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savings and investments in health and education, a more highly trained work<strong>for</strong>ce, and economic<br />

growth, if governments invest in human capital and financial systems. In such situations,<br />

authoritarian leaders can be more willing to loosen political restrictions, or elites may create<br />

pressure <strong>for</strong> a change in government. 7<br />

In a historical analysis similar to that described above <strong>for</strong> civil conflict, <strong>the</strong> likelihood <strong>of</strong> a<br />

government being rated as a full democracy progressively increases as countries pass through <strong>the</strong><br />

demographic transition. Between 1970 and 2007, 14 percent <strong>of</strong> countries with very young age<br />

structures and 80 percent <strong>of</strong> countries with mature age structures were classified as full<br />

democracies, on average, at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> each decade, as shown in Figure 2.1.C-3. 8 This pattern<br />

continues with o<strong>the</strong>r measurements <strong>of</strong> governance: countries with very young and youthful age<br />

structures are also more likely to be characterized by weak institutional capacity, government<br />

corruption, poor regulatory quality, and fewer political freedoms and civil liberties. Countries<br />

that have passed through <strong>the</strong> demographic transition and achieved transitional or, in particular,<br />

mature age structures, are rated much more highly in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se governance measures. 9<br />

Figure 2.1.C-3. Likelihood <strong>of</strong> Democratic Governance by Age Structure Type 10<br />

It is clear that <strong>the</strong>re is no direct causal relationship between population and conflict or population<br />

and democracy—no single demographic threshold that, once crossed, leaves a state doomed to<br />

upheaval or tyranny. Most countries with youthful, growing populations pass through decades<br />

free from outbreaks <strong>of</strong> conflict despite demographic pressures, and <strong>the</strong> ultimate successes and<br />

challenges to development depend on individual context. Researchers have widely reiterated that<br />

<strong>the</strong> presence <strong>of</strong> a youthful age structure is not sufficient to create conflict; nor does a mature age<br />

structure guarantee domestic peace and democracy. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, underlying social conditions that<br />

create grievance and make involvement in an insurgency a viable or even appealing option are<br />

necessary. In fact, because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> interplay <strong>of</strong> factors such as poverty, inequity, and institutional<br />

capacity, <strong>the</strong> relationship is more holistically framed as one between population and<br />

development.<br />

47

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