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Published Report (DOT/FAA/CT-94-36)

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5.3.2 Technical Observer Assessment.<br />

The technical observers concluded that the triple approach<br />

operation at DIA could be conducted safely, based upon their<br />

observations of controller and system performance. The technical<br />

observers reported that controllers had little difficulty<br />

detecting and resolving blunders for this operation. It was<br />

noted that the controllers used the F'MA alerts to their<br />

advantage, and often used the additional lead time in determining<br />

the optimal evasion maneuver.<br />

5.3.3 TWG Assessment.<br />

Based on the established test criteria, the TWG concluded that<br />

the controllers met the simulation objective. The arrival<br />

monitor positions in the simulation proved to be operationally<br />

effective and feasible.<br />

Based on the results of the simulation, the TWG concluded in its<br />

operational assessment (appendix K) that the proposed triple<br />

simultaneous ILS approaches at DIA are acceptable, achievable,<br />

and safe with the FMA system and an appropriate radar system,<br />

such as a Mode S monopulse system or an ASR-9 system enhanced to<br />

provide improved target resolution capabilities.<br />

Based on their operational assessment, the MPAP TWG made three<br />

recommendations: 1) there should be one monitor controller for<br />

each runway; 2) monitor positions should be located adjacent to<br />

one another; 3) a radar system with 2.7 milliradians azimuth<br />

accuracy or better and the capability to resolve two aircraft at<br />

20 nmi separated by 0.9 degrees or more should be used.<br />

5.4 RISK ASSESSMENT.<br />

A risk assessment was conducted on the data from the simulation.<br />

Since there is no recorded operational data about blunders, this<br />

analysis determined a target risk value, and then computed a<br />

blunder rate which would result in the target risk value. This<br />

assessment was based on NTSB data for the total number of air<br />

carrier accidents, as well as the number of fatal accidents on<br />

final approach. A risk model was developed, and it was<br />

determined that about ten 30-degree blunders per 10,000 triple<br />

parallel simultaneous approaches could be tolerated for the risk<br />

of the operation to meet the target risk level. Thus, the risk<br />

assessment indicated that the DIA operation meets the target risk<br />

of 4 x lo-' approaches.<br />

6. CONCLUSIONS.<br />

This simulation tested the controllers ability to effectively<br />

resolve conflicts for the proposed triple simultaneous instrument<br />

landing system (IS) operation at the new Denver International<br />

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