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ief 22 The Time Had Come: Burying the Hatchet After July 2001, the closing date for the history section of this paper, almost three months passed without any major progress on the outstanding issues in Northern Ireland. The emergence of a political vacuum at the governmental level and increasing uncertainty and violence in the streets created a dangerous combination that placed the peace process in jeopardy and generated the most serious crisis in the province since the signing of the Belfast Agreement. A profound breakthrough came on 23 October 2001 when the IRA— following the encouragement of the leadership of Sinn Fein—publicly declared that the organisation had begun to put its weapons permanently and verifiably beyond use (see Box E). When the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD), who had witnessed the ceremony, confirmed that the IRA’ s move was “significant” (see Box F), trust between Northern Ireland’s political actors was renewed and the suspended institutions reinvigorated. David Trimble’s euphoric reaction to the breakthrough—“the day we thought would never come”— conveyed the readiness of moderate Unionism to embark on a new era in the power-sharing government with the Republicans. Without a doubt, the sea-change in the IRA’s fundamental approach, exemplified by its credo, “not a bullet, not an ounce”, resulted from a longer journey from violence to politics. The actual timing of the IRA move, however, was influenced by American pressure imposed after the discovery of an IRA-FARC connection in Colombia in August, and more significantly, the changes in the international political climate in the wake of the September 11 atrocities in the United States. Responding to the augmented international awareness of terrorism that followed the launch of the “war against terrorism”, and the enhanced pressure on perceived terrorist groups that accompanied it, the Republican movement seized the opportunity to make its long expected move to “bury the hatchet”, a gesture that contributed significantly to the revitalisation of the deteriorating peace process. A closer look at the history of the decommissioning debate, including the months of crisis that preceded the breakthrough, may reveal some of the factors which made decommissioning such an intractable obstacle for the peace process. It appears that there were bigger issues at stake behind the 50 B·I·C·C “small” arms. The majority of the findings identified in the subsequent analysis will likely remain unchanged when the long-awaited decommissioning process begins, therefore it is important to mention that the following analysis does not purport itself to be a “now-that- weknow- better” approach. Many of the cul-de-sacs of post-Agreement Northern Ireland may, in retrospect, appear to have been historically unavoidable, resulting from the more or less productive ambiguities endured by many current peace processes. But assessments will gain more depth of field in the brighter light afforded by the actual beginning of the “farewell to arms”, which has already uncovered cracks in the sectarian walls and barriers that have perennially inhibited conflict resolution in Northern Ireland. Comparison limited There were political circumstances in Northern Ireland that gave the issue of paramilitary weapons, a subject accorded extraordinary political attention, the heightened significance it gained during the peace process—a significance greater than in most other comparable cases of peace settlements The Day After: Irish Taoiseach Bertie Ahern with Sinn Fein Education Minister Martin McGuiness and Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams (from left to right) holding a press conference in front of the Dail buildings in Dublin, the day after the IRA’s historic announcement on decommissioning (24 October 2001). Photo: dpa
Box E: The IRA arms statement in full, 23 October 2001 The IRA is committed to our republican objectives and to the establishment of a united Ireland based on justice, equality and freedom. In August 1994, against a backdrop of lengthy and intensive discussions involving the two governments and others, the leadership of the IRA called a complete cessation of military operations in order to create the dynamic for a peace process. ‘Decommissioning’ was no part of that. There was no ambiguity about this. Unfortunately there are those within the British Establishment and the leadership of unionism who are fundamentally opposed to change. At every opportunity they have used the issue of arms as an excuse to undermine and frustrate progress. during the 1990s. Reviewing patterns and mechanisms by which the process of negotiation and implementation of disarmament initiatives was fostered or hindered offers a number of lessons for both the ongoing peace process in Northern Ireland and for other conflict-stricken regions confronting comparable dilemmas. In search of solutions to problems of post-war consolidation, such as how to find ways out of protracted violence, studies of the varying methodologies for managing peace processes have become increasingly popular in international peace and conflict research, with particular emphasis on the case study of Northern Ireland (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2000, and 2002). Benefits and limitations of the comparative perspective have, with respect to Northern Ireland, recently been explored in a comprehensive It was for this reason that decommissioning was introduced to the process by the British Government. It has been used since to prevent the changes which a lasting peace requires. In order to overcome this and to encourage the changes necessary for a lasting peace the leadership of Oglaigh na hEireann has taken a number of substantial initiatives. These include our engagement with the IICD [decommissioning body] and the inspection of a number of arms dumps by the two International Inspectors, Cyril Ramaphosa and Martti Ahtisaari. No one should doubt the difficulties these initiatives cause for us, our volunteers and our support base. The Political process is now on the point of collapse. academic publication (McGarry, 2001). Partisan studies drawing dubious parallels, with instrumental advantage for one of the respective sides in a conflict, have been a common feature of the ongoing political debate and dialogue surrounding the peace process in Northern Ireland (Magginnis, 1999). For example, the difficulties encountered by the South African peace process in putting paramilitary “guns beyond use” has—for all parties in Northern Ireland in different ways and at different times—served as an alluring precedent from which to draw lessons (O’Malley, 2000). Placing Northern Ireland in an international context to show that decommissioning was not a problem unique to the province of Ulster and to demonstrate how others “got it right” (Belfast Telegraph, 19 May 2000) only B·I·C·C guns out of politics Such a collapse would certainly and eventually put the overall peace process in jeopardy. There is a responsibility upon everyone seriously committed to a just peace to do our best to avoid this. Therefore, in order to save the peace process we have implemented the scheme agreed with the IICD in August. Our motivation is clear. This unprecedented move is to save the peace process and to persuade others of our genuine intentions. Signed: P O’Neill Source: BBC News, 23 October 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/ northern_ireland/newsid_1615000/ 1615957.stm. does limited justice to the historical, regional and political specifics of a particular case. We are taking the reverse approach here. With the knowledge of comparable cases of international conflict resolution in mind we want to return for a moment to look at the specific dilemmas plaguing Northern Ireland and begin our assessment from there. Guns out of politics or politics out of guns? After the end of the Cold War, disarmament of paramilitary and militia groups as well as state forces has been crucial to almost all efforts to end internal conflict in parts of Africa, Central America and Southeast Asia. Decommissioning, which in some cases has been incorporated into programmes to demobilise and 51
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