English - BICC

ief 22
The Time Had
Come: Burying
the Hatchet
After July 2001, the closing date for
the history section of this paper,
almost three months passed without
any major progress on the outstanding
issues in Northern Ireland. The
emergence of a political vacuum at the
governmental level and increasing
uncertainty and violence in the streets
created a dangerous combination that
placed the peace process in jeopardy
and generated the most serious crisis in
the province since the signing of the
Belfast Agreement.
A profound breakthrough came on 23
October 2001 when the IRA—
following the encouragement of the
leadership of Sinn Fein—publicly
declared that the organisation had
begun to put its weapons permanently
and verifiably beyond use (see Box E).
When the Independent International
Commission on Decommissioning
(IICD), who had witnessed the
ceremony, confirmed that the IRA’ s
move was “significant” (see Box F),
trust between Northern Ireland’s
political actors was renewed and the
suspended institutions reinvigorated.
David Trimble’s euphoric reaction to
the breakthrough—“the day we
thought would never come”—
conveyed the readiness of moderate
Unionism to embark on a new era in
the power-sharing government with the
Republicans.
Without a doubt, the sea-change in the
IRA’s fundamental approach,
exemplified by its credo, “not a bullet,
not an ounce”, resulted from a longer
journey from violence to politics. The
actual timing of the IRA move,
however, was influenced by American
pressure imposed after the discovery
of an IRA-FARC connection in
Colombia in August, and more
significantly, the changes in the
international political climate in the
wake of the September 11 atrocities in
the United States. Responding to the
augmented international awareness of
terrorism that followed the launch of
the “war against terrorism”, and the
enhanced pressure on perceived
terrorist groups that accompanied it,
the Republican movement seized the
opportunity to make its long expected
move to “bury the hatchet”, a gesture
that contributed significantly to the
revitalisation of the deteriorating peace
process.
A closer look at the history of the
decommissioning debate, including the
months of crisis that preceded the
breakthrough, may reveal some of the
factors which made decommissioning
such an intractable obstacle for the
peace process. It appears that there
were bigger issues at stake behind the
50 B·I·C·C
“small” arms. The majority of the
findings identified in the subsequent
analysis will likely remain unchanged
when the long-awaited
decommissioning process begins,
therefore it is important to mention
that the following analysis does not
purport itself to be a “now-that- weknow-
better” approach. Many of the
cul-de-sacs of post-Agreement
Northern Ireland may, in retrospect,
appear to have been historically
unavoidable, resulting from the more
or less productive ambiguities endured
by many current peace processes. But
assessments will gain more depth of
field in the brighter light afforded by
the actual beginning of the “farewell to
arms”, which has already uncovered
cracks in the sectarian walls and
barriers that have perennially inhibited
conflict resolution in Northern Ireland.
Comparison limited
There were political circumstances in
Northern Ireland that gave the issue of
paramilitary weapons, a subject
accorded extraordinary political
attention, the heightened significance it
gained during the peace process—a
significance greater than in most other
comparable cases of peace settlements
The Day After: Irish Taoiseach Bertie Ahern with Sinn Fein Education Minister Martin
McGuiness and Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams (from left to right) holding a press
conference in front of the Dail buildings in Dublin, the day after the IRA’s historic
announcement on decommissioning (24 October 2001). Photo: dpa