English - BICC

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Burying the hatchet may become the
most tangible symbol that the war
is over. The concrete circumstances
under which protagonists of civil strife
become prepared to “put their arms
beyond use” depend on a variety of
factors: the history and the political
roots of an armed conflict, the cultural
heritage of those who have taken up
arms, and the means and provisions of
the peace settlement. Sometimes, a
window of opportunity may be opened
from the outside, serving as a catalyst
generating a solution for a seemingly
intractable situation.
When we started our research on the
topic of Demilitarisation in Northern
Ireland—The Role of “Decommissioning”
and “Normalisation of Security” in the Peace
Process (DINI) in early 2000, the Belfast
Agreement was almost two years old, a
promising child in the international
arena of conflict settlement that was
struggling enormously hard to learn
how to walk. The issue of
decommissioning paramilitary arms
had become the seemingly
insurmountable stumbling block on the
road to the Agreement’s full
implementation. Between the Ulster
Unionist position of “no guns, no
government” and the Republican stand
of “no surrender” no bridge of trust
and compromise seemed possible.
Interrupted only by short moments of
hope—after the review of the Agreement
in autumn 1999 and the third
party inspections of IRA arms dumps
in summer 2000—one serious crisis
was followed by another. In autumn
2001, a dangerous mix of a political
vacuum at the governmental level and a
rise of violence in the streets made a
collapse of the whole peace process
appear imminent.
The joint project of BICC and
INCORE aims to monitor the
implementation of the Belfast Agreement
and to analyse the governing
provisions of the peace accord with
Preface
particular emphasis on the role of the
domestic and international actors
involved. The case study assesses the
potential of a satisfactory process of
demilitarisation * to foster peace
building and prevent further violent
conflict in a post-war society. In
particular, two relevant sections of the
Belfast Agreement lie at the core of
our analysis:
4 B·I·C·C
the decommissioning of all
paramilitary arms and the
(re)integration of related personnel,
the normalisation of security
arrangements and practices, such as
the reduction of the numbers and
role of the state armed forces, the
removal of security installations and
the redevelopment of former
military areas for civilian needs.
In a comparative attempt we hoped to
offer a key set of lessons applicable as
a door opener into the Northern Irish
impasse, and vice versa, to draw
universal lessons from the Northern
Irish situation that can benefit
comparable international peacemaking
and disarmament initiatives.
The scope of this publication was
determined by the fact that
decommissioning remained the
dominant issue throughout the period
of research. We hope to continue our
research on the other related fields of
demilitarisation.
Like many other colleagues working on
Northern Ireland, we were often
tempted to procrastinate, waiting and
hoping for a breakthrough to present a
more original and optimistic
perspective.
The shattering atrocities of September
11, beyond what any of us could have
imagined, created a change in the
climate of international relations that
induced the Republican movement to
make their decisive start to bury the
hatchet. On 23 October 2001, the
IRA—following the encouragement of
the leadership of Sinn Fein—publicly
declared that the organisation had
begun to put its arms permanently and
verifiably beyond use, and by doing so,
significantly contributed to the
reinvigoration of the deteriorating
peace process. It would go beyond the
scope of our analysis and not do any
justice to the issue, if we attempted
either to draw lessons from Northern
Ireland for the “war against terrorism”
or vice versa—such ill-advised and
careless analogies tend to blur and
distort the actual subject matter and
the lessons that can be derived from it.
The careful reader, though, may find
food for thought upon which to base
further research.
This comprehensive publication on
decommissioning, the first following
the breakthrough of 23 October 2001,
analyses the reasons that made the
arms issue in Northern Ireland such a
difficult obstacle for the peace process.
We assess the attempts to solve the
sensitive arms issue, both the failures
and the process of confidence building
that provided success.
The recognition that the issue of
paramilitary arms carried a symbolic
value and weight that went far beyond
its military potential, serving as the
political foundation upon which both
conflicting parties anchored their
positions, is one of the most pivotal
findings of this research paper.
Part 1 of the brief describes, from the
perspective of the various players, how
the issue of decommissioning
historically originated, developed, and
became institutionalised, from the early
days of the peace talks in 1993 to the
Agreement, and further on to the deep
crisis of the summer of 2001. Part 2
* Demilitarisation is the term normally used by
BICC in its research covering issues of
disarmament, demobilisation and conversion at a
national and international level. In the Northern
Irish debate, demilitarisation predominantly
describes the reduction of state forces and their
security installations.