Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise - Indymedia

UNWANTED INDEPENDENCE 193
elections, Karadžić said that the conditions had now been established for the
three national parties, as the legitimate representatives of their respective peoples,
to reach an agreement better and more effectively than the previous authorities
could. 44 The apportionment of mandates rather closely followed the
corresponding “national key”. There were cities where the Reform Communists
and the League of Reform Forces worked together especially closely, such as
Prijedor and Tuzla. 45 In both of the houses of parliament, the “Party of
Democratic Action” received 86 mandates, while the Serbian Democratic Party
obtained 72 mandates, the Croatian Democratic Community 44, the Reform
Communists and their affiliates 14, and Marković’s party 12. 46
Almost more interesting were the ad personam elections in the seven-member
republic presidium. In the general elections, two representatives were elected to
this body by each of the three nations, with a seventh member being chosen to
represent all “others”. Among the Muslim candidates, Fikret Abdić had received
48 per cent of the popular vote, well ahead of Izetbegović, who had to be
satisfied with 40 per cent. It was nonetheless agreed that Abdić would remain in
his “Agrokomerc” and that Izetbegović would become president of the presidium.
Among the Croatian candidates, Kljuić had received more than 21 per cent of the
votes, somewhat more than the proportion of Croats in Bosnia. It is noteworthy
that the candidates of the Serbs received fewer votes than would have
corresponded to the Serbian share of the population. Biljana Plavšić, a radical, a
biologist by profession, received 26 per cent of the vote, while Nikola Koljević, a
jurist, received 25 per cent. Could it be that not all Serbs supported the radical
line of their leaders The answer is not known for sure even today. Muslim Ejup
Ganić competed as a “Yugoslav” representing “other nationalities”, and received
32 per cent of the vote. He later served as vice president of the Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 47
One could also read the regional divisions in the electoral results. Bihać,
Sarajevo, Zenica, and Tuzla presented themselves unambiguously as Muslim
centers, Banja Luka and the area around Doboj as Serbian strongholds, and
Mostar and western Herzegovina as the Croatian center of gravity in the new
state. The formation of the government unfolded without complications, even if
it was clear that the government in Sarajevo, together with the state presidium,
would operate as a coalition of national representatives, rather than as an efficient
and supranational body. Even then, there was concern that the national
representatives in each province were behaving rather independently. That was
true not only for the Serbs in Banja Luka but also for the Croats of western
Herzegovina and even for the Muslims in their bastions.
Some authors reproached all the Bosnian politicians, including Izetbegović,
for having established their politics on an ethnic/national foundation, rather than
on a democratic basis representing political or economic interests. By this, they
had allegedly brought about the “death of Bosnia”. 48 This argument is unrealistic.
During the entire history of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was always the nation, even
if understood on a religious basis, which constituted the most decisive category of