1pFFjZK

ARISTOTLE 6 1
pous for the subject, and accordingly the * deception is unsuccessful.
A mistake may be made too in the mere syllables
of a word, if they are not significant of sweetness in a voice.
It is thus that Dionysius the fBrazcn in his elegies calls poetry
'
Calliope's screeching," as both poetry and screeching are
voices or sounds; but his metaphor is only a sorry one, as
the sounds of screeching, unlike poetical sounds^ possess no
meaning. Again, the metaphors should not be far-fetched,
but derived from cognate and homogeneous subjects, giving
a name to something which before was nameless, and manilinic
their cognate character as soon as they
There is a metaphor of this kind in the popular enigma
are uttered.
t
" A man on a man gluing bronze by the aid of fire I discovered,"
for the particular process was nameless, but, as both processes
are kinds of application, the author of the enigma described
the application of the cupping-glass as gluing. It is generally
possible in fact to derive good metaphors from well-constructed
enigmas; for as every metaphor conveys an enigma,
it is clear
that a metaphor derived }rom a good enigma is a good one.
ain, a metaphor should be derived from something beautiful,
and tinbeauty
of a noun, as Licymnius says,
and similarly
its ugliness, resides either in the sound or in the sense.
Thrrc is a third point to be observed in regard to metaphors,
which upsets the sophistical theory. For it is not true, as
yson said, that there is no such thing as the use of foul lan-
I
* "The deception," i.e. the concealment of art which tin- speaker or writer
has in view. See p.
1
13, 11. 1 1 ami 24.
riddle thus:
[US, an Athenian rhetorician f the fifth century B.C., is said by
p. 669 D) to have received the name