Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise - Indymedia

UNWANTED INDEPENDENCE 187
adherent Koliševski, who, with the exception of the short “liberal” period under
Krste Crvenkovski (which ended with his removal from office in 1972), held
Macedonia in their hands from 1945 until autumn 1989, bear the responsibility
not only for the aggressiveness in the country’s foreign policy but also for the
internal repression and consequently for the bad relations with the Albanian
minority. Since the transition to new relationships in Macedonia has gone
smoothly, the old way of thinking has disappeared step by step. The past
parliamentary president Andov, leader of the liberal party who had earlier been
put in the “cooler” together with Gligorov because of his reformist tendencies,
held that the old regime in Skopje had to share responsibility also for the collapse
of Yugoslavia. He cites a remark made by Koliševski some time after Tito’s
death according to which, in contrast to the Marshal’s evident opinion, he felt
that a strong Serbia was conducive to a strong Yugoslavia. With this, Andov
held, Koliševski had brought Macedonia into its ruinous alliance with Serbia.
Milan Pančevski’s entry as a member of the LCY Presidium was also
problematic. Then one should recall also Lazar Mojsov’s shameful behavior in
March 1989, when he, as Macedonia’s representative in the state presidency,
made his accusations against Vllasi. Finally, Tupurkovski saddled the incipient
resistance to Milošević with the unfortunate epithet, the “unprincipled
alliance”. 34
At the elections of November 1990, it was not the reform communists,
reorganized as the Social Democratic League of Macedonia, but the
new nationalist-oriented party, “IMRO—Democratic Party for Macedonian
National Unity”, which emerged as the biggest vote-getter. But that ultimately
did not count for much. Of the 120 seats in the parliament, IMRO obtained only
38 seats, against 31 for the reform communists, 11 for the liberals, and 17 for the
strongest Albanian party, the Party for Democratic Prosperity. The latter three
now formed a coalition, leaving the nationalists in the opposition. At the next
elections, four years later, in October 1994, this party, together with Gošev’s newly
created Democratic Party, were so far behind in the first round of voting that they
decided against participating in the second round and instead announced a
“boycott”. The result of the first four years of democratic government under
President Gligorov was an unmistakable strengthening of the moderate left, as
well as a confirmation of Gligorov’s leadership. In spite of the attempted
assassination of Gligorov, Macedonia may be characterized now, as before, as
under presidential rule.
Gligorov’s main service is certainly that, from the beginning of his term of
office, he made a clear renunciation of Macedonian nationalism and came out in
favor of having the constitution formulate Macedonia as a “citizens’ state” (Article
2) rather than as the “national state” of the Macedonian people.
Of course, that alone could scarcely solve Macedonia’s problems. On the right
there remains the relatively strong nationalist party (IMRO) under the leadership
of novelist Ljubčo Georgijevski, who wants a Macedonian national state and
who accused Gligorov of having made too many concessions to the Albanians.