Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise - Indymedia

THE BEGINNING OF THE END 87
themselves against attempts to introduce a passage about the responsibility of the
LCY Presidium. Milošević was making wild attacks on the Slovenes and said
that he would go out to the rally. Kučan replied that if Milošević went out, he
would too. The Slovenian leader repeated his demand that a resolution be
formulated specifying the ostensible responsibility of the Slovenes, if this claim
continued to be upheld.
The decision, which was finally passed by a majority, was less than Milošević
had wanted. Thereupon, the Serbian leader himself obtained what he had been
unable to obtain in the federal party presidium. Shortly after 9 p.m. he spoke to
the demonstrators: “We will fight for the return of peace, order, justice, and unity
in Kosovo and in every part of our country. There is no price too high, no force
which can shake the leadership of Serbia and the citizens of Serbia in their fight
for their just goals.” 103 Then came the threats: “In a short while the names of the
organizers of the demonstrators will be published, and I would like to say to you
that those who have pursued anti-Yugoslav goals will be arrested and punished”.
The applause was colossal.
On 2 March, Vllasi and the two leading figures in the Trepča mines, Aziz
Arbasi and Burhan Kavaja, together with other leading Albanian politicians and
managers, were arrested. Vllasi was taken into custody in Bijeljina (Bosnia), the
birthplace of his wife, and was transferred to Serbia by the local Serbian police
there. 104 People now spoke of “arrest by acclamation”. In the western part of
Yugoslavia there were harsh reproaches made against Dizdarević and other
leading federal authorities, for having permitted this to happen and for having
capitulated to a crowd of demonstrators in Belgrade. 105
The arrest of Vllasi had been prepared through a further manipulation of the
federal leadership, executed by Macedonia’s representative in the state
presidency, Lazar Mojsov. As already mentioned, under Article 317 of the
constitution, the federal Skupština was supposed to be allowed to approve the
proposed “special measures” in Kosovo. Speaking before both houses of
parliament on 2 March 1989, ostensibly in the name of the state presidency,
Mojsov claimed that the presidency had in its possession a “document” which it
had received on 25 February. According to this “document”, Vllasi and other
Albanian leaders in Kosovo had worked out a“three-phase plan”, beginning with
the strike at Trepča and ending with the outbreak of armed insurrection. Only the
declaration of a state of emergency had hindered the execution of this plan.
Mojsov also said that the Albanian secret service in Tirana had been implicated
in this plan. 106 Doubts were immediately expressed throughout non-Serbian
regions of Yugoslavia concerning the authenticity of this supposed “document”;
people spoke contemptuously of a “Mojsov Plan”. 107 It was later proven that
Mojsov had fabricated the story. Dolanc told the Slovenian republic presidency
on 20 March that what Mojsov had said before the Skupština in Belgrade was
not the standpoint of the Yugoslav state presidency, but merely Mojsov’s own
personal initiative, ostensibly advanced with encouragement from Kadijević. 108