SUDAN: Durable solutions elusive as southern IDPs return and ...

"The Sudanese government is failing to comply with the 2007 Joint communiqué on facilitation of
humanitarian activities, as evidenced by its restrictions on humanitarian access, harassment of
humanitarian workers and bureaucratic constraints" (2 December 2008, p.12).
Expulsion of humanitarian NGOs
On 4 March 2009, the International Criminal Court issues an arrest warrant for President Bashir,
for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Immediately after the announcement by the ICC, 13
international NGOs were expelled from northern Sudan, including Darfur, the eastern states, and
the Three Areas. Three Sudanese relief organisations were disbanded. President al-Bashir
subsequently stated that he intended to “Sudanise” humanitarian aid delivery in the country within
one year (UN Secretary-General, 17 April 2009, para. 50; Reuters, 16 March 2009).
The expulsions have directly affected 7,610 aid workers (308 international staff and 7,302
Sudanese nationals) in all of northern Sudan, including Darfur. The 16 agencies together
accounted for 40 per cent of aid workers, delivering more than half the total amount of aid (HPG,
26 March 2009).
In response to the expulsions, the United Nations adopted a three-track approach, focusing on 1)
persuading the Sudanese government to reconsider its decision to expel the 13 NGOs; 2)
mitigating immediate risks that could create a crisis; and 3) reconfiguring the aid architecture, in
close coordination with the Government of National Unity and consultations with the donor
agencies and NGOs, in order to ensure continuity of services (UN Secretary-General, 17 April
2009, para. 51).
Since the 4 March expulsions, the Government of Sudan has refused to allow any of the affected
organisations to return to Sudan, despite repeated appeals by the NGOs, the UN and donor
governments. The Government has indicated that the remaining NGOs could expand their
operations, and that new NGOs may be given permission to come in to fill some of the gaps left
by the expelled NGOs (Reuters, 7 May 2009). However, President Bashir later retracted his
earlier statements to this effect (The Indepedent, 26 May 2009).
The Humanitarian Policy group noted:
"While the expulsions may not immediately lead to a large-scale humanitarian catastrophe, there
are, however, a number of other short- and medium-term implications in terms of security, access
and the application of principles and minimum standards in relief. There are also longer-term
issues around what this means for humanitarian action in Sudan and possibly beyond. The
expulsions profoundly undermine humanitarian coordination and communication in the country as
most of the expelled agencies were major actors on state and national coordinating bodies. The
expelled organisations included the three INGO representatives on the UN Humanitarian Country
Team, half of the INGO Steering Committee and most of the players in state-level Inter-Agency
Management Groups (IAMGs) and INGO steering committees. Affected agencies were also
leading major consortium projects and contributing to communication and coordination between
agencies in the Three Areas and the East" (HPG, 26 March 2009).
Commenting on the question of capacity of the remaining agencies in Darfur to fill the gaps
created by the expulsions, the Humanitarian Practice Network noted:
"The question is not simply whether remaining agencies have the capacity to replicate the
services provided by their expelled and disbanded counterparts, but whether they should seek to
do so at all. On the one hand, the humanitarian imperative makes it clear that human suffering
must be addressed. On the other hand, simply trying to continue operations as before sets a
dangerous precedent in terms of humanitarian space. If the UN and other NGOs rush to replace
the expelled and disbanded agencies, the Sudanese government may well conclude that it can
act against aid agencies with impunity, confident that others will step forward to fill the resulting
gaps. This is of particular concern given the Sudanese government’s longstanding antipathy
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