SUDAN: Durable solutions elusive as southern IDPs return and ...

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people, the equivalent for Southern Kordofan is four. There are significant disparities in service and infrastructure access, with better access in areas that were held by the government during the war. Available data shows that there is one hospital per 115,000 people in the former government-controlled areas of the state, compared to one per 800,000 in former SPLM areas, and one PHCC per 23,000 and 133,000 people respectively. In former SPLM areas of both Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, particularly Kaoda and Kurmuk, NGOs delivered most essential services (HPG, 26 March 2009, p.3). People that were displaced in 2008-09 to Rihaid Himaidan continue to have very limited access to basic services (OCHA, February 2010). Refugees International reports: "As with previous Refugees International field visits in 2008 and 2009, the first concern that communities reported was the lack of basic services – especially education, health ser-vices and water. Furthermore the lack of rain this year has hit local towns and villages as hard as returnees. The impact of drought has meant a much larger population struggling to access food, with WFP dramatically increasing its target beneficiary numbers in the south from 1.1 million to 4.3 million. In some areas of Southern Kordofan, local authori-ties told RI that the majority of returnees have gone back to where they had previously fled due to lack of basic services" (RI, 25 March 2010, p.4). Physical security and Protection of special categories of IDPs Security situation involving ethnic violence has decreased in 2009. The report of the UN Secretary-General notes: “Security incidents involving political or ethnic violence in Southern Kordofan have decreased over the past year. The Abu Junok (Nuba) and Um Sileem (Misseriya) signed a peace accord on 5 October, ending a three-year-old conflict. The Nuba Katla and Wali also finalized a peace agreement on 12 November. New state-level institutional arrangements, including the Council of Elders (“Wise Men”), played a significant role in these accomplishments. The South Kordofan State government has made significant progress in incorporating the 1,708 SPLM civil servants into its political and administrative structures, including the formation of a new committee to facilitate this process” (UN SC, 19 January 2010, p.5). A recent field report by Refugees International states that sexual violence was a common phenomenon during the north-south war and that women expressed fear that they would be again vulnerable to such abuse if the conflict was to broke out again. Only few GBV survivors received assistance and work on prevention is minimal. Efforts to address GBV in Southern Kordofan are seriously limited by funding constraints (RI, 25 March 2010). Abyei The situation in the Abyei area is more complicated still, as a result of the impact of the May 2009 Abyei crisis. In April 2009, the UN Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that, ”The Abyei Area Administration and the Presidency have not yet reached an agreement on the Administration’s budget, severely impeding the Administration’s capacity to establish its presence or provide services throughout the Abyei Road Map Area. The Administration currently has no operating funds, and owes much of its staff several months’ salaries. Ongoing budget negotiations in Khartoum have further limited the Administrator’s capacity to address urgent local issues such as the provision of essential basic services” (UNSG, 17 April 2009, para.14) The National Democratic Institute in interviews with Ngok Dinka in the Abyei area found that, "The humanitarian response of the international community and the UN is widely praised, but Ngok Dinka participants want more emphasis placed on finding a political resolution to the Abyei crisis. Ngok Dinka participants applaud the work of the international community and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) during the crisis and give them credit for saving many lives. Help of almost every kind – food, water, medicine, shelter and education – is described and appreciated by the participants" (NDI, 31 March 2009, p.45). 76
Border demarcation Chatham House reports notes:” Abyei became an administrative part of Northern Sudan in 1905, and the delimitation of its border is a prerequisite for the Abyei referendum, due on the same day as the Southern one. An international Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) delimited the border in 2005. The NCP rejected the ABC report, claiming that its experts, by exceeding their mandate, had defined the oil-rich enclave’s borders too generously. More restricted borders for Abyei, were subsequently decided by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), an international court in the Hague in 2009” (Chatham House, January 2010, p.8). Although both the north and the south accepted the new borders, “the area continues to be flashpoint for north-south relations, not least for local residents. Tensions between the Misseriyah and the Ngok Dinka, both pastoralists, remain an issue, although no clashes have been reported since the Court’s decision” (UN and partners, 11 December 2009, p.16). The progress on border demarcation has been stalled (Chatham House, January 2010, p.8). Reintegration of returnees: livelihoods, services and land A report published in August 2007 and a book published in 2009 by the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) discusses the process of return and reintegration for IDPs and refugees, focusing on two states: Southern Kordofan in the Three Areas, and Northern Bahr el Ghazal in Southern Sudan (The Long Road Home: Opportunities and obstacles to the reintegration of IDPs and refugees returning to Southern Sudan and the Three Areas, Phase I, August 2007; Uncharted territory: land, conflict and humanitarian action, 2009). In relation to Southern Kordofan, the report points out that the return process in Southern Kordofan has been ongoing at least since the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) was signed for the Nuba Mountains in 2002, and that according to the Minister for Rural Development and Water in Southern Kordofan, by 2007 around 600,000 people had already returned (ODI, August 2007, p.17). As