Published Report (DOT/FAA/CT-94-36)

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[OOSS' OSPS) [OOOS'OS6P) [OOSP' OSPP) [000P'OS6€) [OOS€'OSPE) [000E1OS6Z) [OOSZ' OSPZ) [OOOZ'OS6 1) [oos L'OSP 1) 1000 l'OS6) 26
1000 ft. Table 7 presents these data. Qualitative analysis revealed that eight conflicts were between the closer spaced 17R and 17L (i.e., 5280 ft) runways. I : I i 4.2.4 Decision Tree Analysis. A comprehensive review of the eight conflicts that resulted in a miss distance of less than 500 ft was conducted. This review analyzed video tapes, controller response times, controller message lengths, pilot response times, aircraft performance, site coordinator notes, technical observer logs, and controller incident reports. This review was performed to ensure that each TCV, a) was not the result of a simulation anomaly, and b) could have occurred in the operational environment. Three of the eight TCV's had TGF aircraft evader's. The review further indicated that an additional three TCV's were the result of simulation anomalies. In one case, a flight simulator target was incorrectly located. In the second case, the blunder was initiated less than 2 nmi from the runway threshold, which violated procedures outlined in the test plan. In the third case, the blunder was initiated after the run was completed. These six cases were removed from further analysis. Two TCV's were maintained to be valid. These two TCV's are described in the following section. 4.2.5 Test Criterion Violations. The following is a description of the valid TCV's in the DIA simulation. Both TCV's were the result of 30-degree, no-response blunders. 4.2.5.1 Trans World Airlines 621 into American 204. The first TCV occurred between Trans World Airlines 621 (TWA621) and American 204 (AAL204) in the first run on December 3, 1992 (run number 25). Approximately 17 minutes into the run, TWA621 on 17L blundered to the right towards AAL204, a flight simulator on 17R. The ATC message to the endangered aircraft (AAL204) began 7 seconds after blunder initiation. AAL204 acknowledged and responded in a timely manner. The 14 second response time was within the normal range of aircraft response times (Hasman F. and Pratt, M., 1991; Hasman, F:, Pratt, M., and Jones, A., 1991). The lowest horizontal separation was 235 ft, and the lowest vertical separation was 188 ft. The resultant slant range miss distance was 301 ft. Further data, including groundspeeds and altitudes at blunder initiation, can be found in table 8. 27
Page 1 and 2: 1 DOT/FAA/CT-94/3 6 FAA Technical C
Page 3: 1. Title and Subtitle Technical Rep
Page 7 and 8: TABLE OF CONTENTS Page EXECUTIVE SU
Page 9: Figure 1 2 3 4 5 6 LIST OF ILLUSTRA
Page 12 and 13: An evaluation of NBO's and NTZ entr
Page 14 and 15: One specific effect of high density
Page 16 and 17: Technical Center. Indicated air spe
Page 18 and 19: -: zg cui r - I -----1 s: i I - OM
Page 20 and 21: sometimes instructed to disregard c
Page 22 and 23: ILS Localizer Cen tex line A Note:
Page 24 and 25: The Simulation Pilot Subsystem cons
Page 26 and 27: provided by ARTS displays, FMA's pr
Page 28 and 29: Controllers also submitted a report
Page 30 and 31: a. NTZ transgression frequency: b.
Page 32 and 33: 3.3.1.1 No-Controller Intervention
Page 34 and 35: analyses and the TWG operational as
Page 36 and 37: I [OOOO l'OS66) [OOS6'0SP6) [0006'0
Page 41 and 42: TABLE 8. TCV DATA, TWA621/AAL204 Bl
Page 43 and 44: directed not to respond), the 17R c
Page 45 and 46: 4.2.6 Blunder Resolution Performanc
Page 47 and 48: [LSI [ssl [ESI L 35
Page 49 and 50: 4.4.2 Post-Simulation Controller Ou
Page 51 and 52: 4.5.2 Phraseoloav. The second state
Page 53 and 54: number of causes of accidents durin
Page 55 and 56: 1 ACC X 8 WCB's x 102 Itat risk" WC
Page 57 and 58: 5.3.2 Technical Observer Assessment
Page 59 and 60: BIBLIOGRAPHY Bilicki, H. W., TGF an
Page 61 and 62: GLOSSARY Aimort Surveillance Radar
Page 63 and 64: Outer Marker (OM) - A marker beacon
Page 65: APPENDIX A MULTIPLE PARALLEL APPROA
Page 69: APPENDIX B SIMULATION USING THE FDA
Page 72 and 73: Thus, the controller,s ability to d
Page 75: TECHNICAL OBSERVERS REPORT DIA SIMU
Page 79 and 80: FDADS SIMULATION AT DENVER A demons
Page 81: isk blunders, but only 2 TCV's. The
Page 85 and 86: ILS 10L DENVER INTERNATlONAL AIRPOR
Page 87: ILS 17L 1 DENVER TOWER 1205 1 DENVE
Page 91 and 92:
POST-RUN CONTROLLER QUESTIONNAIRE D
Page 93 and 94:
POST-SIMULATION CONTROLLER QUESTION
Page 95 and 96:
CONTROLLER TEST CRITERION VIOLATION
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111. STATEMENT: 1. From your knowle
Page 101 and 102:
PILOT BREAK-OUT QUESTIONNAIRE DIA S
Page 103 and 104:
2.0 GENERAL COMMENTS I 2.1 Please p
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APPENDIX H CONTROLLER REPORT
Page 109:
APPENDIX I TECHNICAL OBSERVER REPOR
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The Technical Observers believe tha
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.. v) CI t E" E 8 - a c .- 0 CI 5 2
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c X > 0 4 L 5-3
Page 121 and 122:
MULTIPLE PARALLEL APPROACH PROGRAM
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APPENDIX L RISK ANALYSIS OF BLUNDER
Page 126 and 127:
2.0 BASIC RISK COMPUTATION 2.1 DEFI
Page 128 and 129:
a fatal accident during an approach
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3.4 ESTIMATING COLLISION RISK The f
Page 132 and 133:
4.0 DETERMINATION OF ALIGNMENT WIND
Page 134 and 135:
The roots of the quadratic equation
Page 136 and 137:
e estimated as the ratio of the num
Page 138:
This is a very high rate, which wou
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Published Report (DOT/FAA/CT-94-36)

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