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Soton Equity and Trusts - alastairhudson.com

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Topic 9: DISHONEST ASSISTANCE AND<br />

UNCONSCIONABLE RECEIPT<br />

General Reading for this topic: Hudson, chapter 20<br />

Exceptionally, the principle of constructive trust will impose a personal liability to account in certain<br />

circumstances. Oakley describes this jurisdiction as being based on equitable <strong>com</strong>pensation - that is,<br />

<strong>Equity</strong>’s equivalent of <strong>com</strong>mon law damages in making orders for payment of money. The principal<br />

category of this personal liability to account is in the area of ‘dishonest assistance’, considered below.<br />

Reference should also be made to the topic of Breach of Trust <strong>and</strong> in particular to the case of Target<br />

Holdings v. Redferns [1996] 1 AC 421, [1995] 3 All ER 785 HL where Lord Browne-Wilkinson sets out<br />

the application of equitable <strong>com</strong>pensation.<br />

1. Introduction.<br />

STRANGERS TO THE TRUST<br />

A “stranger” in this context is someone who is not a trustee of that trust.<br />

Reading: Hudson, section 20.1<br />

You should read first the introduction to chapter 20 to underst<strong>and</strong> the background to these claims. The<br />

remedy is personal liability to account as a constructive trustee on the basis of being a dishonest<br />

assistant to a breach of trust or being a recipient of property knowing of a breach of trust.<br />

2. Dishonest Assistance<br />

Reading: Hudson, section 20.2<br />

a).<br />

The basis for the action<br />

Lord Selborne LC in *Barnes v. Addy ((1874) 9 Ch. App. 244, 251-252):<br />

“… strangers are not to be made constructive trustees merely because they act as<br />

the agents of trustees in transactions within their legal powers, transactions,<br />

perhaps, of which a Court of <strong>Equity</strong> may disapprove, unless those agents receive<br />

<strong>and</strong> be<strong>com</strong>e chargeable with some part of the trust property, or unless they assist<br />

with knowledge in a dishonest <strong>and</strong> fraudulent design on the part of the trustee …”<br />

Agip Africa v. Jackson [1990] Ch 265<br />

b).<br />

The objective test for dishonesty<br />

**Royal Brunei Airlines v. Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378, [1995] 3 WLR 64; [1995] 3 All ER 97,<br />

per Lord Nicholls:<br />

“… acting dishonestly, or with a lack of probity, which is synonymous, means simply<br />

not acting as an honest person would in the circumstance. This is an objective<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ard. ... All investment involves risk. Imprudence is not dishonesty, although<br />

imprudence may be carried recklessly to lengths which call into question the honesty<br />

of the person making the decision. This is especially so if the transaction serves<br />

another purpose in which that person has an interest of his own.”<br />

[1995] 2 A.C. 378, 389:<br />

Before considering this issue further it will be helpful to define the terms being used<br />

by looking more closely at what dishonesty means in this context. Whatever may be<br />

the position in some criminal or other contexts (see, for instance, Reg. v. Ghosh<br />

[1982] Q.B. 1053), in the context of the accessory liability principle acting<br />

dishonestly, or with a lack of probity, which is synonymous, means simply not acting<br />

as an honest person would in the circumstances. This is an objective st<strong>and</strong>ard. At<br />

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