DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY in Southeastern Europe, No 1

li ta ri za ti on fa ci li ti es be ca use the fa ci li ty ma na ge rs mu st sto -
re the scrap ma te ri als until the ma tter is re so lved, the re by
not allo wi ng ade qu ate spa ce to sto re the ite ms that are alre -
ady awa iti ng de stru cti on.
De spi te se ve ral ala rmi ng inte rnal re po rts abo ut the re qu ire -
me nt for re mo val of the scrap ma te ri als, as we ll as re po rts
on the ne ed for ma inte na nce and re pa ir of equ ipme nt and
fa ci li ti es, the MoD has yet to de mo nstra te that it se es the se
issu es as a pri ori ty. All of the se issu es are co ntri bu ti ng to
fu rther de la ys in the de stru cti on pro cess.
The Inte rna ti onal Co mmu ni ty sta nds re ady to pro vi de fi na -
nci al, pro je ct ma na ge me nt and te chni cal assi sta nce sho uld
BiH re qu est it.
For insta nce, in 2009, the UNDP Sma ll Arms Co ntrol and
Re du cti on Pro je ct (thro ugh its do no rs) and the Go ve rnme -
nt of the Uni ted Sta tes of Ame ri ca offe red ne arly 5.8 mi lli -
on BAM (in se pa ra te pro je cts) to assi st BiH in its effo rts to
incre ase the pa ce of de stro yi ng its su rplus mi li ta ry arma me -
nts. 4 To ensu re that BiH wo uld not incur addi ti onal co sts
(e.g., pa yme nt for la bor), the U.S.A.’s do na ti on also inclu -
ded the pa yme nt for spe ci ali zed te chni ci ans to co ndu ct a po -
rti on of the de stru cti on pro cess. Addi ti ona lly, the U.S.A. is
wi lli ng to de stroy what it ori gi na lly do na ted to BiH and also
se le cted ite ms that the BiH fa ci li ti es do not ha ve the te chni -
cal ca pa ci ty to de stroy.
As of Fe bru ary 2010, BiH au tho ri ti es ha ve not yet de ci ded
to fu lly acce pt ei ther offer.
Cu rre ntly, AFBiH is ma inta ini ng 19 ammu ni ti on sto ra ge si -
tes, of which 14 ha ve be en de cla red non-pe rspe cti ve, or su -
rplus to the Sta te ’s de fe nse ne eds. The co ndi ti on of all of
the se si tes is po or, but of the non-pe rspe cti ve mo re so. The -
re is si mply less inte re st in pa yi ng for the re no va ti ons of bu -
ildi ngs and fe nces that may be to rn do wn once the ir co nte nts
ha ve be en re mo ved; in spi te of the fa ct that the po or co ndi -
ti ons of the sto ra ge lo ca ti ons co ntri bu te to the de gra da ti on
of the ammu ni ti on and incre ase the ri sks po sed it.
Ho we ver po or the co ndi ti ons of the sto ra ge si tes and the ir
co nte nts may be, all mu st be se cu red. Acco rdi ng to the
MoD, in 2009 the AFBiH spe nt appro xi ma te ly BAM 2.9 mi -
lli on and allo ca ted ne arly 200 pe rso nnel to gu ard and ma -
inta in the se non-pe rspe cti ve fa ci li ti es. Of co urse, gu ardi ng
all of the se si tes also ta kes so ldi ers away from other ta sks;
for exa mple, te chni ci ans are often put on gu ard du ty, the -
re by de cre asi ng the amo unt of ite ms that can be de stro yed.
BiH is one of 56 pa rtne rs that ha ve agre ed on a set of co -
mmon pri nci ples, inclu di ng he lpi ng one ano ther to impro ve
the qu ali ty of se cu ri ty for the ir re spe cti ve po pu la ti ons.
Thro ugh the OSCE Do cu me nt on Sma ll Arms and Li ght We apo -
ns and the Do cu me nt on Sto ckpi les of Co nve nti onal Ammu ni ti -
on, the OSCE has esta bli shed me cha ni sms for assi sti ng
pa rti ci pa ti ng Sta tes in so lvi ng the ir su rplus pro ble ms.
“…exce ssi ve and de sta bi li zi ng accu mu la ti on and unco ntro -
lled spre ad of sma ll arms and li ght we apo ns…po se a thre at
and a cha lle nge to pe ace, and unde rmi ne effo rts to ensu re
an indi vi si ble and co mpre he nsi ve se cu ri ty.” 5
As a re su lt, the pa rti ci pa ti ng Sta tes ha ve agre ed to stre ngthen
co nfi de nce and se cu ri ty amo ng them thro ugh co mpre he nsi -
ve co ope ra ti on in addre ssi ng the abo ve ri sks by fo rmu la ti ng
no rms, pri nci ples and me asu res that co ver all the aspe cts of
the pro blem. Thro ugh the se no rms and me asu res, the de -
sta bi li zi ng accu mu la ti on and unco ntro lled spre ad of sma ll
arms, li ght we apo ns and asso ci ated ammu ni ti on is pre ve nted.
Each OSCE pa rti ci pa ti ng Sta te may fre ely assess its se cu ri ty
ne eds and de ci de whe ther its ho ldi ngs of sma ll arms inclu -
de a su rplus. Once a su rplus is de cla red, the su rplus ite ms
mu st be pro pe rly ma na ged to pre ve nt loss thro ugh the ft,
ne gle ct and co rru pti on, all of which po se ri sks to the lo cal
po pu la ti on. The aim of this pri nci ple is to stre ngthen na ti -
onal ca pa ci ty to de al wi th such pro ble ms. Si nce unsta ble
ammu ni ti on is da nge ro us, and gu ardi ng and ma inta ini ng su -
rplus arms pre se nts bu rde nso me co sts and be ca use the pa -
rti ci pa ti ng Sta tes wo uld not li ke to see such ite ms sho wi ng
up in mo re tro ubled pa rts of the wo rld, they agre ed that
the pre fe rred me thod of the di spo sal of such arms is de stru -
cti on; i.e., acti ons which re nder the ite ms bo th pe rma ne -
ntly di sa bled and physi ca lly da ma ged. 67