Scientific Underpinnings of - START - National Consortium for the ...

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Table 2.1.B-1. The World’s Largest Countries (Population in Thousands) (Countries in Bold have large Muslim Populations) 2009 2025 China 1,345,751 China 1,453,140 India 1,198,003 India 1,431,272 USA 314,659 USA 358,735 Indonesia 229,965 Indonesia 263,287 Brazil 193,734 Pakistan 246,286 Pakistan 180,808 Brazil 213,802 Bang’desh 162,221 Nigeria 210,057 Nigeria 154,729 Bang’desh 193,752 Russia 140,874 Russia 132,345 Japan 127,156 Mexico 123,366 Mexico 109,610 Japan 120,793 Philippines 91,983 Ethiopia 119,822 Vietnam 88,069 Philippines 117,270 Egypt 82,999 Egypt 104,970 Ethiopia 82,825 Vietnam 102,054 Germany 82,167 Congo, DR 98,123 Turkey 74,816 Turkey 87,364 Iran 74,196 Iran 87,134 Thailand 67,764 Germany 79,258 Congo, DR 66,020 Thailand 72,628 France 62,343 Tanzania 67,394 UK 61,565 UK 66,601 Italy 59,870 France 65,769 S. Africa 50,110 Italy 60,018 Myanmar 50,020 Myanmar 57,582 Most of the 20 largest countries in the world have modest growth rates but large demographic momentum and thus will make the largest contributions to total world population growth in the next 20 years. The fastest growing countries are generally smaller, but they are facing the largest burden of additional growth on a percentage basis (see Table 2.1.B-1). For the next several decades, global population growth will be concentrated in only a few regions and countries, mainly Muslim societies (almost the entire top half of Table 2.1.B-1) and huge states with 33
populations of 75 million or more. Most of the states that comprise Table 2.1.B-1 are also among the world’s lower income countries. By contrast, population growth rates in Europe and Japan are already low, and in some cases they are negative. Therefore, the proportion of the world’s population living in Muslim states, or in the very largest and very poorest states, will grow, and the proportion of the world’s population living in developed countries will shrink. The major exception is the United States, which is expected to add 50 million people in the next 20 years— mostly due to recent and projected immigration of people born elsewhere. Some countries with extremely rapid population growth are likely to manage it reasonably well due to sound management and strong economic growth (e.g., Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates). However, in a number of “flash points,” the inability to integrate rapidly expanding populations into politics and the economy will lead to radical political mobilization among those angry at not attaining the level of prosperity reached by some of their neighbors. Similarly, some of the extremely large countries will probably manage their anticipated growth without conflicts. However, the sheer size of the population increases the large countries face in coming years, combined with their efforts to rapidly industrialize, means that many will also face a “tipping point,” when uneven development leaves tens of millions of disadvantaged people to watch other millions reap the benefits of rapid growth. The disparities of economic fortune among classes, regions, or ethnic groups may become so great as to spark violent protests. Alternately, the migration of rural masses to urban and industrial centers could produce a social crisis. We cannot predict which countries will face such crises, as the crises are due to failed political leadership and administrative management more than population changes per se. But we can say that in many of the largest countries, governments will face exceptional challenges in meeting their populations’ demands for both strong and equitable economic growth and sound political management. We can say with certainty that these trends pose major dilemmas for the economic policy and development of the West, particularly Europe. In 2005, all of Europe comprised 731 million people, which is projected to shrink to just 664 million by 2050, while the rest of the world is projected to grow from 5.8 billion to 8.5 billion. 6 That is, in a single generation (the next 42 years), global population outside of Europe will increase by 2.7 billion, while Europe’s population will decrease by about 67 million. The shrinking demographic weight of European countries puts them on the horns of a dilemma. If the economies of fast-growing developing countries do not catch up to those of the richer countries, then the standard of living enjoyed by the West will seem more elite and unfair than ever, fueling resentment of developing countries against the G-8. On the other hand, if economic growth in those countries does exceed that of the West so that living standards in poor countries or regions starts to approach those of rich countries or regions, then the combination of shrinking population and lagging economies will render the G-8 countries more and more irrelevant to the world economy. Greater resentment or greater irrelevance: certainly a difficult choice. Europe’s combined GDP in 2007 was US$14 trillion dollars (CIA, 2008). 7 Assuming GDP growth per capita of 2.5 percent per year and no net population growth, Europe’s economy would increase by US$9 trillion (excluding inflation) by 2025. For Asia (excluding Japan), 2007 GDP was slightly larger, at US$18 trillion dollars (CIA, 2008). But due to modest growth in GDP per capita plus large population increases in most countries, total GDP is growing far more rapidly in this region. Iran and Pakistan achieved recent growth rates of 4 and 6 percent per year, respectively, while India and China were growing by 8-10 percent per year—and despite the 34
Page 1 and 2: THIS WHITE PAPER IS PUBLISHED JOINT
Page 3 and 4: 2.6.B. Infectious Disease and Socia
Page 5 and 6: Executive Summary (Rosa Affleck, To
Page 7 and 8: The rim of the wheel is a series of
Page 9 and 10: that ultimately, the strategic aspe
Page 11 and 12: Joe Hewitt (3.4) contributes “The
Page 13 and 14: 1. Stability and State Building (Cl
Page 15 and 16: esponsibility for states, and their
Page 17 and 18: 1.2 Catalyzing State Functionality:
Page 19 and 20: The program has addressed the proce
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Page 29 and 30: Turkey 21 68 98 224% 44% Labor Forc
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Page 37 and 38: Canada, and Japan, decreasing birth
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Page 45 and 46: 2.1.C. Demographic Security (Elizab
Page 47 and 48: Figure 2.1.C-2. Risk of Civil Confl
Page 49 and 50: The influence of age structure on d
Page 51 and 52: countries with youthful populations
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Page 55 and 56: Banking Crises and Domestic Agitati
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Page 63 and 64: conducted using GINI had an overall
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Page 69 and 70: 39 Carstens, Agustin, Daniel Hardy
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Page 75 and 76: U.S. national security is defined a
Page 77 and 78: Linkages: Economics to U.S. Nationa
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What Does This Mean to Water and Se
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Marshal Gibbons Ogden 1808: Gallati
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learn about how type 3 countries in
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typhoid, dysentery, hepatitis A and
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Population Changes. The world’s p
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Integrated Water Resources Manageme
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21 “Integrated Water Resources Ma
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2.3.C. Water Security and Scarcity:
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for expansion (Wegerich, 2009). Alt
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destabilize Western Afghanistan if
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Afghanistan explosively, slowing or
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Appendix 2. Figure 2. Central Afgha
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Food and Agriculture Organization (
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2.4. Changing of Climate and State
