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ief 22 Figure 1: Electoral support for Northern Irish political parties, 1996–2001 In percent Source: Nicholas Whyte, 2001. ”Northern Ireland Elections: 7 June 2001.” 13 June 2001. Available via www.explorers.whyte.com. Note: In the 1998 Referendum on the Belfast Agreement, 71.1 percent of the population voted in favour in Northern Ireland. In the Republic of Ireland the figure was 94.4 percent. Northern Westminster Local Northern European Westminster Local Ireland General Government Ireland Parliament General Government Forum Election Elections Assembly Election Election Elections Election Election 1996 1997 1997 1998 1999 2001 2001 UUP 24.2 32.7 27.9 21.3 17.6 26.8 22.9 SDLP 21.4 24.1 20.6 22.0 28.1 21.0 19.4 DUP 18.8 13.6 15.6 18.0 28.4 22.5 21.4 SF 15.5 16.1 16.9 17.7 17.3 21.7 20.7 ALL 6.5 8.0 6.6 6.5 2.1 3.6 5.1 UKUP 3.7 1.6 0.5 4.5 3.0 1.7 0.6 PUP 3.5 1.4 2.2 2.6 3.3 0.6 1.6 UDP 2.2 - 1.0 1.1 - - - Independents - - 3.8 - - - 6.6 Others 4.3 2.5 5.4 6.3 0.2 2.1 1.7 ALL Alliance DUP Democratic Unionist Party PUP Progressive Unionist Party SDLP Social Democratic Labour Party SF Sinn Fein UDP Ulster Democratic Party UKUP United Kingdom Unionist Party UUP Ulster Unionist Party 12 B·I·C·C
“Mr. Mayhew goes on to say ‘. . . the exploratory dialogue will be so we can discuss with Sinn Fein how the IRA will hand over their weapons’. So I say to myself: ‘This is what they want. They want the IRA to stop so that Sinn Fein can have the privilege 12 weeks later, having been properly sanitised and come out of quarantine, to have discussions with senior civil servants of how the IRA can hand over their weapons’. And then I hear that reiterated again and again; by Douglas Hurd, by John Major, by Patrick Mayhew” (Irish News, 8 January 1994). However, even setting aside the fact that there had been no explicit reference to disarmament within the Joint Declaration, the picture is complicated by the absence of any mention of disarmament in the secret communications between the British and Sinn Fein during 1993. The British view was that disarmament was implicit in the secret communication of 5 November 1993 in which it was stated that both sides would “examine the practical consequences of the ending of violence” during exploratory dialogue. For the British, this meant implementing measures to normalise security with the quid pro quo that Republicans would move on decommissioning (Irish Times, 15 July 1995). The clarification of the Joint Declaration made by the British at Sinn Fein’s request in May 1994, reiterated this need to examine the “practical consequences” of any ceasefire in exploratory dialogue but again made no specific reference to disarmament. Although of necessity vague, it did throw into partial relief the choreography which Britain wished to see in the developing process. A “public and permanent” renunciation of violence, followed by a decontamination period of three months was necessary before entry into exploratory dialogue could take place. These preliminary negotiations would simply be a means to exploring the “basis upon which Sinn Fein would come to be admitted to an inclusive political talks process” (Irish Times, 20 May 1994). Decommissioning had thus ceased to be flagged as an indicator of peaceful intent, but the door had been left open to its inclusion within exploratory dialogue. This clarification by the British hardened and elongated the provisions in paragraph 10 of the Joint Declaration to a degree, but the Irish government, for its part, expressed its satisfaction with the British response to Sinn Fein (Bew and Gillespie, 1996, p. 53). The British government appears then to have been speaking in different tones on different occasions regarding the matter of decommissioning. In the period around the issuing of the Joint Declaration, the necessity of disarmament was publicly voiced, but in private communications with Sinn Fein, omitted. The picture is complicated further by the fact that the British government and Sinn Fein published differing accounts of these contacts. Five months after the Declaration was unveiled, the British publicly clarified their understanding of its provisions, again omitting an explicit reference to disarmament but skilfully leaving the way open to its introduction. It was a card placed up the sleeve, but one that Republicans knew they possessed. The initial Republican response Irish Republicans, of course, regarded any suggestion that disarmament might be a necessary test of democratic fitness as anathema. This did not