Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise - Indymedia

228 THE TRAGEDY OF THE WEST
In these days a second argument began to be heard in favor of recognition,
alongside the abovementioned question of the use of force. It was, rather
obviously, Serbia which had intentionally refused to negotiate. Federal
Chancellor Helmut Kohl brought this argument before the Bundestag for the first
time on 27 November. The recognition of the Yugoslav republics who wanted
this, he said, could not be put off through a blockade of negotiations. German
policy-makers now found it necessary to set a deadline for recognition. Kohl said
that this should be accomplished “before Christmas”. The Badinter Commission
supported this standpoint insofar as it established, in its first decision (on 7
December 1991), that Yugoslavia found itself “in the process of dissolution”.
The republics would carry over the problems connected with state succession and
solve them “in accord with the procedures of international law”. 92 How could the
Yugoslav republics manage this, Slovenian President Kučan asked, as long as
they were not recognized as subjects of international law
Before the EC ministers could decide definitely about recognition, they
engaged, following the initiative of Britain and France, in a doubtful endeavor. As
a response to Serbia’s destruction of Lord Carrington’s efforts at negotiation,
they imposed “sanctions”, not only on the responsible republics, Serbia and
Montenegro, but on all the Yugoslav successor states, thus also on Slovenia and
Croatia. These sanctions consisted in essence of the suspension of the agreement
reached earlier between the EC and Yugoslavia concerning trade and
cooperation. Indeed, the ministers declared that they would be happy to lift these
sanctions against republics which showed themselves “ready to cooperate”, only
they took their time about it. Then, well past the turn of the year, the trade
agreement at least was reinstated for Croatia and Slovenia, but even here some
EC states, among them France and Belgium, tried to push through some
limitations to the earlier agreement with Yugoslavia.
When I spoke with Slovenian President Kučan at the end of November 1991,
he had tough words about the EC’s behavior. 93 The constant postponement of
international recognition of Slovenia had brought the republic into an
unendurable situation, he said; it was hindering political and economic
consolidation, creating security problems, and endangering democratic
development. The EC sanctions hurt export-intensive Slovenia, not blameworthy
Serbia, most of all. Slovenia did not want to gain advantages at Croatia’s
expense, but if the EC had problems with the recognition of Croatia, then
Slovenia should not suffer as a result. Kučan also complained that the EC and the
rest of the Western community of states not only tolerated, but even cooperated,
in Serbian endeavors to obstruct air traffic to and from Slovenia and Croatia. As
for the dispatch of UN peacekeeping troops to Croatia, one should not always
leave the initiative to Milošević. As long as Croatia was requesting such troops,
nothing happened; now that Serbia had also demanded this, in order to use the
UN presence to consolidate its own military conquests, the international
community gave in to the demand.