2009, and were rejected by the Government of Southern Sudan; see Sudan Tribune, 6 May 2009 and 24 May 2009; Reuters, 21 May 2009.) The census was a powerful incentive for IDPs from Southern Sudan to return from their places of displacement in northern Sudan to their areas of origin, in order to be counted in the south. See for example IRIN, 20 February 2007, citing Simon Kun, head of the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, as saying, "We are bringing people back for the census; if we had the resources we would increase the number." In April 2008, Human Rights Watch expressed concerns that attacks by militias on travellers in disputed areas dividing northern and southern Sudan reflected an attempt by the Sudanese government to skew the census results, by deterring IDPs from returning home. HRW stated: "The attacks are deterring displaced people from returning to the disputed areas to register for the national census, which is important for future elections, a referendum on independence for the south, and resource distribution between Khartoum and southern Sudan." HRW continued: "The increasing insecurity is preventing Southerners, originating from these areas but displaced by war to Khartoum, from returning to their homes to be counted in the April census. The location of the attacks – on the roads, rather than in villages – has had an immediate impact on movement in and through the area. […] Roadblocks in the oil-producing area of Heglig in Upper Nile State in southern Sudan in late March have discouraged people from returning" (HRW, 10 April 2008). The contested nature of the census is proving to be an obstacle for the national elections mandated by the CPA (originally scheduled for 2008, and no later than July 2009, the elections were put back first to February 2010 and were then finally held in April 2010). According to the International Crisis Group (17 December 2009, pp.3-4): "Organisation of the elections is complicated by the results of the Fifth Housing and Population Census, which the GoSS, Southern Kordofan and JEM reject. They say the results, which are to provide the basis for allocating National Assembly and state assembly seats, have been manipulated to over-represent pro-NCP constituencies. The SPLM questioned the format from the beginning and now calls the results fraudulent, not a credible count of Southerners resident in the North or of Darfur’s population, including internally displaced persons (IDPs). They believe that the results over-count populations in areas of NCP strength and under-count those in other regions. The NCP says the census was internationally monitored and endorsed. The presidency approved the results on 6 May 2009, but all Southern state legislatures passed rejection motions, and the SPLM has said it will not accept an electoral process that uses the 2009 census to determine constituencies and boundaries. The mechanisms for resolving electoral disputes, particularly the Joint High Executive Political Committee, have been unable to find a solution." Elections (April 2010) Voter registration and documentation: According to the National Election Commission (NEC) approximately 79 per cent (16,4 million) of eligible Sudanese (eligible voting population as 71
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SUDAN: Durable solutions elusive as
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CONTENTS CONTENTS 3 OVERVIEW 6 DURA
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LACK OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 114
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southern governments lack commitmen
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Dinka Ngok population and 23 per ce
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areas that researchers from the UK
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support the policy. The SSRC’s ro
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CAUSES, BACKGROUND AND PATTERNS OF
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south is given the option of choosi
Page 19 and 20: esources were among the factors tha
Page 21 and 22: Southern Sudan. Southern Sudanese w
Page 23 and 24: Tensions remain high in the area: t
Page 25 and 26: "In May 2006, the GoS and a faction
Page 27 and 28: "The expulsions will also have impl
Page 29 and 30: 50,000 non-Arab communities before
Page 31 and 32: From the mid-1980s, the Congress’
Page 33 and 34: "In addition to the conflict in the
Page 35 and 36: Kassala n/a Red Sea n/a Total State
Page 37 and 38: Sudan plus Southern Kordofan and Ab
Page 39 and 40: See also the map "LRA Reported Atta
Page 41 and 42: New displacement in 2010 "Since Jan
Page 43 and 44: UNHCR December 2009 United Nations
Page 45 and 46: According to UNMIS, as of December
Page 47 and 48: It is noteworthy that according to
Page 49 and 50: following figures, which indicate t
Page 51 and 52: "A total of 1,161 villages were ass
Page 53 and 54: - The Lord Resistance Army (LRA) (S
Page 55 and 56: The following table shows the break
Page 57 and 58: ANLA 2009 34% 27% 19% Results of th
Page 59 and 60: households that are IDPs (15%) or a
Page 61 and 62: under five in the surveyed area wer
Page 63 and 64: Livelihoods South Sudan Annual Need
Page 65 and 66: Education The 2010 Work Plan for Su
Page 67 and 68: to Juba, preferring to be unemploye
Page 69: shortcoming is most evident in the
Page 73 and 74: Recruitment and use of children by
Page 75 and 76: THE THREE AREAS Overview Humanitari
Page 77 and 78: Border demarcation Chatham House re
Page 79 and 80: 3) Even where school buildings are
Page 81 and 82: DARFUR Physical Security and Integr
Page 83 and 84: efforts to implement its mandate. W
Page 85 and 86: OCHA, Situation Report No. 4 (28 Ma
Page 87 and 88: By September 2009, 40 per cent of t
Page 89 and 90: found to be 15.6 percent (compared
Page 91 and 92: the Masalit and the Fur. The area a
Page 93 and 94: other Darfur Peace Agreement signat
Page 95 and 96: Urban migrants constitute an invisi
Page 97 and 98: in making choices about how to resp
Page 99 and 100: violence, alcohol abuse, involvemen
Page 101 and 102: number of constituencies allocated
Page 103 and 104: of sexual violence remain unreporte
Page 105 and 106: This is particularly important beca
Page 107 and 108: 26. Most children were killed or in
Page 109 and 110: There are also high maternal morbid
Page 111 and 112: KHARTOUM Physical Security and Inte
Page 113 and 114: Basic necessities of life Khartoum
Page 115 and 116: while existing services fell short
Page 117 and 118: The lack of livelihood opportunitie
Page 119 and 120: given for free, so there is much de
Page 121 and 122:
The electoral law presented particu
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"There are still no official number
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DURABLE SOLUTIONS (RETURN, LOCAL IN
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Local integration (settlement in th
Page 129 and 130:
Jidad, Western Darfur, where the in
Page 131 and 132:
Since the signing of the Comprehens
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"The Sudanese government is failing
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As at 20 March 2010, 9,855 of the a
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The UN Secretary-General in his 29
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Amnesty International (AI), October
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Darfur Relief and Documentation Cen
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Internet : http://www.internaldispl
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Internet : http://www.iwpr.net/?p=a
Page 147 and 148:
Page 149 and 150:
Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), 18
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Overseas Development Institute (ODI
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Internet : http://www.sudantribune.
Page 157 and 158:
Page 159 and 160:
UN Office for the Coordination of H
Page 161 and 162:
United Nations and partners, 18 Dec
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