DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY in Southeastern Europe, No 1

44
be used in launching a strategic air offensive against
Russia. However, “the successful adoption of a Rhine
strategy in Western Europe is militarily impracticable
because of the overall shortages of forces. The North
Atlantic Treaty Countries will have insufficient forces
to prevent Western Europe, excluding the United
Kingdom, from being overrun. Therefore, there are
clear advantages to be gained from holding the Italo-
Austrian bridgehead in Southern Europe in order to
retain a foothold for the subsequent counter-offensive
and to contribute to the defense of the United Kingdom
base.” 5
It was believed in the West that the Ljubljana Gap - the
valley in which the Slovenian capital lies - could have
served for a rapid Soviet attack from Hungary into
Italy, although this was never as much of a priority for
NATO as the Central Front. At a minimum, therefore,
to deny Yugoslavia to the Soviet Union was to make
the defense of Italy and Austria easier.
American military representatives had warned the Yugoslav
government that, in the case of war, the Russians
would try to break through Slovenia into Italy
and from Bulgaria to Albania, cutting Yugoslavia off
from Greece. 6 Although the third-largest regular land
force in Europe in 1948, the Yugoslav People’s Army
(JNA) could not withstand such a sustained assault.
The Yugoslav authorities were told that their defensive
capabilities would be considerably enhanced if Yugoslavia
would be willing, in conjunction with the Allies,
to consider Northeastern Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece
as a single defense area. Forces and equipment were
subsequently allocated to the defense of the Ljubljana
Gap in the north and the Vardar valley approach to
the Salonika area in the south. 7
U.S. assistance to Tito included the provision of aircraft
and other military equipment, plus a continuing economic
aid program that won Yugoslavia a unique and
favored position among all Communist countries. The
allocations of American military aid to Yugoslavia — in
tanks, pieces of heavy artillery and jet planes — were
used to equip the units of the JNA in the area of the
Ljubljana Gap and were generally kept in that area. 8
Yugoslavia thus became an important, albeit secondary
factor in Western defense planning and there was
some discussion about the possibility of bringing it
closer to NATO. That discussion continued into the
mid-1950s as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union flirted
with full reconciliation after Stalin’s death. However,
this was never a likely prospect. Tito had repeatedly
assured American and British representatives that Yugoslavia
would come in immediately on the Western
side in the event of an outbreak of war with the Soviet
block in Europe. 9 Still, he was determined to
avoid what might have been regarded as a “provocative”
association with an “aggressive” alliance, and
also to avoid the appearance of commitment to either
bloc. 10
Tito told the British government that the Yugoslav people
“understood and approved” the steps taken by
their government to improve relations with the West.
However, Tito was convinced that joining NATO
would not be understood by the Yugoslav public. “It
was essential,” he said, “to proceed by stages in this
way, carrying public opinion along. Yugoslavia would
be more useful to the West as a united nation outside
NATO , than in it and divided.” 11
Following his famous rapprochement with Khrushchev
in 1955, Tito kept his relations in balance between the
Soviet Union and the United States. He exploited Yugoslavia’s
position in the Cold War, playing one side
against the other with various benefits in trade and
both financial and military assistance.