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Genocide: - DIIS

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Lars Heide<br />

Germany they needed to act carefully to avoid problems with the Gestapo<br />

or the exposure of their German contacts. This is an exciting story that<br />

contributes to an understanding of the interplay between multinationals<br />

and national governments.<br />

The relations between IBM and Dehomag were troubled. Dehomag’s<br />

German founder, Willy Heidinger, established the agency that became<br />

the most profi table of any IBM agency or subsidiary. Already in 1922<br />

Heidinger’s position was so strong that when the American company exploited<br />

the German monetary collapse of the early 1920s to take over Dehomag,<br />

he remained de facto in charge of the company while resenting the<br />

change in ownership. The IBM president Thomas J. Watson was satisfi ed<br />

with Dehomag’s business success, and while he monitored the German<br />

company closely at the level of the board of trustees, he allowed Heidinger<br />

wide operational freedom – a construction which led to several confl icts.<br />

During the 1930s German rearmament and growth provided Dehomag<br />

with more opportunities for increased activity than, for example, Siemens.<br />

Punched cards became important for the arms build-up and for warfare.<br />

The Dehomag profi ts caused IBM annual problems, as transfer of accrued<br />

profi ts was not possible, and Heidinger – who was in his sixties – wanted<br />

his dividends. Declaring the profi ts was delayed for as long as possible<br />

and they were either reinvested or invested in property. From 1940-1941<br />

Heidinger tried use his contacts with the Nazi regime to regain his independence.<br />

Unfortunately Black does not examine this key confl ict between<br />

a multinational company and one of its national clients. He approaches<br />

the relations as being primarily between the Nazi regime and IBM in New<br />

York, personifi ed in the powerful and charismatic Thomas J. Watson. The<br />

author repeatedly claims that these relations represented a “strategic alliance,”<br />

but offers no plausible proof.<br />

To assess the role – and possible complicity – of American multinationals<br />

like General Motors, Ford and IBM operating in the Third Reich, we<br />

need to distinguish between having business assets locked up in Germany<br />

after the introduction of the autarchy before the Nazi seizure of power,<br />

and those actually establishing an alliance with the regime. During the<br />

1930s Watson, through the International Chamber of Commerce, worked<br />

for appeasement with Nazi Germany. He was chairman of the Chamber<br />

286

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