English - BICC

ief 22
Box D: Paramilitary weapons estimates
Irish Republican Army
2.6 tonnes of Semtex explosive
588 AKM assault rifles
400 other assorted rifles
10 general purpose machine-guns
17 DSHK heavy machine-guns
3 0.50 calibre heavy machine-guns
9 Sam-7 missiles
46 RPG-7 missiles
11 RPG-7 launchers
7 flame throwers
115 hand grenades
600 handguns
40 submachine guns
31 shotguns
1.5 million rounds of ammunition
This list does not take into account the
IRA’s capacity to manufacture its own
explosives or other ordnance.
schemes which [offered] the
Commission a greater scope” (IICD
Report, 26 October 2000).
One might expect that such a review
of the Decommissioning Schemes—
which had previously reflected a
somewhat technical mandate for the
IICD and had mainly focused on two
weapon destruction methods—might
lead the Commission to reassess the
creative potential of inspections. A
process of redefining
decommissioning might come under
way describing a procedure according
to which stocktaking, arms control and
verification could precede the actual
measures of destruction, the sealing or
otherwise reliable means of “putting
weapons beyond use”.
However, the initial euphoria resulting
from the unexpected IRA move faded
rapidly; a violent intra-Loyalist feud
erupted in the Shankill area of Belfast
in late summer, expelling 70 families
from their homes and again throwing
darkness over the North. The feud had
Loyalist Paramilitary Groups:
Ulster Volunteer Force and
Ulster Defence Association/
Ulster Freedom Fighters
44 B·I·C·C
74 VZ58 assault rifles
674 handguns
20 RPG-7 grenades
185 RGD grenades
80 submachine guns (including
home made)
33 shotguns
Unknown quantities of Powergel
commercial explosive
A report in the Irish Times of May 1998
stated that sometime between 1996 and
1998 the UVF and UDA smuggled
hundreds of assault rifles, submachine
guns and pistols into Northern Ireland.
The report estimated that the UDA
and UVF each had 200 assault rifles/
submachine guns.
nothing to do with decommissioning,
but it took place at a time when it was
becoming obvious that neither the
Unionist mainstream nor the Loyalist
paramilitaries seemed satisfied with the
approach exercised through the
inspections, arguing that the IRA
initiative was not tantamount to
disarmament. The largest Loyalist
paramilitary groups, UFF and UDA, as
well as the second largest, UVF,
decided against reciprocating the IRA
initiative, while none of the
paramilitary organisations held
meetings with the IICD at that time.
The return of distrust:
sanctioning Sinn Fein
ministers
On 28 October 2000, after a UUP
Council meeting that again left David
Trimble hanging on with a very slim
majority, the First Minister—and party
leader of the UUP—imposed a
package of sanctions, including a ban
on Sinn Fein ministers from cross-
The breakaway Real IRA has a small
number of rifles, handguns, machineguns,
unknown quantities of Semtex,
detonators and home-made mortars.
The Continuity IRA has small quantities
of rifles and pistols and a small
amount of Semtex. It has recently
acquired an M79 grenade launcher.
Both the Continuity IRA and the Real
IRA have the ability to manufacture
their own explosives.
The Irish National Liberation Army has
dozens of automatic weapons and
pistols. It has circa 100 kilos of
commercial explosives.
The Loyalist Volunteer Force has only a
small number of rifles and handguns,
and a limited amount of commercial
explosives.
Sources: Magill, June 1998; Irish Times,
14 May 1998; Guardian, 8 May 2000
border meetings of the North-South
Ministerial Council. Through this he
hoped to push the IRA to move
further on decommissioning.
The carefully orchestrated steps of the
summer in this new phase of
institutionalising the peace process
came close to collapse in autumn
because of a return to the policy of
deadlines and ultimata which had
already failed before. Banning the Sinn
Fein ministers from those parts of the
institutions of the Agreement which
were supposed to foster closer links
between the North and the South of
Ireland—and which were hence of
particular significance to
Republicans—was perceived as a
painful variation on the “no guns, no
government” stance of the Ulster
Unionists. In reaction to Trimble’s
sanctions, Sinn Fein stepped up their
demands that the British government
fulfil its commitments to further scale
down security installations and to fully
implement the recommendations of
the Patten Commission on policing.
Sinn Fein also took the banning of