Nothing Mat(t)ers: A Feminist Critique of Postmodernism
Nothing Mat(t)ers: A Feminist Critique of Postmodernism
Nothing Mat(t)ers: A Feminist Critique of Postmodernism
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EXISTENCE AND DEATH 55<br />
way for when, in the interior space <strong>of</strong> his language, he killed man and God<br />
both at the same time, and thereby promised with the Return the multiple and<br />
re-illumined light <strong>of</strong> the gods (1973b, p. 306).<br />
The specular and spectacular mirror stage 7 In Lacan’s theory, (1936/1977) the child<br />
recognizes absence, lack and realizing it is not merged with the mother/world,<br />
emerges into a break from the Real and seeks images <strong>of</strong> the original (the imagery)<br />
and language (the symbolic). Here the child in the mirror phase is Foucauldian<br />
structure, grasping the lightning chain <strong>of</strong> signifi<strong>ers</strong> in his Apocalyptic birth.<br />
Nietzsche’s return is used as a Frankensteinian moment <strong>of</strong> self-illumination by the<br />
demiurge <strong>of</strong> knowledge: a static Being <strong>of</strong> Discourse recognizes itself when modern<br />
thought’s question “Who is speaking” flashes across both Renaissance resemblance<br />
and Classical representation, symbol and sign, and the Science <strong>of</strong> Being is known.<br />
From a position <strong>of</strong> stasis, man re-apprehends being in a flash <strong>of</strong> lightning. Yet, since<br />
there is no memory, no aletheia in Foucault’s epistemology, there can be no new<br />
futures.<br />
There is no intentional, subjective time in Foucault’s Darwinian science <strong>of</strong><br />
history. His discursive practices are governed by a spatializing logic as univ<strong>ers</strong>al as<br />
Hegel’s. There is no work in Foucault’s time, no labour. Space is not perceived, and<br />
time is not experienced. Temporality is absent in Foucault’s writing because he<br />
rejects lived experience as a foundation for knowledge, and time is experienced.<br />
Foucault’s archaeology <strong>of</strong> knowledge and genealogy <strong>of</strong> power are natural<br />
“sciences”, marked by a Nietzschean theory <strong>of</strong> evolution: the struggle for life and<br />
the will to power. The key works <strong>of</strong> Charles Darwin, The Origin <strong>of</strong> Species by<br />
Means <strong>of</strong> Natural Selection or the Preservation <strong>of</strong> Favoured Races in the Struggle<br />
for Life and The Descent <strong>of</strong> Man and Selection in Relation to Sex were also<br />
preoccupied with the forms, variations and origins <strong>of</strong> life. Foucault’s structural<br />
Darwinism studies the descent <strong>of</strong> competitive, Malthusian formations.<br />
“Man” is a creature <strong>of</strong> some not entirely omniscient deity: “Before the end <strong>of</strong> the<br />
eighteenth century, man did not exist—any more than the potency <strong>of</strong> life, the<br />
fecundity <strong>of</strong> labour, or the historical density <strong>of</strong> language. He is a quite recent<br />
creature, which the demiurge <strong>of</strong> knowledge fabricated with its own hands less than<br />
two hundred years ago” (Foucault: 1973b, p. 308). 8 Who are these demiurges, these<br />
splendid, flawless unities <strong>of</strong> knowledge which gave birth to “man” but topple into<br />
the yawning chasms which border each episteme Epistemes are the spaces for the<br />
deployment <strong>of</strong> new modes <strong>of</strong> being <strong>of</strong> the empiricities Life, Labour and Language.<br />
Yet these two dimensional tables have no depth. The modern episteme, for example,<br />
has a length <strong>of</strong> about 1795–1950, and is wide enough to sustain the inscription <strong>of</strong><br />
those positivities which support all our forms <strong>of</strong> empirical knowledge. Successive<br />
7. Jacques Lacan (1936), Le stade du miroir comme formateur de la fonction du Je, Écrits, Paris:<br />
Seuil: 1966, pp. 93–100; Écrits: a Selection (1977) translated by Alan Sheridan, London: Tavistock,<br />
pp. 1–7.<br />
8. If one points out that need, memory and desire were subjects <strong>of</strong> Classical thought, Foucault<br />
count<strong>ers</strong> that nevertheless, “there was no epistemological consciousness <strong>of</strong> man as such” (1973b,<br />
p. 309).