13.09.2014 Views

Published Report (DOT/FAA/CT-94-36)

Published Report (DOT/FAA/CT-94-36)

Published Report (DOT/FAA/CT-94-36)

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

Technical Observers <strong>Report</strong><br />

This report is the consensus of the Technical Observers concerning<br />

the DIA triple simultaneous approach simulation. It contains<br />

general conclusions concerning the conduct of the simulation, as<br />

well as our recommendations to the Technical Work Group.<br />

The simulation was to triple runways spaced 7,600 feet and 5,280<br />

feet apart with a simulated radar system including a 4.8 second<br />

update rate and the Final Monitor Aid (FMA). FMA is the Sony 20 x<br />

20 high resolution color display with controller alerts.<br />

During the simulation, the controllers had little difficulty<br />

detecting and resolving blunders. The relative ease in which the<br />

controllers were able to maintain required Separation became more<br />

evident as they grew accustomed to the equipment and procedures.<br />

In fact, as controllers gained experienced with the FMA, they were<br />

able to wait longer to evaluate the situation and then initiate<br />

action to resolve the blunder. Alert algorithms and runway Spacings<br />

appeared to be the factors which allowed the controllers to take<br />

extra time when evaluating these situations. The slower response<br />

time did not appear to cause any "close calls" or test criterion<br />

violations (TCV). As the simulation progressed, it appeared that<br />

some controllers grew bored as they monitored approaches. Although<br />

the time spent on position monitoring simultaneous approaches<br />

varies facility to facility, controllers would never be required<br />

to perform this function for such long periods in reality. The ease<br />

in which blunders can be detected with the equipment tested and the<br />

monotony of the task, are factors which may possibly influence a<br />

controllers ability to maintain separation between aircraft.<br />

Whether a controller is bored or not is of course impossible to<br />

observe, however the Technical Observers agree this area may need<br />

some additional study through human factors testing.<br />

All but two controllers who participated had prior experience in<br />

the procedures and equipment used for this test. Early in the<br />

simulation the experience level of the new controllers was evident.<br />

Even though a briefing was conducted to all personnel and practice<br />

runs were performed prior to the actual simulation, the Technical<br />

Observers believe that more time should be devoted to training of<br />

controllers new to these simulations. The practice runs were<br />

conducted until the new controllers indicated they felt comfortable<br />

with equipment and procedures. The Technical Observers believe the<br />

training should be conducted for a predetermined period decided by<br />

the TWG and not left up to the discretion of the new controllers.<br />

This training could effect the early portion of the simulation. As<br />

an example, there were several nuisance breakouts during the early<br />

portion of the simulation due to the new and returning controllers<br />

adjusting to the equipment.<br />

I- 1

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!