Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise - Indymedia

86 THE BEGINNING OF THE END
for the declaration of a state of emergency in all of Yugoslavia. But Milošević
himself seemed to have no interest in this idea, as he had to concentrate on the
situation created by the demonstrations in Belgrade and Kosovo, a situation
which was now almost out of control.
The reaction of the Slovenes was sharp. One should not submit to pressure
from the street, said Boris Mužević, Slovenia’s representative in the party
presidium; Morina and the others were “grown-ups” and knew themselves
whether they wanted to resign or not. Ivica Račan of Croatia lent his support to
the state of emergency in Kosovo, but did not want to yield to pressure from the
streets. Kučan noted that when someone sends the people onto the street in order
to exert pressure on political organs, this could be the start of a civil war. What
did it mean to accuse the Slovenes of “ignorance” The extraordinary measures
had been adopted without Slovenia’s consent, and one did not yet know the
details. If the LCY Presidium was going to attack Slovenia constantly and to
insinuate that Slovenia and Croatia were supporting “counter-revolution” in
Kosovo, then the party presidium should adopt an appropriate resolution, publish
it, and then convene the Central Committee. The others obviously did not want to
do this.
In the meantime, Dizdarević, chair of the state presidency, had gone outside to
the demonstrators and had begun to speak. “I know that your concern about
Yugoslavia has brought you here,” he said, continuing: “One must finally bring
the constitutional changes in Serbia to fruition.” 102 Dizdarević’s appearance,
expressly—as he put it—“in the name of the presidency of Yugoslavia”, shocked
non-Serbs throughout Yugoslavia. Nor did this appearance avail Dizdarević
much, as Serb demonstrators hissed at him. But he provided Milošević’s
propaganda with a justification to declare this demonstration, which was the
expression of extreme Serbian nationalist intolerance, a “meeting for
Yugoslavia”.
Scarcely back in the session of the federal party leadership, Dizdarević began,
together with Milošević, to demand that something be done: “The demonstration
is becoming too big. We must calm things.” It was for this purpose that he had
gone out to the demonstrators. Šuvar considered it necessary to say that the party
leadership stood unwaveringly behind the constitutional changes in Serbia. After
a pause during which a resolution was drawn up, Milošević renewed his pressure
for an immediate answer to the demonstrators. Račan warned, “If we follow
Milošević’s advice, we will in future have to submit to every such mass
demonstration.” Kučan: “Is there any point at all in discussing this I do not
accept ultimatums”. Milošević now resorted to outright blackmail: If the
demonstrators were not given an answer, he would not take responsibility for
what would happen in Belgrade. But with this challenge, the Serbian leader had
gone too far. Račan: “I reject blackmail and pressure tactics”. Šuvar tried to find
a compromise: one could describe the resignations as a “moral act” which could
be countermanded. But Milošević had only contempt for this proposal. “That
sounds like a funeral peroration,” he commented. Šuvar and Korošec set