Neo-Bonapartism? A parallel between Nicolas Sarkozy and ...

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Neo-Bonapartism? A parallel between Nicolas Sarkozy and Napoleon III proposal are listed by Hicks, such as: an intervention force of 60,000 European troops deployable for one year with the requisite air and naval support capabilities, the capability to deploy and support two to three “peace-enforcement” operations and additional civilian missions across multiple theaters, common European planning and operational capabilities, and a French commitment to spend €377 billion over the next twelve years on defense (2008). Within a domestic context marked by a strong non-proliferation model, Sarkozy even campaigned in favor of a possible use of nuclear weapons. As cited by Bowen, “in a letter to a French antinuclear group, Citizen Action for Nuclear Disarmament, Sarkozy insisted on the essential character of France’s nuclear force de frappe and declared his support for an upgrading of the nuclear-tipped missiles on France’s attack submarines” (2007). The same burly stance applies when France’s interests are jeopardized abroad. Sarkozy adopted for instance unused-of (in France’s tradition) methods of handling terrorism. While reporting on Sarkozy’s “war against Al Qaeda”, Von Randow noted that following the murder of a French hostage by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), the “government is thinking out loud about retribution for an attack on the AQMI bunker in Northern Mali, by drawing on experience commandos in the region who are familiar with this kind of mission” (2010), and no matter if such undertaking endangers Spain’s negotiations about the release of two of its citizens at the mercy of the very same organization. In addition, Sarkozy is worried about AQMI’s threat vis a vis the Hexagon’s strategic interests in the region, among which “the sand of Niger (where) lies the source of 40% of France’s uranium consumption” but also the fact that “France relies on nuclear energy for nearly 80% of its electricity; the Sahel region is arguably more important to France than the Persian Gulf region is to the US” (Blanche, 2010). A website dedicated to this project is available starting Dec 7 th 2010 at: http://www.aui.ma/personal/~Y.Assaoui/ 88
Neo-Bonapartism? A parallel between Nicolas Sarkozy and Napoleon III Another noticeable feature of the foreign policy, Bonapartist style, is its reliance upon hyper- activism and the preaching of the big conferences culture. At this level, a kind of parallelism can be established with its reliance upon popular plebiscite at the domestic level: it is as if, in its desire to manage the collective sake, Bonapartism needs a kind of legitimacy brought by its fellow foreign leaders vis a vis its foreign undertakings. However, such an approach is not contradictory with the unilateral decision-making approach, especially when the domestic interests are in contradiction with what the multilateral actors seems to prefer. Napoleon III for instance advocated for decades his fondness for multilateral solutions to diplomatic crises, especially the ones involving, in a way or another, his European neighbors. As explained by Echard, “from 1849 to 1963, he repeatedly urged the assembling of a general congress: during the same period, he responded to every European crisis with at least a willingness to seek solutions at the conference table” (1966). It was notably the case for the Paris conference of November 1852 that settled the Franco-Russo fight over Constantinople (in Paris’ favor), another Paris meeting in August 1858 where a convention dismantling the 1815’s treaties was signed by a European Congress, or the 1866’s conference organized conjointly with Otto Von Bismarck to reach an agreement on the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen candidacy for the Spanish throne. In parallel, and as outlined by Gildea, the emperor pursued an active policy of mediation between disputed countries; like when he “mediated between Prussia and Austria, taking Venetia from Austria to bestow on the humiliated Italians, and hoping for some compensation for France in the future” (2003). Finally, unilateral foreign policy decisions were also taken by Louis Napoleon; it is interesting at this regard to cite the imperial settling of the Italian question without any form of consultation with Italy. Gildea explains that this A website dedicated to this project is available starting Dec 7 th 2010 at: http://www.aui.ma/personal/~Y.Assaoui/ 89
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Neo-Bonapartism? A parallel between Nicolas Sarkozy and ...

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