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Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise - Indymedia

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126 WESTERN YUGOSLAVIA REACTS<br />

In today’s independent Croatia <strong>of</strong> Franjo Tudjman, the historical myths do not<br />

enter the picture as forcefully as they did in Ustaše times, but they are,<br />

nonetheless, more strongly expressed than in any <strong>of</strong> the Croatian political<br />

movements prior to the Second World War. They resulted, inter alia, in some<br />

damage to relations with Istria and Dalmatia. The <strong>of</strong>ten penetratingly expressed<br />

ideas <strong>of</strong> Tudjman and his adherents concerning the special role <strong>of</strong> Croatia and <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>its</strong> “western” Christianity in history may be traced, on the one hand, back to<br />

Tudjman’s personality and, on the other hand, to the special circumstances in<br />

which Croatian independence had to develop. The communist regime in<br />

<strong>Yugoslavia</strong> was, as a matter <strong>of</strong> principle, hostile to Croatian national<br />

consciousness, being inspired by a mixture <strong>of</strong> communist, Yugoslav, and Greater<br />

Serbian tendencies. The anti-national policy in Croatia after 1971, already<br />

described (p. 17), worked especial mischief. It was the time when the Catholic<br />

Church stepped forward as the only refuge for Croatian national feeling. One<br />

could reproach the Church, if one wished, that it played on this to build up <strong>its</strong><br />

strength. The great convocations, which the Church organized in the late 1970s<br />

and early 1980s, sometimes conveyed the impression that the direct activity <strong>of</strong> the<br />

hand <strong>of</strong> God in Croatian history had to be revealed. 105 But one must consider<br />

that the posture <strong>of</strong> political-spiritual combat had been forced on the Church and<br />

that it made use <strong>of</strong> such weapons as it had at hand. I cannot remember any<br />

religious manifestations from that time which were directed against another<br />

people, for example Serbs. That the Catholic Church <strong>of</strong> Croatia was by no means<br />

the tabernacle <strong>of</strong> all the wild ideas about the role <strong>of</strong> Croatia as “antimurale<br />

christianitatis” was shown in the clarity with which Zagreb Archbishop Kuharić<br />

criticized Tudjman’s Bosnian policy.<br />

Certainly, the so-called forced conversions were a sad chapter in Croatia’s<br />

history. Here, especially during the persecutions by the Ustaše in 1941–42, many<br />

Serbs in the Krajina and other parts <strong>of</strong> the country, including Bosnia, were forced<br />

to convert to Catholicism. On this point, one should say that the marked disunity<br />

which characterizes Croatia in geographic, historical, and political terms also<br />

made <strong>its</strong>elf evident within the Church. That was Archbishop Stepinac’s big<br />

problem. A second historical point was the difficulty <strong>of</strong> demarcating the Church<br />

from an ideology which, by contrast with German national-socialism or Italian<br />

fascism, inserted religion into the national mythos. The correct interpretation is<br />

probably that at the beginning the upper clergy <strong>of</strong> the Church in Croatia,<br />

Stepinac included, were rather taken by the idea <strong>of</strong> spreading Catholicism<br />

eastward. 106 The Vatican had to underline that only voluntary conversions could<br />

be accepted. 107 The same sources mention, however, that the Ustaše state had<br />

treated the question <strong>of</strong> conversions from the start as an affair <strong>of</strong> state. 108 When<br />

the first persecutions <strong>of</strong> Serbs became public, the problem took on yet another<br />

dimension for the Church. Now conversions <strong>of</strong>ten seemed to afford the only<br />

possibility <strong>of</strong> saving the lives <strong>of</strong> Serbs, as Maček also writes, 109 while, on the other<br />

hand—and here, once more, the old differences were observable—especially in<br />

Bosnia-Herzegovina, one still found a primitive missionary zeal.

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