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“Mr. Mayhew goes on to say ‘. . . the
exploratory dialogue will be so we can discuss
with Sinn Fein how the IRA will hand over
their weapons’. So I say to myself: ‘This is
what they want. They want the IRA to stop
so that Sinn Fein can have the privilege 12
weeks later, having been properly sanitised
and come out of quarantine, to have
discussions with senior civil servants of how
the IRA can hand over their weapons’. And
then I hear that reiterated again and again; by
Douglas Hurd, by John Major, by Patrick
Mayhew” (Irish News, 8 January 1994).
However, even setting aside the fact
that there had been no explicit
reference to disarmament within the
Joint Declaration, the picture is
complicated by the absence of any
mention of disarmament in the secret
communications between the British
and Sinn Fein during 1993. The British
view was that disarmament was implicit
in the secret communication of 5
November 1993 in which it was stated
that both sides would “examine the
practical consequences of the ending
of violence” during exploratory
dialogue. For the British, this meant
implementing measures to normalise
security with the quid pro quo that
Republicans would move on
decommissioning (Irish Times, 15 July
1995). The clarification of the Joint
Declaration made by the British at Sinn
Fein’s request in May 1994, reiterated
this need to examine the “practical
consequences” of any ceasefire in
exploratory dialogue but again made
no specific reference to disarmament.
Although of necessity vague, it did
throw into partial relief the
choreography which Britain wished to
see in the developing process. A
“public and permanent” renunciation
of violence, followed by a
decontamination period of three
months was necessary before entry
into exploratory dialogue could take
place. These preliminary negotiations
would simply be a means to exploring
the “basis upon which Sinn Fein would
come to be admitted to an inclusive
political talks process” (Irish Times, 20
May 1994).
Decommissioning had thus ceased to
be flagged as an indicator of peaceful
intent, but the door had been left open
to its inclusion within exploratory
dialogue. This clarification by the
British hardened and elongated the
provisions in paragraph 10 of the Joint
Declaration to a degree, but the Irish
government, for its part, expressed its
satisfaction with the British response to
Sinn Fein (Bew and Gillespie, 1996, p.
53). The British government appears
then to have been speaking in different
tones on different occasions regarding
the matter of decommissioning. In the
period around the issuing of the Joint
Declaration, the necessity of
disarmament was publicly voiced, but
in private communications with Sinn
Fein, omitted. The picture is
complicated further by the fact that the
British government and Sinn Fein
published differing accounts of these
contacts. Five months after the
Declaration was unveiled, the British
publicly clarified their understanding
of its provisions, again omitting an
explicit reference to disarmament but
skilfully leaving the way open to its
introduction. It was a card placed up
the sleeve, but one that Republicans
knew they possessed.
The initial
Republican response
Irish Republicans, of course, regarded
any suggestion that disarmament might
be a necessary test of democratic
fitness as anathema. This did not mean
that they were altogether shy in
discussing the matter in the pre- and
immediately post-ceasefire period.
However, in their view it was best seen
in a much wider context, one of
“demilitarisation” and a matter that
would be resolved as a part of the
process rather than a condition of
entry to it. As Adams made clear in the
months before the Declaration, he
wanted a process to develop that would
“see an end to the IRA”, indeed for
some time Sinn Fein’s policy had been
B·I·C·C
origin of the issue
“. . . total demilitarisation. We want to see
all the forces in the conflict setting aside their
weapons—right now, today. What we’re
involved in is an initiative which will hopefully
lead to a process. As that develops the various
armed forces—crown forces, loyalist,
republican—will see fit, at a time of their
own choosing to demilitarise” (Belfast
Telegraph, 22 October 1993).
In the days following the ceasefire,
Adams again reiterated the belief that
“there must be a process of
demilitarisation” and that the task
before the actors was to “create a
climate so that all engaged in armed
action” would be “demilitarised” (Irish
Times, 2 September 1994), but he did
not see the issue of the handing over
of IRA weapons as a “stumbling block
on the way to peace” and pointed to
the fact that most of the guns in the
conflict lay in the hands of the British
Army. Martin McGuinness, who was to
become Sinn Fein’s leading negotiator
in the peace process, expressed
optimism that “a total demilitarisation”
could be brought about quickly (Irish
Times, 3 September 1994).
Aside from public pronouncements,
Sinn Fein are reported to have given
tacit assurances to the Irish
government that the issue of weaponry
would have to be dealt with and that
paramilitary guns would have to be
“banjaxed” [destroyed] (Duignan, no
date, p. 151). As Albert Reynolds was
to recollect in his dealings with
Republicans at that time, he was
assured that in return for not pressing
the matter or prior disarmament,
decommissioning “implicitly going
beyond the approach of the ‘pike in
the thatch’ would be dealt with during
the process of reaching a negotiated
settlement” (Irish Times, 9 December
1995).
Disarmament was clearly a matter that
Republicans realised they would have
to face up to at some stage in the
process, but not one which they
believed should be used as a tollbooth
supervising entry to political talks.
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