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decommissioning. The IICD also
anticipated the creation of a timetable
for decommissioning which would be
worked out with paramilitaries; one
which they would be “expected to
adhere to” to ensure completion by
May 2000 (Irish Times, 3 July 1999).
These developments spurred the
British and Irish governments into
issuing a joint statement, The Way
Forward document (see Irish Times, 3
July 1999), which set out how
decommissioning and devolution could
be achieved. The Way Forward stipulated
that the Executive would be set up and
powers devolved to the Northern Irish
Assembly in mid-July—an effective
deadline. Shortly afterwards, “within
days of devolution”, as Blair was to put
it (Irish Times, 5 July 1999), the IICD
would confirm a start to the process of
decommissioning as defined in their
report and have “urgent discussions”
with the paramilitaries’ points of
contact (Irish Times, 3 July 1999). The
IICD would then specify that actual
decommissioning was to start within a
specified period. There was also a
failsafe clause in that the governments
promised to suspend the institutions
of the Agreement, if commitments on
either decommissioning or devolution
were not kept. Regarding the former, it
was to be left to the IICD to determine
whether paramilitaries were fulfilling
their commitments on
decommissioning (Irish Times, 3 July
1999).
What did Unionism
make of The Way
Forward?
In June, as a leaked UUP document
showed, there had indeed been some
debate about the possible merits of
dropping the policy of prior
decommissioning and instead adopting
what it called Blair’s “preferred strategy
of putting the main pressure for
decommissioning onto Sinn Fein after
devolution rather than prior to
devolution” (Sunday Tribune, 4 July
1999). The document argued that
Republicans would be unlikely to
actually decommission in the near
future and would consequently incur
blame for the lack of progress, putting
the UUP in a favourable position. This
argument did not however carry the
day, as The Way Forward proposals were
seen to be too vague and risky. As
Trimble stated:
“The demand of the IRA is government first
and then, maybe guns. How can democrats in
Britain, America and Ireland ask that we do
this? If we agree to put democracy at the
disposal of a secret cabal of committed
terrorists, in advance of them giving up arms,
we are not acting like democrats but like
delinquents” (Sunday Times, 11 July 1999).
The failsafe mechanisms were “flawed
and unfair” whilst the
decommissioning scheme was greatly
weakened by the lack of an explicit
timetable (Irish Times, 14 July 1999).
The UUP would only countenance
letting Sinn Fein into government
without prior disarmament if two
conditions were met. Firstly, if there
was a default on decommissioning,
Sinn Fein should be expelled rather
than the institutions suspended, as at
present the arrangements would
“punish the good and guilty alike”.
Secondly, the SDLP would have to
commit themselves to supporting the
Executive without Sinn Fein’s presence
(Sunday Times, 11 July 1999). There was
little likelihood of either condition
being met, particularly given the
SDLP’s view that the UUP was using
the impasse to “bleed more
concessions out of the governments.
To bleed this process dry” (Irish Times,
16 July 1999).
Unionism did not feel that it had the
room to manoeuvre on
decommissioning, so it decided to
stonewall. The knowledge that, in a
recent European Parliament election,
12 out of 13 Unionist voters had opted
for parties with a ‘no guns, no
government’ policy, may have weighed
heavily in the UUP mind (Irish Times,
19 July 1999).
B·I·C·C
guns and government
The fact that these negotiations had
taken place in the summer, Northern
Ireland’s marching season and a time
of especially heightened tension, did
not help matters either. When the 15
July came and the nominations were
put forward to the Executive, Ulster
Unionists stayed away. As only Nationalist
and Republican ministers were
nominated, the Executive contravened
the Agreement’s rules on crosscommunity
inclusivity and so
immediately expired, in scenes
reminiscent of a farce. Emotions ran
high and there were bitter words from
all sides in the following weeks as the
blame game was played. With the
Agreement stalled, the process now
slipped into a period of review.
The review: Autumn/
Winter 1999
There had been considerable emotional
fallout in the weeks after the stillbirth
of the Executive, a set of
circumstances compounded by
wrangling between Unionist, Nationalist
and Republican over the release of
the Patten Commission’s report on
proposed policing structures. For
Republicans, the proposed reforms did
not go far enough but for Unionists,
the proposals threatened the future
security of Northern Ireland and
represented a slap in the face to the
Royal Ulster Constabulary’s record of
service. Trimble described the report as
a “shoddy piece of work” (Irish Times,
10 September 1999). By the autumn, a
recognition of harsh political realities
had emerged. There was a growing
sense that deflections or evasions from
the goals of decommissioning and
devolution could not be tolerated.
Although the IRA had murdered a
suspected informer and had been
caught smuggling a sizeable quantity of
arms from America, this did not
automatically dishearten the British and
Irish governments. Whilst they
condemned these IRA actions, they
appeared to accept that both the
smuggling and the assassination had
been approved by the Republican
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