SUDAN: Durable solutions elusive as southern IDPs return and ...

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On 10 February 2009 the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme was launched in Ed-Damazin, Blue Nile State, while on 6 February 2009 the Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission and the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) inaugurated the first State office in Torit, Eastern Equatoria State: the first of ten State offices where staff of both entities will be co-located. On 16 February 2009, the second Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Round Table met in Juba to reaffirm the stakeholders’ commitment to the process and secure funding for the reintegration programme. Donors pledged a total of $88.3 million for 2009 and 2010, conditioned upon the continued development of certain disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme areas, including the proportional downsizing of the armed forces, an effective weapons verification and disposal system, and an effective monitoring and evaluation system. The Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan committed themselves to such programme development, as well as to the release of $45 million in direct support to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former fighters and measures to ensure their access to land (see UNSG, 17 April 2009, paras. 43-47). On the issue of disarmament of civilians, the Enough Project states, "The proliferation of small arms in Southern Sudan continues to fuel widespread local violence among pastoralists competing for resources and power that has not been reduced by GoSS-initiated civilian disarmament campaigns." (Enough, 19 February 2009, p.3). The UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, following a visit to Jonglei State in May 2009 where he met with people displaced by inter-tribal violence, appealed for a peaceful resolution of problems through dialogue and reconciliation, and called upon all key players to begin a process of voluntary disarmament in the counties affected by inter-tribal violence (OCHA, 8 May 2009). For more detail on the impact of small arms in Southern Sudan, see the reports by the Small Arms Survey (December 2007 and January 2009), and Reuters, 15 March 2009. Movements of people from Darfur to Southern Sudan Following the issue of an arrest warrant for President Bashir by the International Criminal Court on 4 March 2009, a total of 16 relief agencies were expelled from northern Sudan. This sparked warnings that the disruptions in the provision of assistance to Darfurians could trigger an exodus of people from South Darfur into Southern Sudan, particularly to the State of Northern Bahr el Ghazal. The UN and the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission consequently embarked on a contingency planning exercise (IRIN, 13 March 2009; FEWS Net, March 2009). On 23 March 2009, IRIN reported that according to UNMIS, the State of Western Bahr el Ghazal was already experiencing an influx of displaced people from neighbouring South Darfur. Displacement caused by LRA attacks In early December 2008, Joseph Kony, the leader of the Ugandan rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), refused to sign the Final Peace Agreement that his own delegation had negotiated with the Government of Uganda. This followed earlier occasions in 2008 at which Kony had been expected to sign the agreement but failed to make an appearance. In December, the forces of Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Southern Sudan launched joint military operations against the LRA in their hide-out in the Garamba National Park in DRC. In response to these attacks, groups of LRA fighters stepped up their attacks against civilians in this region, killing hundreds of people and forcing tens of thousands of people into displacement. Some Congolese civilians were internally displaced, while others fled across the border into 20
Southern Sudan. Southern Sudanese who had been living as refugees in the DRC also fled back across the border into Southern Sudan. Within Southern Sudan, tens of thousands of people were forced into internal displacement by the attacks (see the briefing of the Security Council by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, 16 January 2009). According to OCHA estimates for 2009 over 83,000 people have been displaced by LRA violence in Southern Sudan; almost 67,000 of whom are internally displaced Sudanese, while about 17,000 are Congolese refugees who fled across the border (NGO coalition, 2010, p.11; MSF, December 2009, p.25 ). Maps of the displacement caused by the LRA attacks are available at OCHA, December 2009 and OCHA, 19 February 2009. Secondary displacement caused by demolitions of IDPs’ homes in urban areas In January 2009, the Government of Central Equatoria State announced the start of the demolition of the homes of IDPs in areas of Juba where land was required for town planning. Two IDP camps in Juba were targeted for demolition: Nakasungola and Jebel Kujur. Since then, other areas in Juba town have been affected by demolitions, including Hai Nyakama, Hai Sendia Fok, and Hai Fadia (UN Resident Coordinator, 5 May 2009). By early May 2009, the UN Demolition Taskforce reported that according to the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, the total number of people affected by the demolitions stood at 27, 800 (UN Resident Coordinator, 5 May 2009). The IDPs living in Nakasungola camp had settled there in 1989, on land owned by the government. The authorities maintained that the land was needed for the construction of the General Assembly building. The majority of the 508 households living on the site did not want to return to their areas of origin, but wanted to settle in Juba permanently. However, the