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were allowed into the talks process,
without the obligation of
decommissioning of any sort, Unionist
rage was palpable. Vociferous attacks
were made upon both the British
government and Sinn Fein. Ken
Maginnis, the UUP’s security
spokesman, lamented the fact that,
after the UUP had “most reluctantly
accepted” the Mitchell compromise,
the government felt secure enough to
elevate “an evil Mafia” to the
conference table by “sleight of hand”
(Irish Times, 24 September 1997).
Trimble called for the expulsion of
Sinn Fein from the talks after the IRA
announced that it had difficulties with
the Mitchell Principles, a move which
he described as a “contemptible little
trick” (Irish Times, 12 September 1997).
Similarly, the Unionist leader took
delight at the SDLP’s support for the
principle of consent in the talks and
Sinn Fein’s objection. This marked “the
start of the process of the
marginalisation of Sinn Fein and the
break up of the pan-nationalist front”
(Irish Times, 25 September 1997). This
rhetoric reflected more bark than bite.
Sinn Fein had gained entry into the
talks despite Unionism’s insistence on
decommissioning; yet Ulster Unionists
could not bring themselves to walk out
of the process, a move which would
brand them as spoilers and cost them
influence with the two governments.
Consequently, there was a need to
insulate themselves from the criticism
of Unionists fervently opposed to the
process. Engaging Sinn Fein only
through proximity talks was one
means, another was to adopt the most
vocally confrontational stance against
Republicans. Such criticism could only
intensify following the signing of the
Agreement, especially since
Republicans did not hand in weaponry
even after the negotiations and
endorsement of the Agreement in
referenda north and south of the
border.
The UUP took a firm line on the
question of forming an executive with
Sinn Fein in their manifesto released
shortly before the elections to the new
Assembly. For Sinn Fein to take up
their ministerial posts, there would
have to be a statement that the war was
over, an end to punishment beatings,
the progressive dismantling of
paramilitary structures, and complete
disarmament within two years (Belfast
Telegraph, 9 June 1998). The Unionists
were compromising in the short term,
but issuing a costly post-dated cheque
that would have to be cashed in the
near future. By projecting strict terms
into the future, pro-Agreement
Unionists were playing for time against
those who opposed the deal in the here
and now. It was a tactic which would
be resurrected through the next phase
of the process.
Loyalist dealings with
the IICD
Whilst both the PUP (Progressive
Unionist Party) and UDP (Ulster
Democratic Party) had signed up to the
Mitchell principles, developments
within Loyalism pointed to a mixed
attitude to decommissioning. On the
one hand, the Ulster Volunteer Force
(UVF) were quick to appoint the PUP’s
Billy Hutchinson as their direct liaison
with the IICD (Belfast Telegraph, 25 May
1998). Both the Ulster Defence
Association (UDA) and UVF fully
supported the Belfast Agreement
whilst even the extremist splinter
group, the Loyalist Volunteer Force
(LVF), declared a ceasefire. In
December 1998, this latter group
actually handed in a small number of
munitions to the IICD; the first and so
far only act of voluntary
decommissioning (Belfast Telegraph, 18
December 1998). This move was
prompted more by short term
considerations than any commitment
to a process of disarmament; in
particular the need to secure the early
release of their prisoners.
UDA/UDP electorally
unrepresented
Movement sometimes appeared likely
from the largest Loyalist group. John
White of the Ulster Democratic Party
B·I·C·C
run-up to the agreement
(UDP) stated that he would
recommend that the UDA should
make the first move on disarmament
and so pressurise Republicans to follow
suit (Belfast Telegraph, 21 June 1998). But
there were certain indications of a
more complex picture. Firstly, the
UDA did not appoint a liaison to the
IICD and it seemed unlikely that they
would begin the process of
disarmament. In fact, several months
before the Agreement, the UDA had
broken its ceasefire in retaliation for
the assassination of the Loyalist
Volunteer Force leader Billy Wright.
They had a reputation as the most
volatile of the two main Loyalist
paramilitary groups, a volatility that
proved difficult to assuage given that
the UDP failed to gain a single seat at
the Assembly elections. Even those
linked to the UVF ultimately felt that
decommissioning was unlikely to
happen even in a benign scenario. As
Billy Hutchinson said, “if the IRA
decommission that doesn’t mean the
UVF will. It’s not in the UVF’s
interests to decommission. It’s in the
UVF’s interests to ensure that Loyalist
areas remain protected” (Belfast
Telegraph, 10 October 1998).
Loyalist decommissioning seemed a
long way off, set somewhere in the
hazy distance. A message from the
UVF Command Staff stated that “the
Ulster Volunteer Force will retain their
weaponry, regardless of political
expediency, until such times as the
people of Ulster are guaranteed a
future safe from the despotism of
armed Irish Republicans” (Combat,
December 1998). There were to be no
olive branches. As Gerry Kelly, a
leading Sinn Fein negotiator and longtime
adversary of Loyalism would say,
the Belfast Agreement was a “contract
between opponents” (An Phoblacht, 15
April 1998); behind its words lay
mistrust, not a sense of partnership or
reconciliation. How would
decommissioning be resolved against
this backdrop?
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