a result of these large return movements, some villages in Southern Kordofan have more than doubled in size since the arrival of the returnees, putting tremendous pressure on resources, food and shelter in particular (ODI, August 2007, p.7). The report provides a detailed discussion of the obstacles to reintegration faced by these returnees, in terms of social reintegration, livelihoods, access to services, and land (see ODI, August 2007, pp.17-37; ODI, 2009, pp.154-157). Below are a number of excerpts from the ODI reports, highlighting some of the key findings in relation to Southern Kordofan. Insecurity and lack of access to services in return areas are a disincentive to return "Disincentives to return include: · Continued evidence of insecurity, including tribal conflict. · Poor services in areas of return. This was mentioned by IDPs still living in Khartoum, who are particularly aware of the poor water services from recent visits they have made to the area. Lack of education facilities is a major disincentive, especially for families that can afford to send their children to secondary school in Khartoum" (ODI, August 2007, p.19). · Land conflict, deterring people from returning to areas such as Kaw Nwaro and Hajar Jallaba despite the high agricultural potential of these areas. Livelihoods 77
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SUDAN: Durable solutions elusive as
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CONTENTS CONTENTS 3 OVERVIEW 6 DURA
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LACK OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 114
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southern governments lack commitmen
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Dinka Ngok population and 23 per ce
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areas that researchers from the UK
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support the policy. The SSRC’s ro
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CAUSES, BACKGROUND AND PATTERNS OF
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south is given the option of choosi
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esources were among the factors tha
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Southern Sudan. Southern Sudanese w
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Tensions remain high in the area: t
Page 25 and 26: "In May 2006, the GoS and a faction
Page 27 and 28: "The expulsions will also have impl
Page 29 and 30: 50,000 non-Arab communities before
Page 31 and 32: From the mid-1980s, the Congress’
Page 33 and 34: "In addition to the conflict in the
Page 35 and 36: Kassala n/a Red Sea n/a Total State
Page 37 and 38: Sudan plus Southern Kordofan and Ab
Page 39 and 40: See also the map "LRA Reported Atta
Page 41 and 42: New displacement in 2010 "Since Jan
Page 43 and 44: UNHCR December 2009 United Nations
Page 45 and 46: According to UNMIS, as of December
Page 47 and 48: It is noteworthy that according to
Page 49 and 50: following figures, which indicate t
Page 51 and 52: "A total of 1,161 villages were ass
Page 53 and 54: - The Lord Resistance Army (LRA) (S
Page 55 and 56: The following table shows the break
Page 57 and 58: ANLA 2009 34% 27% 19% Results of th
Page 59 and 60: households that are IDPs (15%) or a
Page 61 and 62: under five in the surveyed area wer
Page 63 and 64: Livelihoods South Sudan Annual Need
Page 65 and 66: Education The 2010 Work Plan for Su
Page 67 and 68: to Juba, preferring to be unemploye
Page 69 and 70: shortcoming is most evident in the
Page 71 and 72: Family Life, Participation, Access
Page 73 and 74: Recruitment and use of children by
Page 75: THE THREE AREAS Overview Humanitari
Page 79 and 80: 3) Even where school buildings are
Page 81 and 82: DARFUR Physical Security and Integr
Page 83 and 84: efforts to implement its mandate. W
Page 85 and 86: OCHA, Situation Report No. 4 (28 Ma
Page 87 and 88: By September 2009, 40 per cent of t
Page 89 and 90: found to be 15.6 percent (compared
Page 91 and 92: the Masalit and the Fur. The area a
Page 93 and 94: other Darfur Peace Agreement signat
Page 95 and 96: Urban migrants constitute an invisi
Page 97 and 98: in making choices about how to resp
Page 99 and 100: violence, alcohol abuse, involvemen
Page 101 and 102: number of constituencies allocated
Page 103 and 104: of sexual violence remain unreporte
Page 105 and 106: This is particularly important beca
Page 107 and 108: 26. Most children were killed or in
Page 109 and 110: There are also high maternal morbid
Page 111 and 112: KHARTOUM Physical Security and Inte
Page 113 and 114: Basic necessities of life Khartoum
Page 115 and 116: while existing services fell short
Page 117 and 118: The lack of livelihood opportunitie
Page 119 and 120: given for free, so there is much de
Page 121 and 122: The electoral law presented particu
Page 123 and 124: "There are still no official number
Page 125 and 126: DURABLE SOLUTIONS (RETURN, LOCAL IN
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Local integration (settlement in th
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Jidad, Western Darfur, where the in
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Since the signing of the Comprehens
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"The Sudanese government is failing
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As at 20 March 2010, 9,855 of the a
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The UN Secretary-General in his 29
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Amnesty International (AI), October
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Darfur Relief and Documentation Cen
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Internet : http://www.internaldispl
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Internet : http://www.iwpr.net/?p=a
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Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), 18
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Overseas Development Institute (ODI
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Internet : http://www.sudantribune.
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UN Office for the Coordination of H
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United Nations and partners, 18 Dec
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