authorities had not allocated alternative land to these IDPs prior to the demolitions, insisting instead that these IDPs return to their villages of origin (see Governor of Central Equatoria State, 16 January 2009; Sudan Tribune, 20 January 2009; RCSO et al, 10 February 2009; IRIN, 26 May 2009). The Government of Southern Sudan as well as the State governments have thus far resisted the rapid process of urbanisation in Southern Sudan, insisting instead that all IDPs and refugees return to their villages of origin in the rural areas, despite the lack of services and livelihoods in the rural areas. The authorities’ rationale for this policy is that if people return to their areas of origin, services will eventually be provided in these areas, thus contributing to the development of the rural parts of Southern Sudan. (A detailed discussion and critique of GoSS’ policy on returns and the authorities' resistance to the process of urbanisation in Southern Sudan can be found in ODI, September 2008). Three Areas The "Three Areas" refers to those areas along the border between the north and the south which secured specific protocols during negotiations for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). At the time, these areas were Abyei, Southern Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains. Under the terms of the CPA, the Nuba Mountains became part of a new State of Southern Kordofan based on the boundaries of Kordofan’s two States prior to 1974, and Southern Blue Nile became Blue Nile. Therefore, the "Three Areas" now refer to Abyei, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. 21
Page 1 and 2: SUDAN: Durable solutions elusive as
Page 3 and 4: CONTENTS CONTENTS 3 OVERVIEW 6 DURA
Page 5 and 6: LACK OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 114
Page 7 and 8: southern governments lack commitmen
Page 9 and 10: Dinka Ngok population and 23 per ce
Page 11 and 12: areas that researchers from the UK
Page 13 and 14: support the policy. The SSRC’s ro
Page 15 and 16: CAUSES, BACKGROUND AND PATTERNS OF
Page 17 and 18: south is given the option of choosi
Page 19: esources were among the factors tha
Page 23 and 24: Tensions remain high in the area: t
Page 25 and 26: "In May 2006, the GoS and a faction
Page 27 and 28: "The expulsions will also have impl
Page 29 and 30: 50,000 non-Arab communities before
Page 31 and 32: From the mid-1980s, the Congress’
Page 33 and 34: "In addition to the conflict in the
Page 35 and 36: Kassala n/a Red Sea n/a Total State
Page 37 and 38: Sudan plus Southern Kordofan and Ab
Page 39 and 40: See also the map "LRA Reported Atta
Page 41 and 42: New displacement in 2010 "Since Jan
Page 43 and 44: UNHCR December 2009 United Nations
Page 45 and 46: According to UNMIS, as of December
Page 47 and 48: It is noteworthy that according to
Page 49 and 50: following figures, which indicate t
Page 51 and 52: "A total of 1,161 villages were ass
Page 53 and 54: - The Lord Resistance Army (LRA) (S
Page 55 and 56: The following table shows the break
Page 57 and 58: ANLA 2009 34% 27% 19% Results of th
Page 59 and 60: households that are IDPs (15%) or a
Page 61 and 62: under five in the surveyed area wer
Page 63 and 64: Livelihoods South Sudan Annual Need
Page 65 and 66: Education The 2010 Work Plan for Su
Page 67 and 68: to Juba, preferring to be unemploye
Page 69 and 70: shortcoming is most evident in the
Page 71 and 72:
Family Life, Participation, Access
Page 73 and 74:
Recruitment and use of children by
Page 75 and 76:
THE THREE AREAS Overview Humanitari
Page 77 and 78:
Border demarcation Chatham House re
Page 79 and 80:
3) Even where school buildings are
Page 81 and 82:
DARFUR Physical Security and Integr
Page 83 and 84:
efforts to implement its mandate. W
Page 85 and 86:
OCHA, Situation Report No. 4 (28 Ma
Page 87 and 88:
By September 2009, 40 per cent of t
Page 89 and 90:
found to be 15.6 percent (compared
Page 91 and 92:
the Masalit and the Fur. The area a
Page 93 and 94:
other Darfur Peace Agreement signat
Page 95 and 96:
Urban migrants constitute an invisi
Page 97 and 98:
in making choices about how to resp
Page 99 and 100:
violence, alcohol abuse, involvemen
Page 101 and 102:
number of constituencies allocated
Page 103 and 104:
of sexual violence remain unreporte
Page 105 and 106:
This is particularly important beca
Page 107 and 108:
26. Most children were killed or in
Page 109 and 110:
There are also high maternal morbid
Page 111 and 112:
KHARTOUM Physical Security and Inte
Page 113 and 114:
Basic necessities of life Khartoum
Page 115 and 116:
while existing services fell short
Page 117 and 118:
The lack of livelihood opportunitie
Page 119 and 120:
given for free, so there is much de
Page 121 and 122:
The electoral law presented particu
Page 123 and 124:
"There are still no official number
Page 125 and 126:
DURABLE SOLUTIONS (RETURN, LOCAL IN
Page 127 and 128:
Local integration (settlement in th
Page 129 and 130:
Jidad, Western Darfur, where the in
Page 131 and 132:
Since the signing of the Comprehens
Page 133 and 134:
"The Sudanese government is failing
Page 135 and 136:
As at 20 March 2010, 9,855 of the a
Page 137 and 138:
The UN Secretary-General in his 29
Page 139 and 140:
Amnesty International (AI), October
Page 141 and 142:
Darfur Relief and Documentation Cen
Page 143 and 144:
Internet : http://www.internaldispl
Page 145 and 146:
Internet : http://www.iwpr.net/?p=a
Page 147 and 148:
Page 149 and 150:
Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), 18
Page 151 and 152:
Overseas Development Institute (ODI
Page 153 and 154:
Page 155 and 156:
Internet : http://www.sudantribune.
Page 157 and 158:
Page 159 and 160:
UN Office for the Coordination of H
Page 161 and 162:
United Nations and partners, 18 Dec
Page 163 and 164:
Page 165 and 166:
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