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negotiations made it “impossible for
any agreement to be reached without
the positive support of parties
representing majorities in each main
part of the community” and
underlined their belief that progress on
decommissioning in parallel with
substantive political talks would lead to
a “benign dynamic” of growing
confidence and a mutually acceptable
outcome (Belfast Telegraph, 17 July
1997).
The British government had already
been at work in trying to build
Republican trust by effectively
removing the decommissioning issue as
a possible block in inter-party
negotiations. On the 8 July 1997, Blair
sent a letter to Martin McGuinness
stating his commitment to moving as
“rapidly as possible to an agreed
political settlement”. “The situation in
Northern Ireland means that delay is
not acceptable”, he wrote. It was not
necessary for the IRA to hand in
weaponry in order to keep Sinn Fein in
the process as “the only ground for
exclusion once a party has joined the
negotiations” was a dishonouring of
the Mitchell Principles on non-violence
(Irish Times, 18 July 1997).
IRA ceasefire
reinstated
This commitment from the British
successfully secured a reinstatement of
the IRA ceasefire on the 19 July.
Unionism reacted with rage, and the
DUP and the smaller United Kingdom
Unionist Party withdrew permanently
from the talks process. Although
unhappy with the governments’
position, the Ulster Unionists took a
more pragmatic approach; as one
negotiator commented: “The IRA has
called a tactical ceasefire, so we should
engage in tactical talks” (Irish Times, 26
September 1997). The Ulster Unionists
thus engaged in only indirect contact
with Sinn Fein during the talks in order
to insulate themselves from criticism.
Despite the lack of decommissioned
weaponry, walking away from
negotiations was judged to be a risky
venture which would portray Unionism
as the spoiler of hopes for peace, and
weaken Unionist input. The Union
could not be defended “long distance”
(Irish Times, 26 September 1997).
Sinn Fein duly signed up to the
Mitchell Principles on non-violence in
September and gained admittance to
the talks process. Comforting language
for Unionism came in the form of a
joint declaration by the British and
Irish governments that
decommissioning was an
“indispensable part of the
negotiation”, a phrase which resurfaced
in an agreed procedural motion at the
all-party talks which opened the way to
substantive constitutional negotiations
(Irish Times, 16 September 1997, 26
September 1997). Yet a substantial
question mark hung over Republican
intent; the IRA made clear that it
would have “problems with sections of
the Mitchell Principles” and concluded
that “decommissioning on our part
would be tantamount to surrender”. To
the IRA, questions about disarmament
led up a blind alley and smacked of
bad faith as “those with a genuine
interest in developing a peace process
which has the potential for producing a
just and lasting peace will have no
interest in decommissioning beyond
the point where all guns are silent”
(Irish Times, 12 September 1997).
The Independent
International
Commission on
Decommissioning
(IICD)
If that was the case, what was to be the
point of the Independent International
Commission on Decommissioning
(IICD), instituted a matter of weeks
later? The Commission included
commissioners from the same three
nations involved in the International
Body, General John de Chastelain from
B·I·C·C
run-up to the agreement
Canada, as Chairman, Brigadier Tauno
Nieminen from Finland, and Mr.
Andrew Sens from the United States.
The IICD had been tasked, in line with
the British and Irish Agreement of
June, to facilitate the process of the
destruction of arms and to liase with
the subcommittee on decommissioning
at the negotiations.
It is significant that no clear agreement
on the question of decommissioning
was reached at the otherwise
successfully concluded negotiations. As
one commentator has emphasised, the
decommissioning issue was not an
important focus within the talks
proper, indeed it was “submerged in
the sub-committees—literally parked”
(Mac Ginty, 1998, pp. 40–41). In terms
of decommissioning, what the talks
participants agreed to was a fudge: the
key paragraph relating to
decommissioning in the Belfast
Agreement of April 1998 simply stated
that the negotiators affirmed their
commitment to paramilitary
disarmament and would use their
influence to achieve decommissioning
within two years (see Box B for the
decommissioning clause in the Agreement).
The IICD would however act in
support of this and its mandate
enabled it, inter alia, to consult with the
governments, paramilitary
representatives and the political parties,
present proposals and reports relevant
to decommissioning, and monitor and
verify the actual decommissioning of
weaponry (see Agreement on the
Independent International
Commission on Decommissioning, 26
August 1997 at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/
events/peace/docs/dec26897.htm).
Further to this, on 30 June the two
decommissioning schemes (as set out
in the British and Irish
Decommissioning Acts of 1997) came
into effect, allowing the disposal of
weaponry to be undertaken either by
the Commission or by the
paramilitaries themselves. The schemes
prohibited the forensic examination of
armaments, and rendered them
inadmissible as evidence in court (Irish
Times, 30 June 1998). There were no
explicit timetables or definite
guarantees that disarmament would
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