Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise - Indymedia

THE BEGINNING OF THE END 79
married a daughter of the last king of Montenegro, Nikola. The Montenegrin
civil war in the Second World War was, for a long time, a three-cornered contest
pitting Chetniks, Partisans, and Autonomists against each other. After the war,
Montenegrin intellectuals behaved in an especially dogmatic way, Djilas being
no exception; in 1948, the proportion of Montenegrins among the
“Cominformists” was comparatively high. In later years, a certain liberality
gained ground in Montenegro, thanks to promotion by people such as Žarković.
The leadership could not solve the difficult economic problems, to be sure; these
had their origins above all in the so-called “political investments”, such as the
Nikšić Steelworks.
The “conquest” of Montenegro by Milošević’s supporters, such as the new
party chief and later president Momir Bulatović, showed, at a stroke, that
something which had hardly occurred to anyone before could come to pass, viz.,
that Milošević, and with him Serbia, would some day dominate the institutions
of Yugoslavia—and this from the top down, through the party presidium and
state presidency, as well as through the parliament. Milošević could now count
on the votes of Serbia, Vojvodina, Montenegro, and Kosovo in all federal
bodies, even if the battle was not yet completely over in the last of these.
Moreover, Macedonia was also supporting him at the time; the leadership there
had needlessly entangled itself in a similar conflict against local Albanians, as
had Serbia. In addition, the politicians in Bosnia-Herzegovina and even in
Croatia had to worry about internal disturbances in the event that they resisted
Serbian wishes. The army leadership stood on Milošević’s side in all important
questions. The principle of consensus functioned only on the state level and even
here it was by no means impermeable.
The new situation set off alarm bells not only in Ljubljana but also in Zagreb
and Sarajevo, and for that matter also in the central organs of the federation. The
frail Dizdarević unexpectedly told the next session of the LCY Presidium where
he was present that what had occurred in Montenegro was the collapse of the
party; in view of the massive wave of resignations there, the question presented
itself as to whether the party organs in Montenegro could still claim to have any
legitimacy. 80 He further raised the question as to whether the complete breakdown
of the system of public security in that republic did not call for federal measures.
One had already experienced this phenomenon in Vojvodina and in Kosovo
where something similar was happening. Thus, as Dizdarević pointed out, the
party had, for all practical purposes, been dissolved through demonstrations,
which is to say, through extra-institutional procedures, in three parts of the
country. Could one put up with this
Milošević at once tried to reassure the others. In Vojvodina everything was
“solved” and in Montenegro one needed to replenish the party organs. If the LCY
leadership had seriously considered withdrawing recognition of the legality of
the highest party organs of Montenegro, it should have held an extraordinary
party congress in that republic. That would have been extremely unfavorable for
Milošević because it was one thing to drive exhausted leaderships to resign with