Published Report (DOT/FAA/CT-94-36)

The Technical Observers believe that consideration should also be
given to rotating new controllers into the simulations. Reaction
time could be affected due to their familiarity of the process, We
believe that half of the controller work force should be new to
each simulation.
Communications between the simulator pilots and the controllers
was a factor as the TCV statements will reflect. The pilots flying
the simulators may have flown for a particular carrier for a long
period of time but during the simulation they were assigned another
carrier call sign. This resulted in a missed communication and
possibly a TCV. Data will be reviewed to determine if this was
actually the case. There were other problems associated with
communications between the controllers and the pseudo pilots due
to inexperience of the pseudo. These problems were discussed as
practical on an individual basis and should be considered when
evaluating simulation results.
Aircraft types and performance characteristics were always a
concern to the controller during a blunder situation. These
concerns seemed to be amplified when a lower performance aircraft
was involved and on the center runway approach. Although a TCV may
not have resulted due to this situation, the Technical Observers
suggest that lower performance aircraft be assigned runway 16L at
DVX when practical because of the additional space between runways.
This would allow more time for the lower performance aircraft to
evade should it become necessary.
CONCLUSION
The Technical Observers agree that triple simultaneous approaches
at the DVX airport can be safely accomplished using the 4.8 second
update radar and the Final Monitor Aid (FMA).
u- c-Dco3;fLm.L
Richard B. Herschmann
SATCS, IAH ATCT
Chester W. Anderson
Special Projects Officer
AGL-507
boel A. Forrest
SATCS, ATL ATCT
1-2
W alrace/F .- Watson
ATM, HSV ATCT