Nothing Mat(t)ers: A Feminist Critique of Postmodernism
Nothing Mat(t)ers: A Feminist Critique of Postmodernism
Nothing Mat(t)ers: A Feminist Critique of Postmodernism
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100 NOTHING MAT(T)ERS<br />
Good French philosophy proceeds in the manner <strong>of</strong> the immanent critique, playing<br />
<strong>of</strong>f sections <strong>of</strong> the text to reveal internal contradictions, demonstrating the hidden<br />
reliance on repudiated beliefs, and the consequences <strong>of</strong> a text’s actions. 12 If this were<br />
good French philosophy, then, or the time <strong>of</strong> the sophists, we would now proceed<br />
through a close examination <strong>of</strong> how the Lacanian text contradicts its psycho-ethical<br />
suppositions, and perhaps argue that Lacan’s univ<strong>ers</strong>e entre-deux-morts still depends<br />
on a bourgeois sense <strong>of</strong> happiness. The partiality <strong>of</strong> the immanent critique is that<br />
rationality is seen as culminating in the most recent immanent critique: the unreason<br />
<strong>of</strong> reason, the reason <strong>of</strong> unreason. Yet there is a critical position that is not that <strong>of</strong> the<br />
discipline or the disciples: a critique by those who do not learn from the Master to<br />
what they may object. We might try something else then, and show how Lacan<br />
complicates Freud’s question “What do women want” with his own argument that<br />
men want death. Our ironic rev<strong>ers</strong>al might not be acceptable no matter how<br />
immanent.<br />
The feminist and psychoanalyst, Luce Irigaray, was expelled from the Lacanian<br />
school in 1974, because as the back cover says, Speculum <strong>of</strong> the Other Woman<br />
(Irigaray: 1974/1985c) “provoked the wrath <strong>of</strong> the Lacanian faction, leading to her<br />
expulsion from the Freudian School and from her teaching position at Vincennes.”<br />
Her originality and resistance certainly indicate courage. Speculum <strong>of</strong> the Other<br />
Woman (1974/1985c) and This Sex Which Is Not One (1977/1985d) review Western<br />
philosophy from the position <strong>of</strong> female morphology and difference. 13 Her rev<strong>ers</strong>al<br />
<strong>of</strong> Nietzsche supposes: what if women were a language, what then Irigaray’s<br />
Parler n’est jamais neutre (1985b) shows how all language is sexed, how discourse<br />
is not neutral. “L’ordre sexuel du discours” (1987d) is a close grammatical<br />
cataloguing <strong>of</strong> texts, deciphered according to hysterical or obsessive compulsive<br />
characteristics. Such attention to grammar and psychology, and belief in the primacy<br />
<strong>of</strong> language and sexuality in culture is post-Lacanian.<br />
Irigaray’s ethical premises and approaches to Desire and the Law were, like<br />
Lacan’s L’éthique de la psychanalyse, produced as a series <strong>of</strong> univ<strong>ers</strong>ity seminars.<br />
H<strong>ers</strong> were delivered in 1982 in Rotterdam. In Éthique Irigaray takes up Plato’s<br />
Symposium, Aristotle’s Physics #V, Descartes on the passions <strong>of</strong> the soul, Spinoza’s<br />
lecture on ethics, Hegel’s Phenomenology <strong>of</strong> Spirit, Merleau-Ponty on the visible<br />
12. A witty critique <strong>of</strong> critique appears in Vincent Descombes’ (1986) “Introduction: Analytical<br />
v<strong>ers</strong>us Continental Philosophy” in Objects <strong>of</strong> All Sorts, A Philosophical Grammar, (pp. 1–14),<br />
Lorna Scott-Fox and Jeremy Harding, Trans. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ<strong>ers</strong>ity Press.<br />
13. For a clear presentation <strong>of</strong> Irigaray’s representation <strong>of</strong> difference and how it has been<br />
misund<strong>ers</strong>tood as anatomical determinism, see Margaret Whitford (1988) (1989). Diana Fuss’s<br />
Essentially Speaking, Feminism, Nature and Difference (1989) contains summaries <strong>of</strong> antiessentialist<br />
positions and chronicles the essentialist/constructionist opposition which she<br />
characterizes as central to contemporary feminist debates. As an “anti-essentialist who wants to<br />
preserve…the category <strong>of</strong> essence” (1989 p. xiv), she attempts to show that essentialism is not<br />
necessarily reactionary. This work contrasts with Judith Butler’s (1990) Gender Trouble which<br />
argues that the foundational categories <strong>of</strong> nonpoststructuralist feminism are oppressive and<br />
exclusionary. An excellent discussion is Angela Miles’s chapter “Anti-essentialist reductionisms:<br />
Equality v<strong>ers</strong>us specificity” in Transformative Feminisms: Integrative Global P<strong>ers</strong>pectives, New<br />
York: Routledge, forthcoming 1993.