mean that they were altogether shy in discussing the matter in the pre- and immediately post-ceasefire period. However, in their view it was best seen in a much wider context, one of “demilitarisation” and a matter that would be resolved as a part of the process rather than a condition of entry to it. As Adams made clear in the months before the Declaration, he wanted a process to develop that would “see an end to the IRA”, indeed for some time Sinn Fein’s policy had been B·I·C·C origin of the issue “. . . total demilitarisation. We want to see all the forces in the conflict setting aside their weapons—right now, today. What we’re involved in is an initiative which will hopefully lead to a process. As that develops the various armed forces—crown forces, loyalist, republican—will see fit, at a time of their own choosing to demilitarise” (Belfast Telegraph, 22 October 1993). In the days following the ceasefire, Adams again reiterated the belief that “there must be a process of demilitarisation” and that the task before the actors was to “create a climate so that all engaged in armed action” would be “demilitarised” (Irish Times, 2 September 1994), but he did not see the issue of the handing over of IRA weapons as a “stumbling block on the way to peace” and pointed to the fact that most of the guns in the conflict lay in the hands of the British Army. Martin McGuinness, who was to become Sinn Fein’s leading negotiator in the peace process, expressed optimism that “a total demilitarisation” could be brought about quickly (Irish Times, 3 September 1994). Aside from public pronouncements, Sinn Fein are reported to have given tacit assurances to the Irish government that the issue of weaponry would have to be dealt with and that paramilitary guns would have to be “banjaxed” [destroyed] (Duignan, no date, p. 151). As Albert Reynolds was to recollect in his dealings with Republicans at that time, he was assured that in return for not pressing the matter or prior disarmament, decommissioning “implicitly going beyond the approach of the ‘pike in the thatch’ would be dealt with during the process of reaching a negotiated settlement” (Irish Times, 9 December 1995). Disarmament was clearly a matter that Republicans realised they would have to face up to at some stage in the process, but not one which they believed should be used as a tollbooth supervising entry to political talks. 13
Page 1 and 2: ief 22 Burying the Hatchet The Deco
Page 3 and 4: ief 22 Burying the Hatchet The Deco
Page 5 and 6: analyses the underlying factors and
Page 7 and 8: In einem ideologisierten Konflikt k
Page 9 and 10: B·I·C·C part 1 9
Page 11: “The British and Irish Government
Page 15 and 16: decommissioning impasse, than as a
Page 17 and 18: in the process, the Irish governmen
Page 19 and 20: decommissioning in the hope that Re
Page 21 and 22: Times, 13 March 1995, 18 March 1995
Page 23 and 24: horizon; following open plenary dis
Page 25 and 26: negotiations made it “impossible
Page 27 and 28: that this would inflame Nationalist
Page 29 and 30: concerns about decommissioning in t
Page 31 and 32: of undermining the rights of voters
Page 33 and 34: were allowed into the talks process
Page 35 and 36: A “collective act of reconciliati
Page 37 and 38: decommissioning. The IICD also anti
Page 39 and 40: government also indicated its suppo
Page 41 and 42: although details again remained spa
Page 43 and 44: The two international arms inspecto
Page 45 and 46: David Trimble at a press conference
Page 47 and 48: The elections on the 7 June, which
Page 49 and 50: B·I·C·C part 2 49
Page 51 and 52: Box E: The IRA arms statement in fu
Page 53 and 54: conflict resolution. That may expla
Page 55 and 56: assessments are certainly encouragi
Page 57 and 58: for progress on any other, the Agre
Page 59 and 60: facilitated by the United States, a
Page 61 and 62: put the arms beyond use. The IICD,
Page 63 and 64:
Proliferation of Violence and the M
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the most part, been dormant through
Page 67 and 68:
eing used to facilitate the convers
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Why did decommissioning occur? Alth
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on Republican militarism, boosting
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ANC African National Congress CIRA
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Graduate Institute of International
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T he transfer of resources from the
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