Nothing Mat(t)ers: A Feminist Critique of Postmodernism

76 NOTHING MAT(T)ERS
how the predominant form of Midrash, Rabbinic Midrash of “parable or allegory—
reading one thing in terms of another” (1986, p. 3; italics in original) emerged in late
antiquity. It is distinct from earlier, purely written hermeneutical processes of
reading scripture. This Rabbinic Midrash, or Judaism of the dual Torah, oral and
written, stems from the belief that God’s revelation of the Torah to Moses at Sinai
“came forth in two media: one written, the other formulated and transmitted only
through memory” (1986, p. 3). Rabbinic Midrash “appeals to some other set of
values or considerations than those contained within the verse or topic at hand” and
“reads Scripture within the principle that things are never what they seem” (1986, p.
44). Neusner also indicates that this method and attitude is similar to the doctrine of
Pharisaism, of “hermeneutic pretense” (1986, p. 3) and metamorphosis: things are
not what they seem and one behaves as if they were other. Deconstruction modifies
Rabbinic Midrash but retains its hermeneutic pretense for pure masculine reading:
signification and resignation, palimpsests without end. 8
Foucault called Derrida the last classicist. Classicism, for Foucault, was the
episteme between the Renaissance and the modern period ordered by a relationship
to the word that was under the law of representation; the being of language was
absolute, raw and meaningful. In “Mon corps, ce papier, ce feu,” 9 a fiery twentypage
rejoinder to Derrida’s “Cogito and the History of Madness,” Foucault (1972)
took up Derrida’s critique of the role of madness and dreaming in the Cartesian
development of doubt. This dispute between Derrida and Foucault centers on
Descartes’ discussion of madness in the first pages of The Meditations. Each accuses
the other of being “metaphysical” in interpreting the rationality or irrationality of the
relationship of knowledge to being. Ironically, theirs is a contest over the grounding
of anti-foundationalism. They debate the grounds of philosophical discourse, and the
nature of the “nothingness of unreason” (Foucault: 1973a, p. 285). What emerges as
of interest for us here is the theme of the origin of meaning and its relationship to
Nietzsche’s sense of and mastery of “feminine” formlessness. What is the matrix
after the death of the Creator Pudenda origo 10 warn Foucault (1972, p. 584) and
Nietzsche (1978, p. 148) whenever they claim “Life is will to power” (Nietzsche:
1978, p. 148). Aristotle postulated a “First Cause” and the Christian Fathers—
notably St. Thomas Aquinas—built their systems upon his account of the Unmoved
Mover of all things. Aristotle’s concern with the conjunction of matter and form led
him to postulate four types of causes: material, formal, efficient and final. Matter is
the material cause, and form the cause which produces new entities. The efficient
cause, the motive force behind production, becomes Foucault’s discursive practices.
The final cause, which determines the course of development, is ostensibly negated
by both Foucault and Derrida. Platonism’s only reality was the Idea. Derrida and
Foucault debate the First Cause of the Word: formal or efficient In De Generatione
8. Christine Froula (1988) indicates Derrida’s father-son genealogy and line of authority.
9. This is the appendix to the 1972 Gallimard edition of L’historie de lafolie. It is only found in this
edition. English translation by Geoff Bennington, “My Body, This Paper, This Fire,” The Oxford
Literary Review, Autumn, 1979, 4, (1) pp. 9–28. Translations here are my own.
10. One’s descent must be a source of shame.