English - BICC

ief 22
From Crisis to the
Rubicon?
2000–2001
11 February 2000:
hope and trust
suspended
The severe crisis that occurred in
February 2000 revealed what had
not been achieved by the peace process
since the signing of the Agreement in
1998: some kind of mutual
understanding among the main
conflicting parties in the North, the
UUP and Sinn Fein. Such an
understanding could have created
confidence and resulted in the
establishment of a language capable of
communicating the political objectives
and real concerns of the leaders and
their constituencies. The actual events
of 11 February—when Northern
Ireland Secretary Peter Mandelson
triggered the suspension of the
Executive in order to preclude David
Trimble’s resignation as First Minister—may
at some time in the future
be interpreted as a set-back of
historical significance. At the crucial
moment of implementing the
institutional core piece of the Agreement,
the act signalled a fundamental
withdrawal of trust. Accusations from
the Nationalist and Republican side
ranged from “faulty decision” (Seamus
Mallon) to “greatest disaster” (Martin
McGuinness).
Apparently the crisis occurred in spite
of a rather successful first two months
performance of the power-sharing
experience, when people in Northern
Ireland learned that—with their new
ministers at work—the media had
started to focus on schools, health and
equality issues rather than on bullets
and bad guys. Moreover, the crisis
occurred in spite of cautious steps
towards decommissioning: the IRA
had begun to cooperate with the IICD
in December 1999, while De
Chastelain’s report of 12 February
2000 contained the statement that
there was “a real prospect . . . to fulfil
the substance of its mandate”(Irish
Times, 12 February 2000). In its report,
the IICD referred to a first time
commitment of the IRA to
decommission “[putting] arms and
explosives beyond use in the context
of the full implementation of the
Good Friday Agreement”, a move
welcomed by both governments “as a
development of real significance” (Irish
Times, 12 February 2000). While David
Trimble indicated that progress could
not be too quick, if he was to free
himself from the narrow margin
caused by a considerable number of
dissenters in his party, Sinn Fein leader
Gerry Adams stated that, with the
suspension, the British government
had capitulated to Unionist pressure
and deadlines instead of testing the
new IRA position to overcome the
decommissioning impasse.
In the following weeks, the famous
blame game was played out. While
intensive, behind-the-scenes talks
started between Sinn Fein and the two
governments to defrost the
decommissioning ice block, public
attention moved to the other
controversial issue of how to introduce
a new police force into Northern
Ireland. Unionist frustrations and fears
were that full implementation of the
Patten Commission’s recommendations
on policing (www.belfast.org.uk/
report.htm) would lead to an
unbearable loss of identity for the
RUC. Conversely—and with slightly
different frontlines than over
decommissioning—Nationalists and
Republicans jointly voiced their
criticism against the upcoming legislati-
42 B·I·C·C
ve process on policing which they
feared did not take all Patten principles
on board and would therefore make
joining the new police unacceptable for
members of the Catholic community.
The debate during those months
indicated that policing was in many
respects to become the more farreaching
and important issue: unlike
decommissioning, reform of the police
force would not only deal with the
impending remnants of the past but
would be about a whole new definition
of security—concept and structure—
for the province. Thus another even
more complex field of counting the
other side’s gains and losses had now
been opened. This was the time when a
shift in negotiation strategies was
attempted in order to move the
contentious security issues forward.
Next to decommissioning and policing,
the downsizing of state security—
termed “demilitarisation” by the
Republicans and “normalisation” in the
Agreement—started to move into a
new package deal to accommodate the
interlocked, but divided, concerns
about the future of security in
Northern Ireland.
The IRA initiative:
opening arms dumps
to third party
inspections
On 7 May 2000, a Joint Statement of
the British and the Irish governments
was published containing a new plan
for the full implementation of the
Agreement in relation to the unsettled
issues and one which was to be
achieved by June 2001 (see Sunday
Times, 7 May 2000, for full text). In
parallel, the IRA issued a statement
saying:
“For our part the IRA leadership is
committed to resolving the issue of arms. The
political responsibility for advancing the
current situation rests with the two
governments, especially the British government,
and the leadership of the political parties. The