Gaming the Float: How Managers Respond to EPS-based Incentives

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Page 1 and 2: Gaming the Float: How Managers Resp
Page 3 and 4: earnings will choose more shares ou
Page 5 and 6: targets. Managers change the target
Page 7 and 8: it does not increase as the firm’
Page 9 and 10: meeting that forecast. This leads t
Page 11 and 12: 2.2 Time series determinants of sha
Page 13 and 14: ealized but before they are reporte
Page 15 and 16: A and incentive compensation in Pan
Page 17 and 18: elationship between incentive compe
Page 19 and 20: the view that increases in forecast
Page 21 and 22: In columns 2 and 3, we measure our
Page 23 and 24: atypical amount. In Table 9, we rep
Page 25 and 26: price levels observed in the data.
Page 27: management tools. 27
Page 31 and 32: A Appendix We show that a drop in a
Page 33 and 34: Figure 1: Example of the relationsh
Page 35 and 36: Figure 3: Median Shares Outstanding
Page 37 and 38: Table 2: Determinants of Shares Out
Page 39 and 40: Table 4: Shares Outstanding: First
Page 41 and 42: Table 6: Changes in Shares Outstand
Page 43 and 44: Table 8: Changes in Shares and Acco

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