English - BICC

Why did
decommissioning
occur?
Although weapons had a political value
for Republicans, the leadership was
also aware of the costs accrued from
delaying on disarmament. The failure
to decommission periodically
engendered unwelcome pressure from
the British and Irish governments; it
also helped fracture Unionism to such
an extent that the institutions of the
Belfast Agreement would themselves
be imperilled. The political value of
holding on to weapons centred on
easing the Republican movement’s
arduous transition, but this did not
mean that arms would need to be
retained indefinitely. If the question of
decommissioning could simply be
stretched out for as long as it is
advantageous, then the grassroots
could be reassured through the period
of ideological adjustment during which
their recalcitrant stance on
disarmament could be quietly
deconstructed by the leadership.
Republicans could seek concessions on
issues such as policing or
demilitarisation in return for gradualist
movement on decommissioning. These
advances, alongside the continued
electoral growth of Sinn Fein, would
improve morale at the movement’s
base, making actual decommissioning
all the more likely.
Republican movement on disarmament
was clearly discernible from May 2000;
the inspection of several arms dumps
amounted to a designation of these
weapons for actual decommissioning at
an unspecified future date. In response
to this, a more propitious framework
for decommissioning was developed by
the two governments—
decommissioning was increasingly seen
as being linked to other issues of
security such as demilitarisation and
policing.
Perhaps the greatest boost to
decommissioning was given by the
electoral results of June 2001. In these
elections Sinn Fein nosed ahead of the
SDLP to become the largest Nationalist
party. Simply put, Republican
bullets have been decisively superseded
by the ballot as a political tool.
Weaponry has no real use and may
actually be an impediment to further
electoral growth; it certainly presents a
clear danger to the Belfast Agreement
which Sinn Fein supports.
It may be helpful to revisit certain
tenets of Republican military strategy
to assess just how far they, and the
peace process, have come. Republican
violence had several components. The
first component was to act as a costly
irritant to the British state. The second,
to draw attention and publicity to the
question of partition, a form of
propaganda by deed. The third, to foil
attempts by the British, Unionists, and
constitutional Nationalists to reach an
internal settlement. IRA violence could
act as a partial veto on any prospective
settlement; it tended to act as a
corrosive and partial solvent on any
possible rapprochement. The attempt
to harry and harass the British until
they withdrew from Ireland failed as
the state simply dug itself in for the
‘Long War’.
Armed propaganda is unnecessary—
and of course, prone to backfire
bloodily—when Sinn Fein is being
feted by political leaders worldwide for
having moved on to the road of peace.
The partial veto deriving from IRA
activity has now been replaced by the
very real veto inherent in being the
largest Nationalist party. In terms of
traditional Republican strategy, guns
are of no use and only serve to expose
Republicanism to political attack from
its opponents. The electoral success
of Sinn Fein has proved the efficacy
of Sinn Fein’s peace strategy and
has given them the political space
to disarm without appearing to have
surrendered.
B·I·C·C
conclusions
These internal circumstances favouring
an act of decommissioning were
already crystallising when unforeseen
external factors greatly accelerated the
process. Revelations about IRA
involvement in the training of the
Marxist FARC paramilitaries in
Colombia soured Republican relations
with the US government and large
swathes of Irish America. Soon after,
this embarrassment was compounded
by the September 11 attacks on New
York and Washington. To be associated
with an organisation which the US
State Department viewed as terrorist,
and to have the residual taint of
terrorist methods, threatened to place
Republicanism outside the political
pale. Although these circumstances
underlined the need for
decommissioning within Republican
thinking and accelerated its progress,
the process was already underway.
Loyalism and
decommissioning
At first glance, the prospects for
Loyalist decommissioning do not look
bright. The political outlook within
Loyalism differs from that of
Republicans on the merits of the peace
process, and appears less consistent.
IRA decommissioning was fuelled by a
strong adherence to the survival of the
institutions of the new political
dispensation; the political space to
decommission was created by their
electoral success.
In contrast, many Loyalists feel that the
new dispensation has done little for
them or the working class areas in
which they live. Loyalism’s political
concerns, the thinking goes, have been
overshadowed by the more media
savvy and electorally successful Sinn
Fein. The Loyalist presence in the
electoral arena is weak, and thus does
not act as a powerful incentive to
relinquish weaponry. The PUP has only
two seats in the Assembly while the
UDP failed to win any Assembly seats
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