Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise - Indymedia

IRRECONCILABLE POSITIONS 159
proposed that the army be sent in against the demonstrators. He later claimed
that the representatives of Macedonia and Bosnia had assented to the army
intervention. 100 The army was now sent into Belgrade; instead of Albanians,
Slovenes, and Croats, some ten thousand Serbs were, for a change, playing the
role of enemies of the state.
The Slovenian presidential council responded with a declaration alleging that
Jović had once more violated the constitution. Instead of becoming depoliticized,
the army was being turned into a factor in the confrontations even within the
republics.
These events flowed directly into that remarkable coup in mid-March 1991.
Mesić claims that Jović and Defense Minister Kadijević had already demanded,
on the occasion of the army’s ostensible “mediation” in Pakrac in early March,
that a state of emergency be declared, in response to the deterioration in
interethnic relations throughout the country, and that Jović be granted “full
powers of war”. 101 Jović had come to an agreement with Admiral Brovet, who said
that the Defense Ministry’s proposal was grounded on the “constitutional task of
the army”. In the 5 March 1991 session, Jović demanded that the army be
authorized to take necessary steps, at which point Mesić left the meeting, since
Jović refused to offer any explanations to the Croatian representative. Drnovšek
remarked that, in this way, all chances for a peaceful solution in the country
would soon be lost.
After the events in Belgrade, there was a session of the state presidency on 12,
14, and 15 March 1991, at which members of the presidency were pressured to
agree to a proclamation of a state of emergency and to the transfer of authority to
the army. Evidently, or so one must conclude, Milošević felt sure of the army’s
loyalty and certain that, with the concurrence of a majority in the state
presidency, he could enlist the army for his own purposes. Once again, Jović
engaged in unbelievable manipulations. Mesić reports how the members of the
higher state organ were, upon their arrival at the federal building in Belgrade,
asked to step into army buses, so that they might be taken to the headquarters of
the General Staff, where the facts could be discussed more conveniently. 102
Mesić considered this an attempt to imply a physical threat; when he asked if this
signified the arrest of the state presidency, he was told that such a conjecture was
utterly without foundation. Mesić was of the opinion that this entire theatrical
production was being staged above all to put pressure on the Bosnian
representative, Bogićević, whose vote was needed in order to obtain a majority.
But as they entered, Bogićević assured Mesić that he would remain firm.
Drnovšek refused to attend the session at all, under such conditions.
Kadijević’s proposals were: to proclaim a state of emergency in the entire
country, to place the army in a state of combat readiness, to concede all police
powers to the army, and to abolish all legislative acts which were incompatible
with the federal constitution. 103 According to Mesić, this was a demand for a free
hand for a comprehensive attack on at least Croatia. In spite of all endeavors to