Nothing Mat(t)ers: A Feminist Critique of Postmodernism
Nothing Mat(t)ers: A Feminist Critique of Postmodernism
Nothing Mat(t)ers: A Feminist Critique of Postmodernism
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28 NOTHING MAT(T)ERS<br />
The totalising thought <strong>of</strong> historical materialism has established everything<br />
except its own existence. Or, to put it another way, contaminated by the<br />
historical relativism which it has always opposed, it has not exhibited the truth<br />
<strong>of</strong> History as it defines itself, or shown how this determines its nature and<br />
validity in the historical process, in the dialectical development <strong>of</strong> praxis and<br />
<strong>of</strong> human experience (1976, p. 19).<br />
In order to grasp the problem <strong>of</strong> how to “speak the truth” without absolutizing it or<br />
falling into an historical relativism, Sartre distinguishes between scientific and<br />
dialectical reason:<br />
The modern scientist sees Reason as independent <strong>of</strong> any particular rational<br />
system. For him, Reason is the mind as an empty unifier. The dialectician, on<br />
the other hand, locates himself within a system: he defines a Reason, and he<br />
rejects a priori the purely analytical Reason <strong>of</strong> the seventeenth century, or<br />
rather, he treats it as the first moment <strong>of</strong> synthetic, progressive Reason. It is<br />
impossible to see this as a kind <strong>of</strong> practical assertion <strong>of</strong> our detachment; and<br />
equally impossible to make <strong>of</strong> it a postulate, or a working hypothesis (1976,<br />
p. 20).<br />
Lévi-Strauss rejects Sartre’s distinction:<br />
The discovery <strong>of</strong> the dialectic subjects analytical reason to an imperative<br />
requirement: to account also for dialectical reason. This standing requirement<br />
relentlessly forces analytical reason to extend its programme and transform its<br />
axiomatic. But dialectical reason can account neither for itself nor for<br />
analytical reason (1966, p. 253).<br />
For Sartre, only dialectical reason can und<strong>ers</strong>tand human history and its totalizing<br />
movement through praxis: matter is mechanical and inert, but mind is dialectical and<br />
active. It is possible to criticize Sartre’s model, however, without turning to<br />
animism, animatism, or Lévi-Strauss. The structuralist “dialectic” is static: men/Man<br />
are the unconscious bear<strong>ers</strong> <strong>of</strong> a univ<strong>ers</strong>al totem. Women are neither particular nor<br />
univ<strong>ers</strong>al in this account, but our subjugation is necessary to the establishment <strong>of</strong><br />
civilization. Lévi-Strauss’s argument about the relationship <strong>of</strong> consciousness to<br />
nature is therefore not original: “male-stream thought” has always concluded that<br />
male superiority is natural. Lévi-Strauss’s particular contribution to patriarchal<br />
ideology is his binary coded model <strong>of</strong> nature and culture (sky/earth, man/woman,<br />
and the social relations <strong>of</strong> marriage) as structure. He rejects the Sartrean for-itself but<br />
simply reformulates the in-itself as passively structured: if Sartre says matter is<br />
nothing except the site <strong>of</strong> struggle, necessity and nausea, Lévi-Strauss argues that<br />
matter is entirely negative-form. Lévi-Straussian Man is competitive, hostile and<br />
uncooperative, and requires the formation <strong>of</strong> alliances through the exchange <strong>of</strong><br />
men’s sist<strong>ers</strong>. However, he also transf<strong>ers</strong> this drive to power from men as a group to<br />
a primordial structure. His theory <strong>of</strong> culture ref<strong>ers</strong> to the body, but the embodiment<br />
is male, and the sexuality is already constructed as patriarchal. Lévi-Strauss has