English - BICC

ief 22
leadership to assuage the grassroots in
the wake of earlier concessions on
decommissioning. Neither of these
actions was to be taken as a breach of
the ceasefire (Sunday Tribune, 22 August
1999). The painful need to face up to
certain realities was also underlined by
David Trimble, who bemoaned those
who talked of “so called alternatives”
to dealing with Sinn Fein; the UUP
would “not achieve progress without
agreement with Nationalists and this
includes Republicans. . . .the problem
we face now is inescapable while Sinn
Fein maintains substantial electoral
support” (Sunday Tribune, 10 October
1999).
A sense of necessary compromise was
also stressed by the IICD in a
statement of the 15 November which
noted that time was now very short if
decommissioning was to be achieved in
the stipulated time frame and that
consequently urgent progress was now
needed. The Commission was
convinced that decommissioning could
only be achieved in the context of the
Agreement being implemented and
reminded the participants that they had
a “collective responsibility” in this
regard. The appointment of authorised
representatives by paramilitaries to liase
with the IICD was described as an
“urgent” and “significant” confidencebuilding
measure. Clearly, the
Commission now felt that it was time it
assumed a “more proactive role” (Irish
Times, 16 November 1999).
The urgency of the IICD statement
was not so much a spur to compromise
as a reflection of the degree of
achievement already reached in the
review conducted under the
chairmanship of George Mitchell.
From the outset, the focus of the
Review had been a narrow one,
concentrating specifically on breaking
the deadlock over decommissioning
and the formation of a government
(Irish Times, 7 September 1999). This
tight focus had served to prevent
incursions from emotive issues such as
policing, which might bog down the
process. The negotiations, which had
been conducted under a tighter veil of
secrecy, were blossoming out into a
highly choreographed affair. Both the
UUP and Sinn Fein welcomed the
statements from the IICD and shared
the view that the body should adopt a
more proactive and central role (Irish
Times, 7 September 1999).
This choreography culminated in a
series of confidence-building speeches
by the parties to the negotiations. The
most important came from Sinn Fein
and the Ulster Unionists. The latter
explicitly recognised and accepted that
it was “legitimate for nationalists to
pursue their political objective of a
united Ireland by consent through
exclusively peaceful and democratic
methods.” The UUP also committed
itself to the principles of “inclusivity,
equality and mutual respect” in
government. They had also partially
retreated from the ‘no guns, no
government’ pledge. Only a “genuine
and meaningful response” to the IICD
report was required before the way was
clear for the establishment of the
political institutions. This effectively
meant the IRA’s appointment of a
representative to, and dialogue with,
the IICD (Irish Times, 17 November
1999). The quid pro quo from Sinn Fein
was a statement stressing their belief
that the issue of arms would be “finally
and satisfactorily settled” under the
aegis of the IICD and that the party
was committed to “discharging its
responsibilities in this regard.” Sinn
Fein also underlined their commitment
to peaceful means and opposition to
“any use of force or threat of force by
others for any political purpose” (Irish
Times, 17 November 1999).
Building trust
These statements were designed to
have a galvanising effect in building
trust. Unionists were saying that they
were not interested in excluding
Nationalists from government while
Sinn Fein had put light years between
itself and the rhetoric of the armalite
and ballot box. This was the nearest
38 B·I·C·C
that Republicans could get to admitting
that the war was over. The Republican
commitment to discharging their
responsibilities on decommissioning
was also crucial and one of the final
pieces of the jigsaw; the appointment
of an authorised IRA representative to
the IICD, was slotted in soon after
(Irish Times, 18 November 1999).
Interestingly, the IRA statement
announcing the appointment also
acknowledged the “leadership given by
Sinn Fein throughout this process”, a
phrase which appeared to be an
implicit signal that Republicanism was
firmly on the political path and that if
Sinn Fein discharged its
responsibilities, the IRA would follow
their lead. Needless to say, for
Republicans, any prospect of
decommissioning would ultimately
depend upon the full implementation
of the Agreement.
Despite the confidence-building
measures, Adams continually warned
that no one should underestimate just
how far Sinn Fein had stretched itself
in the Review (Irish Times, 19 November
1999, 25 November 1999). That
Republicanism had stretched itself at
all began to appear in some doubt,
when senior Sinn Fein negotiators were
reported as stating their belief that the
IRA would never disarm (Irish Times, 19
November 1999, 20 November 1999).
However, Sinn Fein were quick to
rebut the accuracy of these reports,
and described them as misleading (Irish
Times, 22 November 1999). If
Republicans had stretched themselves,
pro-Agreement Unionists felt even
more exposed. Stepping into an
executive without a beginning to
disarmament seemed a bold move.
There was however more than one
safety net. Firstly, Peter Mandelson, the
Northern Ireland Secretary who had
replaced Mowlam in October, initiated
legislation in Westminster to suspend
the Executive and other institutions if
there was any default on
decommissioning or devolution (Irish
Times, 23 November 1999). The Irish