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Today’s Population Demographics T
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ecosystem of the massive Mississipp
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Table 2.4.A-2. The Mosquito Vectors
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odents, such as the US West and the
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The Globalization and Industrializa
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3. The earth is warming and the pac
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30. Raoult D, Fournier P-E, Fenocca
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Economics, Resources, and Developme
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Security concerns and issues do not
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3 Yalowitz, p. 13 4 Gautier, G. L.
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Stern addresses the impacts of glob
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Vulnerabilities to Climate Change a
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Considering the historical evidence
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change mitigation can be defined ge
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5 Wolf, A.T., A Kramer, A. Carius,
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Carpenter, S.R., P.L. Pingali, E.M.
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Energy 2.4.D. Energy, Africa, and C
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Researchers who have systematically
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another Rwanda happen. However, whe
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2.4.E. Energy: A National and Globa
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500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100
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to combat environmental pollution.
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The first and most important step i
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impacts, and reduced environmental
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Recognizing the characteristics of
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Figure 2.5.B-9. A Snapshot of Selec
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more than 42 years. That is, the le
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Using average values from the liter
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27 Coal Power database, U.S. Depart
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2.5. Food 2.5.A. World Food Availab
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also are the source of clean air, w
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preserve critical wildlife habitats
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3 von Braun, J. (2007). “The worl
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2.5.B. Food Production in Arid Regi
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ut the impacts of leaching salts pr
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Sustainable use of treated waste wa
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2.6. Epidemics 2.6.A. Epidemics: A
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populations, migrants, prostitutes)
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egions. Initiatives that are purely
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2.6.B. Infectious Disease and Socia
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HIV in the early 1980s is likely th
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treatment are lost until an outbrea
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3. Social Science Modeling and Anal
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what in-sample analysis will allow.
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groups. 45 This examination of oper
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31 O'Brien, S. P. (2002). "Anticipa
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Figure 3.2.A-1. Simplified Cultural
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“Tragedy of the Commons,” in wh
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Anthropological Theories of Collaps
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exacerbate rather than resolve prob
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14 Handwerker, W. P. (1986). “The
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The following section presents a me
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mutually exclusive and exhaustive c
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For example, the national televisio
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Figure 3.4-1. Risk of Future Instab
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Infant Rates Militarization Neighbo
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Overview of Results Table 3.4-2 lis
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Table 3.4-3 lists the 17 countries
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een newly classified as partial dem
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In addition, the indicator for econ
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Table 3.4-5 - The Peace and Conflic
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armed conflict. The symbol indicat
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3.5. Perception is Reality: Stabili
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the Gallup World Poll. The World Po
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unstable areas, the most critical n
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3.6. Assessing the Stability of Int
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games of complete information and b
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4 Kahn, Herman (1962). Thinking Abo
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2. A partnership is not a relations
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is necessary is that the payoffs fo
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2. Implications for Setting up the
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how to be selective. We have alread
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10 Making Partnerships Work on the
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3.8. Process Query System as a Fram
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for associating evidence, events, o
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e instantiated to accommodate the n
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The table below describes examples
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16 S. Oh et al., A Scalable Real-Ti
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mid-1980s, Battelle introduced one
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increase or decrease the a priori p
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ather than being buried as so many
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state. American foreign policy woul
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14 E. J. Honton, G. S. Stacey, and
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community preparedness, but no docu
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Societal and Community Resiliency:
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1 World Conference on Disaster Risk
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Figure 4.1-1. The Multi-organizatio
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Table 4.1-1. Summary Social Science
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1 U Sudan Strategic Assessment TTPs
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Approach - Analyzing a Region as a
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situations, this analysis is perfor
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a rapid assessment. Gaining access
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Appendix A. Acronyms A2C2 ACH ACM A
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TCS ToL TRADOC TTPs UNO USAFA WHO W
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