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concerns about decommissioning in
the immediate aftermath of the
Agreement. Ahern stated that he
looked forward to the
decommissioning of arms “later in the
summer” (Irish Times, 13 April 1998)
and that decommissioning was “not an
issue that was going to go away” (Irish
Times, 2 May 1998). The Taoiseach
added that “parties associated with
paramilitary organisations who want to
hold executive office have the
responsibility to ensure that guns
remain silent and out of commission,
and that the ceasefires do in fact
represent a total and definitive ending
of violence” (Irish Times, 2 May 1998).
The Irish government—as well as the
leaders of the other political parties in
the Republic—made repeated calls for
the IRA to state, in the clearest
possible terms, that the war was over.
As Ahern underlined: “People are
entitled to an absolute assurance that
the conflict is over, that weapons will
not be used again either by the parties
owning them or allowed to fall in the
wrong hands, and that they will be
safely and verifiably disposed of ” (Irish
Times, 15 May 1998). This seesawing
approach of applying pressure to
Republicans, then expressing sensitivity
to their ideological contortions, then
applying pressure on Republicans again
in order to reassure the rather touchy
pro-Agreement Unionists, resembled
the approach of Britain’s Labour
administration, albeit in a slightly more
mollified form. Both governments
actions thus exhibited the same
approach to the question of
decommissioning in this phase of the
process, that of trimming.
Republicanism and
decommissioning,
1996–1998
One of Sinn Fein’s most
comprehensive treatments of the
decommissioning question was given in
their submission to the Mitchell
commission in January 1996. In many
ways it was a rather Janus-faced
document pointing at once to the old
rigidities and also to new possibilities.
The demand for decommissioning was
castigated as a “stalling device and a
bogus argument created by the British
to avoid the commencement of all
party talks”; a disarmament gesture
would “symbolise an IRA surrender”
something which was “hardly a
reasonable or justifiable demand” and
would “ignore nationalist fears of a
repeat of 1969.” Even the distinction
between paramilitary and security force
weapons was held to be mischievous as
“this distinction between legal and
illegal is subjective, dubious, lacks
moral credibility and is particularly
insulting to the many victims of
Britain’s ‘legal’ violence”. There were
however substantial chinks of light
piercing some of the old certainties.
The document noted repeatedly that
the issue of arms “must be settled to
everyone’s satisfaction” and asserted
that, given the right political scenario,
the actual modalities of
decommissioning could be agreed “in a
matter of hours”. Sinn Fein also
asserted the belief that “in any
democratic society all guns must come
under democratic authority and
control” (Irish Times, 11 January 1996).
Republicans accused the British of
turning an objective of the peace
process—disarmament as a natural
consequence of a peace settlement
which removed the causes of
conflict—into a Machiavellian obstacle
to progress. In their view, Republicans
had already made the one real piece of
progress in taking the gun out of
politics by securing the IRA ceasefire;
“the big achievement has been to
silence the weapons so that a
negotiated settlement can be achieved
and as part of this that those who have
weapons will be persuaded to dispose
of them” (Irish Times, 11 January 1996).
Thus, the ball was not in their court.
This attitude was hardened by Major’s
treatment of the Mitchell report which
Adams accused him of having
“effectively dumped” (Irish Times, 25
B·I·C·C
run-up to the agreement
January 1996); the Republican belief
was that Britain had deliberately taken
the process “off at a tangent” in order
to forestall progress (Irish Times, 27
January 1996).
Old shibboleths were quick to return
to Republican tongues; the analysis of
British policy on decommissioning was
simply that it was being formulated by
“slow learners” and a “particular
mindset within a certain clique of the
British establishment” besotted with
memories of empire (Irish Times, 19
February 1996). The decommissioning
obstacle was a Machiavellian ploy to
“micro manage” the conflict, to reduce
the pace of change so that it could be
more easily regulated from London.
Indeed, it was a plot to wear down
Republicanism utterly by continually
playing for time. As Adams said:
“Mr Major and his advisers calculated that if
the peace process was stretched and stretched
and stretched the IRA would find it
impossible to go back to war. In other words
the IRA would be defeated. The British
would then only have to make the minimal
changes necessary to underpin this ‘new’
situation” (Irish Times, 15 October 1996).
Barbed language like this represented a
defensive strategy, it served to rally the
troops during a period of low
momentum in the process and sought
to deflect criticism of the IRA’s
renewed, if sporadic campaign. The
IRA was even stonier in its utterances.
They refused to “leave nationalist areas
defenceless this side of a final
settlement” and promised “no surrender
of IRA weapons under any
circumstances and to anyone.
Disarmament of all the armed groups
is only viable as part of a negotiated
settlement and nobody knows that
better than the British. We will accept
no pre-condition whatsoever” (An
Phoblacht, 7 March 1996). At least a
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